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AEHR, Aehr Test Systems
Test solutions enables Aehr the unique ability to deliver wafer level test and burn-in and package part burn-in for AI accelerators, GPUs, and high-performance computing processors.
We are a leading provider of test solutions for testing, burning-in, and stabilizing semiconductor devices in wafer level, singulated die, and package part form, and have installed thousands of systems worldwide.
The trend is driving additional test requirements, incremental capacity needs, and new opportunities for Aehr Test products and solutions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Contactors (52%), Systems (37%) and Services (10%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 21% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −12%) on a 38% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 37% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −13%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Contactors at 52%.
- Contactors52%$31M
- Systems37%$22M
- Services10%$6M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMFeb 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $15M | $19M | $30M | $21M | $22M | $17M | $51M | $65M | $66M | $59M | $45M | RevenueRevenue |
| 35% | 36% | 42% | 36% | 38% | 36% | 47% | 50% | 49% | 41% | 31% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 48% | 37% | 25% | 37% | 34% | 40% | 20% | 19% | 21% | 31% | 39% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 30% | 25% | 14% | 20% | 15% | 22% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 18% | 26% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($6M) | ($5M) | $915K | ($5M) | ($3M) | ($4M) | $8M | $13M | $10M | ($6M) | ($16M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −42.4% | −26.1% | 3.1% | −23.7% | −12.4% | −25.2% | 15.3% | 20.6% | 15.2% | −9.6% | −35.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($7M) | ($6M) | $528K | ($5M) | ($3M) | ($2M) | $9M | $15M | $33M | ($4M) | ($11M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($6M) | ($4M) | ($1M) | ($6M) | ($2M) | ($3M) | $2M | $10M | $2M | ($7M) | ($7M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $203K | $271K | $417K | $431K | $384K | $328K | $356K | $450K | $657K | $2M | $3M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($715K) | ($112K) | ($3M) | ($2M) | ($516K) | ($2M) | ($11M) | ($8M) | ($35M) | ($11M) | ($5M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $919K | $477K | $572K | $173K | $163K | $227K | $416K | $1M | $749K | $5M | $5M | CapexCapex |
| 6.3% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 1.4% | 0.8% | 2.1% | 1.1% | 8.5% | 10.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($6M) | ($5M) | ($2M) | ($6M) | ($2M) | ($3M) | $1M | $10M | $1M | ($10M) | ($10M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −44.7% | −25.2% | −6.0% | −27.6% | −9.8% | −17.6% | 2.1% | 14.7% | 1.5% | −16.5% | −22.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($7M) | ($5M) | ($2M) | ($6M) | ($2M) | ($3M) | $1M | $9M | $1M | ($12M) | ($12M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −49.7% | −26.3% | −6.5% | −27.6% | −9.8% | −17.6% | 2.1% | 13.3% | 1.5% | −21.0% | −26.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $11M | $2M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| -113% | -76% | 11% | -39% | -21% | -39% | 40% | 29% | 16% | -5% | -13% | ROICROIC |
| — | -34% | 3% | -34% | -20% | -18% | 19% | 19% | 30% | -3% | -8% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −34% | 3% | −34% | −20% | −18% | 19% | 19% | 30% | −3% | −8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $939K | $18M | $17M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $31M | $48M | $49M | $25M | $37M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $522K | $4M | $3M | $5M | $4M | $5M | $13M | $17M | $10M | $14M | $12M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $7M | $7M | $9M | $9M | $8M | $9M | $15M | $24M | $37M | $42M | $41M | InventoryInvent. |
| $1M | $3M | $2M | $2M | $945K | $3M | $4M | $9M | $5M | $7M | $2M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $6M | $8M | $10M | $12M | $11M | $11M | $24M | $31M | $42M | $49M | $51M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $9M | $29M | $29M | $20M | $18M | $19M | $60M | $89M | $98M | $89M | $96M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $5M | $8M | $11M | $6M | $4M | $9M | $11M | $16M | $11M | $16M | $9M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 3.7× | 2.6× | 3.6× | 4.6× | 2.1× | 5.4× | 5.5× | 9.3× | 5.7× | 11.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $11M | $11M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $10M | $31M | $31M | $21M | $21M | $22M | $62M | $98M | $128M | $149M | $157M | Total assetsAssets |
| $6M | $6M | $6M | $0 | $2M | $2M | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| $5M | ($12M) | ($11M) | ($5M) | ($4M) | ($3M) | ($31M) | — | — | — | ($37M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -10.2× | -7.3× | 2.3× | -19.8× | — | — | — | — | — | — | -64.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($703K) | $17M | $19M | $15M | $14M | $11M | $51M | $76M | $112M | $123M | $139M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 7.0% | 5.3% | 3.4% | 4.3% | 4.1% | 6.6% | 5.9% | 4.2% | 3.8% | 8.8% | 14.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 13.1M | 16.3M | 22.8M | 22.4M | 22.9M | 23.5M | 27.8M | 29.2M | 29.6M | 29.6M | 30.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.11 | $1.16 | $1.30 | $0.94 | $0.97 | $0.71 | $1.83 | $2.22 | $2.24 | $1.99 | $1.50 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.52 | $-0.35 | $0.02 | $-0.23 | $-0.12 | $-0.09 | $0.34 | $0.50 | $1.12 | $-0.13 | $-0.38 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.50 | $-0.29 | $-0.08 | $-0.26 | $-0.10 | $-0.12 | $0.04 | $0.33 | $0.03 | $-0.33 | $-0.34 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.55 | $-0.31 | $-0.08 | $-0.26 | $-0.10 | $-0.12 | $0.04 | $0.30 | $0.03 | $-0.42 | $-0.40 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.07 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.05 | $0.03 | $0.17 | $0.16 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.05 | $1.03 | $0.85 | $0.69 | $0.61 | $0.49 | $1.84 | $2.59 | $3.77 | $4.15 | $4.59 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.4 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.7%/yr | +15.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +10.2%/yr | +88.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +46.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($10M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2M it takes just to hold its position. It put $3M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($12M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($4M) | $33M | $15M | $9M | ($2M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2M | +$657K | +$450K | +$356K | +$328K |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$5M | +$3M | +$3M | +$3M | +$1M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$11M | −$35M | −$8M | −$11M | −$2M |
| Cash from operations | ($7M) | $2M | $10M | $2M | ($3M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2M | −$749K | −$450K | −$416K | −$227K |
| Owner earnings | ($10M) | $1M | $10M | $1M | ($3M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$3M | — | −$912K | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ($12M) | $1M | $9M | $1M | ($3M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -16% | 2% | 15% | 2% | -18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $3M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer ($15M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -22.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($6M) ÷ interest expense $252K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $25M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $25M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 88 + DIO 438 − DPO 70 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -113%–40%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($4M) ÷ invested capital $98MIndustry peers: median -28%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -45%–15%; latest ($10M) = operating cash ($7M) − maintenance capex $2MIndustry peers: median -25%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -16% of revenue this year, a -16% median across 10 years. It chose to put $3M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($12M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves ($15M).
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($4M) · cash from operations ($7M)
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips on it. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.16×ExpandingCapex $5M ÷ depreciation $2M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $59M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 5.68×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $73M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.46/share (latest year $-0.12), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.91/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −22% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −22% early to 9% lately, median −12% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Worst year 2016 · −42.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“We are exposed to risks related to the use of artificial intelligence by us and our competitors.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Feb 27, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$37M
- Receivables$12M
- Inventory$41M
- Other current assets$6M
- Accounts payable$2M
- Other current liabilities$7M
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Erickson | $1.7M | $6.9M | $10M |
| 2024 | Mr. Erickson | $1.4M | −$928k | $1M |
| 2025 | Mr. Erickson | $3.4M | $2.3M | ($10M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership6.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$5M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 9% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Aehr Test Systems is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?-0.53×
Across the record the business reported $31M of net income but generated ($17M) of operating cash, a -0.53-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?52% → 117% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $8M to $53M while revenue grew 212%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (52% of revenue then, 117% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$35M · 77% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Revenues from the Company's five largest customers accounted for approximately 77%, 93%, and 97% of its net revenues in fiscal 2025, 2024, and 2023, respectively.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductor Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LABStandard BioTools Inc. | $85M | 50% | -63.7% | -28% | -43% |
| FOCLEDAP TMS S.A. | $71M | 43% | -35.0% | -115% | -25% |
| FEIMFrequency Electronics Inc. | $63M | 26% | -8.6% | -6% | 2% |
| APTAlpha Pro Tech Ltd. | $59M | 38% | 6.7% | 9% | 6% |
| AEHRAehr Test Systems | $59M | 39% | -11.0% | -13% | -13% |
| SSIISS Innovations International Inc. | $42M | 27% | -149.0% | -86% | -156% |
| EYPTEyePoint Inc. | $31M | — | -243.5% | -161% | -276% |
| OPTXSyntec Optics Holdings Inc. | $28M | 23% | -1.9% | -3% | 1% |
| Group median | — | 38% | -23.0% | -20% | -19% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Aehr Test Systems has delivered.
Aehr Test Systems’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($12M) on 31M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-01; net cash $37M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5M) runs well above depreciation ($3M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($10M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← AEE its page in the Manual AEIS →
Industry order: ← ACMR the Semiconductor Equipment chapter ASML →