Share count
53Mpeak FY2017
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RS, Reliance Inc.
Steel capital-intensive
We distribute a full line of over 100,000 metal products, including alloy, aluminum, brass, copper, carbon steel, stainless steel, titanium and other specialty steel products.
We have been in business over 85 years since our original organization on February 3, 1939, operating a single metals service center in Los Angeles, California fabricating steel reinforcing bar.
We are not dependent on any particular customer or industry because we process and distribute a broad variety of metals.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$14.3B
+3.3% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $14.8B 5-yr avg $14.8B
Gross margin 44%
Revenue $4.0B +15.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 9.1% yr-ago 7.9%
Net income $266M yr-ago $201M
Net margin 6.6% yr-ago 5.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Carbon steel (55%) and Aluminum (17%), with 5 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 29% and operating margin about 8.1% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 6.0% to 15% — on a steadier 29% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Carbon steel at 55%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Carbon steel55%$7.9B
- Aluminum17%$2.5B
- Stainless steel14%$1.9B
- Toll processing and logistics5%$647M
- Alloy4%$641M
- Copper and brass3%$377M
- Miscellaneous2%$306M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $8.6B | $9.7B | $11.5B | $11.0B | $8.8B | $14.1B | $17.0B | $14.8B | $13.8B | $14.3B | $14.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| 30% | 29% | 28% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 44% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 21% | 20% | 18% | 19% | 21% | 16% | 15% | 17% | 19% | 20% | 19% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $518M | $662M | $938M | $1.0B | $566M | $1.9B | $2.5B | $1.7B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.0% | 6.8% | 8.1% | 9.2% | 6.4% | 13.8% | 14.7% | 11.7% | 8.4% | 7.1% | 7.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $304M | $613M | $634M | $702M | $369M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.3B | $875M | $739M | $805M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 28% | -6% | 25% | 24% | 22% | 25% | 24% | 23% | 23% | 24% | 24% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $627M | $399M | $665M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $799M | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.4B | $831M | $918M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $222M | $218M | $215M | $219M | $227M | $230M | $240M | $245M | $269M | $278M | $279M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $76M | ($466M) | ($230M) | $330M | $534M | ($915M) | ($27M) | $25M | $229M | ($242M) | ($222M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $155M | $162M | $240M | $242M | $172M | $237M | $342M | $469M | $431M | $329M | $306M | CapexCapex |
| 1.8% | 1.7% | 2.1% | 2.2% | 2.0% | 1.7% | 2.0% | 3.2% | 3.1% | 2.3% | 2.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $472M | $237M | $425M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $563M | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $503M | $612M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.5% | 2.4% | 3.7% | 9.7% | 11.4% | 4.0% | 11.0% | 9.6% | 8.4% | 3.5% | 4.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $472M | $237M | $425M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $563M | $1.8B | $1.2B | $999M | $503M | $612M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 5.5% | 2.4% | 3.7% | 9.7% | 11.4% | 4.0% | 10.4% | 8.1% | 7.2% | 3.5% | 4.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $349M | $38M | $78M | $178M | $7M | $439M | — | $24M | $365M | $3M | $3M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | $25M | $485M | $50M | $337M | $324M | $630M | $480M | $1.1B | $594M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 6% | 10% | 10% | 12% | 7% | 20% | 25% | 17% | 11% | 9% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| 7% | 13% | 14% | 13% | 7% | 23% | 26% | 17% | 12% | 10% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $123M | $154M | $128M | $174M | $684M | $301M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $318M | $217M | $250M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $960M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $926M | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| $302M | $347M | $339M | $275M | $259M | $454M | $412M | $410M | $362M | $375M | $552M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.1B | $3.3B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $3.4B | $3.6B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.7B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $4.2B | $4.9B | $4.8B | $3.9B | $4.1B | $4.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $656M | $704M | $699M | $675M | $613M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $844M | $1.2B | $848M | $1.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 4.1× | 4.3× | 4.7× | 4.5× | 5.1× | 3.9× | 3.6× | 5.7× | 3.2× | 4.9× | 4.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $7.4B | $7.8B | $8.0B | $8.1B | $8.1B | $9.5B | $10.3B | $10.5B | $10.0B | $10.4B | $10.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $1.4B | $980M | $1.4B | $486M | $71M | $824M | $1.2B | $1.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 6.1× | 9.0× | 10.9× | 11.9× | 9.0× | 31.1× | 40.2× | 43.4× | 28.8× | 18.2× | 18.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $4.1B | $4.7B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $5.1B | $6.1B | $7.1B | $7.7B | $7.2B | $7.2B | $7.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 73.1M | 73.5M | 72.4M | 67.9M | 65.3M | 64.3M | 61.5M | 59.0M | 56.2M | 52.9M | 52.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $117.80 | $132.19 | $159.23 | $161.72 | $135.02 | $219.09 | $276.85 | $250.88 | $245.97 | $270.34 | $285.44 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.16 | $8.34 | $8.75 | $10.34 | $5.66 | $21.97 | $29.92 | $22.64 | $15.56 | $13.98 | $15.48 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $6.45 | $3.23 | $5.86 | $15.61 | $15.34 | $8.75 | $30.55 | $24.16 | $20.64 | $9.50 | $11.78 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $6.45 | $3.23 | $5.86 | $15.61 | $15.34 | $8.75 | $28.89 | $20.38 | $17.76 | $9.50 | $11.78 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $2.12 | $2.20 | $3.31 | $3.57 | $2.64 | $3.68 | $5.56 | $7.94 | $7.66 | $6.22 | $5.89 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $56.74 | $63.46 | $64.49 | $76.73 | $78.38 | $94.62 | $115.25 | $130.85 | $128.36 | $135.60 | $137.05 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.7%/yr | +14.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +4.4%/yr | −9.1%/yr |
| EPS | +14.4%/yr | +19.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +12.7%/yr | +18.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +10.2%/yr | +11.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
9%low FY2016
Gross margin
28%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.4×peak FY2017
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$503Mowner earningsvs.$739Mnet incomelow FY2017
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $739M of profit but $503M of owner earnings: $237M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $739M | $875M | $1.3B | $1.8B | $1.4B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$278M | +$269M | +$245M | +$240M | +$230M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$56M | +$57M | +$65M | +$65M | +$71M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$242M | +$229M | +$25M | −$27M | −$915M |
| Cash from operations | $831M | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $799M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$329M | −$269M | −$245M | −$240M | −$237M |
| Owner earnings | $503M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $563M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$162M | −$223M | −$102M | — |
| Free cash flow | $503M | $999M | $1.2B | $1.8B | $563M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 8% | 10% | 11% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $56M), owner earnings is nearer $447M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 18.2×ComfortableOperating income $1.0B ÷ interest expense $56M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 1.2× operating profitModest net debtCash $217M − debt $1.4B
What this means
Netting $217M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 1.2× a year's operating profit (1.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 39 + DIO 97 − DPO 17 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 6%–25%; 9% latest = NOPAT $774M ÷ invested capital $8.4BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 2%–11%; latest $503M = operating cash $831M − maintenance capex $329MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $56M of SBC) leaves $447M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $831M ÷ net income $739M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $703M ÷ Owner Earnings $503M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $503M of Owner Earnings, $703M (140%) went back to shareholders, $109M dividends, $594M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $56M stock comp, the real buyback was about $539M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.18×MaintainingCapex $329M ÷ depreciation $278M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $14.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.88×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1.4B vs $3.3B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +90%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $19.27/share (latest year $14.48), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $140.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 9% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 6.0% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −3.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$4.6B
- Cash & short-term investments$250M
- Receivables$2.0B
- Inventory$2.2B
- Other current assets$135M
Current liabilities$1.0B
- Debt due within a year$700K
- Accounts payable$552M
- Other current liabilities$490M
Current ratio4.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.24×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$700K due · $250M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.0× → 4.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$896MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$336M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.7B (annual-report basis)
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$700Kthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$700Kthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$500Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.4Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$250M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$503M
Together, against $700K due next year1074.6×
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $752M against the $700K due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1075 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$81Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$375Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$319Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$1.4B
Lease obligations (present value)$319M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.7B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.7B, of which the leases are 18%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $11.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2.8B · 25%
- Buybacks$4.0B · 36%
- Retained (debt / cash)$4.2B · 38%
- Returned to owners$4.0B
46% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $4.0B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$166.04
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 24M shares were bought for $4.0B, about $166.04 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $79.49 (2018) to $282.98 (2024), and 2024, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($1.1B).
- Net change in share count−28.9%
The diluted count fell from 73M to 52M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained14%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($4.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $652M, so each retained $1 added about 0.14 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$3.1B30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity30%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.8B of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Karla R. Lewis | $14.2M | $47.2M | $563M |
| 2022 | Karla R. Lewis | $14.9M | $31.3M | $1.9B |
| 2023 | Karla R. Lewis | $14.3M | $23.8M | $1.4B |
| 2024 | Karla R. Lewis | $13.5M | $16.8M | $1.2B |
| 2025 | Karla R. Lewis | $13.4M | $15.6M | $503M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$56M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Reliance Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $229M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Steel
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WCCWESCO Intl | $23.5B | 20% | 4.5% | 8% | 2% |
| AVTAvnet Inc. | $22.2B | 12% | 2.3% | 7% | 1% |
| GWWW.W. Grainger Inc. | $17.9B | 39% | 11.9% | 29% | 8% |
| TELTE Connectivity plc | $17.3B | 33% | 16.3% | 15% | 13% |
| RSReliance Inc. | $14.3B | 29% | 8.3% | 11% | 7% |
| LKQLKQ Corporation | $13.7B | 39% | 8.5% | 8% | 6% |
| HSICHenry Schein Inc. | $13.2B | 31% | 6.1% | 13% | 5% |
| RYZRyerson Holding Corporation | $4.6B | 18% | 3.7% | 12% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 30% | 7.2% | 11% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Reliance Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Reliance Inc. earns about $991M on its 6.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−9%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $612M on 51M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $1.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Reliance Inc. (RS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RS, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← RRX its page in the Manual RSG →
Industry order: ← PKX the Steel chapter RYZ →