Owner Scorecard


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AVT, Avnet Inc.

Avnet, Inc. and its consolidated subsidiaries, is a leading global electronic component technology distributor and solutions provider that has served customers' evolving needs for more than a century.

Avnet serves a wide range of customers: from startups and mid-sized businesses to enterprise-level original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs"), electronic manufacturing services ("EMS") providers, and original design manufacturers ("ODMs").

Regional divisions ("business units") within each operating group serve primarily as sales and marketing units to streamline sales efforts and enhance each operating group's ability to work with its customers and suppliers, generally along more specific geographies or product lines.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AVT · Avnet Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$22.2B
−6.6% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $25.0B 5-yr avg $23.3B
Gross margin 10% 5-yr avg 12%
Operating margin 2.3% 5-yr avg 3.1%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 0%
Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 12% and operating margin about 2.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −0.0% to 4.5% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$17.4B$19.0B$19.5B$17.6B$19.5B$24.3B$26.5B$23.8B$22.2B$25.0BRevenueRevenue
14%13%13%12%11%12%12%12%11%10%Gross marginGross mgn
10%10%10%10%10%8%7%8%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$444M$209M$366M($5M)$281M$939M$1.2B$844M$514M$567MOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.5%1.1%1.9%−0.0%1.4%3.9%4.5%3.6%2.3%2.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$525M($156M)$176M($31M)$193M$692M$771M$499M$240M$214MNet incomeNet inc.
8%25%17%22%21%4%32%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($369M)$253M$535M$730M$91M($219M)($714M)$690M$725M$149MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$155M$235M$181M$182M$132M$102M$89M$87M$72M$73MDepreciationDeprec.
($1.1B)$151M$148M$552M($263M)($1.1B)($1.6B)$71M$376M($179M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$120M$156M$123M$74M$50M$49M$195M$226M$147M$116MCapexCapex
0.7%0.8%0.6%0.4%0.3%0.2%0.7%1.0%0.7%0.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($489M)$98M$412M$657M$41M($268M)($802M)$603M$653M$77MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−2.8%0.5%2.1%3.7%0.2%−1.1%−3.0%2.5%2.9%0.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($489M)$98M$412M$657M$41M($268M)($908M)$464M$577M$33MFree cash flowFCF
−2.8%0.5%2.1%3.7%0.2%−1.1%−3.4%2.0%2.6%0.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$803M$15M$56M$52M$18M$18MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$89M$88M$87M$84M$84M$98M$106M$112M$113M$113MDividends paidDiv. paid
$276M$324M$569M$238M$184M$222M$163M$303MBuybacksBuybacks
7%2%5%-0%6%14%12%9%7%5%ROICROIC
10%-3%4%-1%5%17%16%10%5%4%Return on equityROE
8%−5%2%−3%3%14%14%8%3%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$836M$621M$546M$477M$200M$154M$288M$311M$192M$202MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.3B$3.6B$3.2B$2.9B$3.6B$4.3B$4.8B$4.4B$4.3B$5.5BReceivablesReceiv.
$2.8B$3.1B$3.0B$2.7B$3.2B$4.2B$5.5B$5.5B$5.2B$5.5BInventoryInvent.
$1.9B$2.3B$1.9B$1.8B$2.4B$3.4B$3.4B$3.3B$3.5B$4.6BAccounts payablePayables
$4.3B$4.5B$4.3B$3.9B$4.4B$5.1B$6.9B$6.5B$6.1B$6.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$7.5B$7.6B$6.9B$6.3B$7.2B$8.9B$10.8B$10.4B$10.0B$11.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.5B$3.0B$2.6B$2.3B$3.1B$4.3B$4.2B$4.5B$4.1B$5.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.1×2.6×2.7×2.8×2.3×2.1×2.5×2.3×2.4×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.1B$981M$877M$774M$838M$759M$781M$781M$837M$817MGoodwillGoodwill
$9.7B$9.6B$8.6B$8.1B$8.9B$10.4B$12.5B$12.2B$12.1B$13.5BTotal assetsAssets
$1.8B$1.7B$1.7B$1.4B$1.2B$1.6B$3.1B$2.9B$2.7B$2.9BTotal debtDebt
$944M$1.0B$1.2B$948M$1.0B$1.5B$2.8B$2.6B$2.5B$2.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.5×2.3×2.7×-0.0×3.1×9.4×4.7×3.0×2.1×2.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.2B$4.7B$4.1B$3.7B$4.1B$4.2B$4.8B$4.9B$5.0B$5.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.1%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$181M$137M$119M$119MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
129M120M111M100M100M99.8M93.4M91.8M87.4M83.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$135.56$158.76$176.16$175.51$195.02$243.55$284.22$258.69$253.98$299.25Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.08$-1.30$1.59$-0.31$1.93$6.94$8.26$5.43$2.75$2.56EPS (diluted)EPS
$-3.80$0.81$3.72$6.54$0.41$-2.69$-8.59$6.57$7.47$0.92Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.80$0.81$3.72$6.54$0.41$-2.69$-9.73$5.05$6.60$0.39Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.69$0.74$0.79$0.84$0.84$0.99$1.14$1.22$1.30$1.36Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.94$1.30$1.11$0.73$0.50$0.49$2.09$2.47$1.69$1.40Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$40.28$39.07$37.37$37.09$40.77$42.00$50.89$53.63$57.33$59.40Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.2%/yr+7.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+2.7%/yr
EPS−4.8%/yr
Dividends / share+8.2%/yr+9.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.6%/yr+18.2%/yr
Book value / share+4.5%/yr+9.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-6.6%
    “Sales in constant currency decreased 6.7% year over year, reflecting a reduction in sales volume primarily due to the lower demand for electronic components.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
87Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
7%low FY2020
Gross margin
11%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.8×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$653Mowner earningsvs.$240Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $653M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $72M it takes just to hold its position. It put $76M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $577M.

Reported net income$240M
Owner earnings$653M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$240M$499M$771M$692M$193M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$72M+$87M+$89M+$102M+$132M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$36M+$33M+$39M+$37M+$29M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$376M+$71M−$1.6B−$1.1B−$263M
Cash from operations$725M$690M($714M)($219M)$91M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$72M−$87M−$89M−$49M−$50M
Owner earnings$653M$603M($802M)($268M)$41M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$76M−$140M−$106M
Free cash flow$577M$464M($908M)($268M)$41M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%3%-3%-1%0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $72M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $76M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $36M), owner earnings is nearer $616M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $514M ÷ interest expense $246M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.5B · 4.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $192M − debt $2.7B
    What this means

    Netting $192M of cash and short-term investments against $2.7B of debt leaves $2.5B owed, about 4.8× a year's operating profit (5.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 71 + DIO 96 − DPO 64 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -0%–14%; 7% latest = NOPAT $493M ÷ invested capital $7.5B
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -3%–4%; latest $653M = operating cash $725M − maintenance capex $72M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $36M of SBC) leaves $616M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $725M ÷ net income $240M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $417M ÷ Owner Earnings $653M
    What this means

    Of $653M Owner Earnings, $417M (64%) went back to shareholders, $113M dividends, $303M buybacks. Net of $36M stock comp, the real buyback was about $267M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.06×
    Expanding
    Capex $147M ÷ depreciation $72M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $22.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.43×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.7B vs $5.9B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +177%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.14/share (latest year $2.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $61.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 3% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 24%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Worst year 2020 · −0.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −4.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“The market for the Company's products and services is very competitive and subject to technological advances (including artificial intelligence), new competitors, non-traditional competitors, and changes in industry standards.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$11.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$202M
  • Receivables$5.5B
  • Inventory$5.5B
  • Other current assets$218M
Current liabilities$5.7B
  • Debt due within a year$470M
  • Accounts payable$4.6B
  • Other current liabilities$567M
Current ratio2.01×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.05×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$5.7Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$470M due · $202M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+33.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 2.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$2.8BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.2B$230M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$553M
'27$0
'28$500M
'29$0
'30$0
later$622M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$553Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$553Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$553Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 28, 2026$202M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$653M
Together, against $553M due next year1.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $855M against the $553M due in the twelve months after the Jun 28, 2025 schedule: 1.5 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Jun 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$1.1B · 66%
  • Dividends$862M · 50%
  • Buybacks$2.3B · 132%
  • Returned to owners$3.1B

    348% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $862M as dividends and $2.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$2.6B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $2.6B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.8B to $2.9B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $634M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$43.48

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 52M shares were bought for $2.3B, about $43.48 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $39.23 (2022) to $51.44 (2025); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $44.09 ($569M).

  • Net change in share count−35.2%

    The diluted count fell from 129M to 83M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.30/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$844M7% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity17%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$944Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

$438M written down across 3 years (2018, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 46% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Phil Gallagher$6.2M$8.6M$41M
2021Phil Gallagher$2.9M$377k$41M
2022Phil Gallagher$8.1M$9.9M($268M)
2023Phil Gallagher$9.7M$13.4M($802M)
2024Phil Gallagher$8.8M$5.5M$603M
2025Phil Gallagher$9.9M$6.6M$653M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio221:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$36M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Avnet Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.59×

    Across the record the business reported $2.9B of net income but generated $1.7B of operating cash, a 0.59-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trading Companies & Distributors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ARWArrow Electronics Inc.$30.9B12%3.6%10%1%
FERGFerguson Enterprises$30.8B31%8.9%21%5%
GPCGenuine Parts Company$24.3B35%7.1%15%5%
WCCWESCO Intl$23.5B20%4.5%8%2%
AVTAvnet Inc.$22.2B12%2.3%7%1%
GWWW.W. Grainger Inc.$17.9B39%11.9%29%8%
TELTE Connectivity plc$17.3B33%16.3%15%13%
RSReliance Inc.$14.3B29%8.3%11%7%
Group median30%7.7%13%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Avnet Inc. has delivered.

Avnet Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Avnet Inc. earns about $114M on its 0.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+24%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $33M on 82M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-25; net debt $2.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($116M) runs well above depreciation ($73M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $78M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Avnet Inc. (AVT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AVT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AVR its page in the Manual AVTR →

Industry order: ← ARW the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter BCC →