Owner Scorecard


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TEL, TE Connectivity plc

Trading Companies & Distributors capital-intensive Serial acquirer

We are a global industrial technology leader creating a safer, sustainable, productive, and connected future.

As a trusted innovation partner, our broad range of connectivity and sensor solutions enable the distribution of power, signal, and data to advance next-generation transportation, energy networks, automated factories, data centers enabling artificial intelligence, and more.

Segments Effective for fiscal 2025, we reorganized our management and segments to align the organization around our current strategy.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TEL · TE Connectivity plc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$17.3B
+8.9% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $18.7B 5-yr avg $16.1B
Gross margin 36% 5-yr avg 33%
Operating margin 19.7% 5-yr avg 16.8%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 16%
Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 15%
Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Transportation Solutions (54%) and Industrial Solutions (46%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 37% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 9 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 33% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 4 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, Transportation Solutions, is also where the profit is made: 54% of revenue and 57% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit same segments
  • Transportation Solutions54%$9.4B57% of profit
  • Industrial Solutions46%$7.9B43% of profit

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$12.2B$14.0B$13.4B$12.2B$14.9B$16.3B$16.0B$15.8B$17.3B$18.7BRevenueRevenue
34%34%33%31%33%32%32%34%35%36%Gross marginGross mgn
13%11%11%11%10%10%10%11%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%4%4%4%4%4%4%4%4%4%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$1.9B$2.3B$2.0B$537M$2.4B$2.8B$2.3B$2.8B$3.2B$3.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
15.4%16.7%14.7%4.4%16.3%16.9%14.4%17.6%18.6%19.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.7B$2.6B$1.8B($241M)$2.3B$2.4B$1.9B$3.2B$1.8B$2.9BNet incomeNet inc.
10%-1%5%11%16%42%20%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2.3B$2.5B$2.4B$2.0B$2.7B$2.5B$3.1B$3.5B$4.1B$4.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$611M$667M$690M$711M$769M$785M$794M$826M$838M$962MDepreciationDeprec.
($68M)($876M)($187M)$1.4B($448M)($864M)$305M($669M)$1.3B$380MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$679M$935M$749M$560M$690M$768M$732M$680M$936M$1.0BCapexCapex
5.6%6.7%5.6%4.6%4.6%4.7%4.6%4.3%5.4%5.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.6B$1.8B$1.7B$1.4B$2.0B$1.7B$2.4B$2.8B$3.2B$3.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.5%12.8%12.4%11.8%13.3%10.4%15.0%17.7%18.6%18.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.6B$1.5B$1.7B$1.4B$2.0B$1.7B$2.4B$2.8B$3.2B$3.4BFree cash flowFCF
13.5%10.8%12.4%11.8%13.3%10.4%15.0%17.7%18.6%18.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$250M$153M$283M$339M$423M$220M$110M$339M$2.6B$2.5BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$546M$588M$608M$625M$647M$685M$725M$760M$803M$838MDividends paidDiv. paid
$614M$879M$1.1B$523M$831M$1.4B$945M$2.1B$1.3BBuybacksBuybacks
13%17%15%2%17%18%14%18%11%17%ROICROIC
17%24%17%-3%21%22%17%26%15%22%Return on equityROE
12%18%12%−9%15%16%10%20%8%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.2B$848M$927M$945M$1.2B$1.1B$1.7B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.1B$2.4B$2.3B$2.4B$2.9B$2.9B$3.0B$3.1B$3.4B$3.5BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.6B$1.9B$1.8B$1.9B$2.5B$2.7B$2.6B$2.5B$2.7B$3.0BInventoryInvent.
$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.3B$1.9B$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2BAccounts payablePayables
$2.4B$2.7B$2.8B$3.1B$3.5B$3.9B$4.0B$3.8B$4.1B$4.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$5.9B$6.2B$5.6B$5.8B$7.3B$7.3B$7.9B$7.6B$8.0B$8.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$3.8B$4.4B$3.5B$3.7B$4.7B$4.6B$4.5B$4.7B$5.1B$4.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.4×1.6×1.6×1.6×1.6×1.8×1.6×1.6×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.7B$5.7B$5.7B$5.2B$5.6B$5.3B$5.5B$5.8B$7.1B$7.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$19.4B$20.4B$19.7B$19.2B$21.5B$20.8B$21.7B$22.9B$25.1B$25.7BTotal assetsAssets
$4.3B$4.0B$4.0B$4.1B$4.1B$4.2B$4.2B$4.2B$5.7B$5.7BTotal debtDebt
$3.1B$3.2B$3.0B$3.2B$2.9B$3.1B$2.5B$2.9B$4.4B$4.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
14.4×21.8×29.1×11.2×43.5×41.8×28.8×39.9×41.7×31.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$9.8B$10.8B$10.6B$9.4B$10.6B$10.8B$11.6B$12.4B$12.6B$13.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.8%0.8%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
358M353M340M332M333M325M317M309M299M296MShares out (diluted)Shares
$34.04$39.63$39.55$36.66$44.81$50.10$50.58$51.28$57.73$63.16Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.70$7.27$5.42$-0.73$6.79$7.47$6.03$10.33$6.16$9.82EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.59$5.05$4.92$4.31$5.96$5.23$7.57$9.05$10.71$11.46Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.59$4.29$4.92$4.31$5.96$5.23$7.57$9.05$10.71$11.46Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.53$1.67$1.79$1.88$1.94$2.11$2.29$2.46$2.69$2.83Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.90$2.65$2.20$1.69$2.07$2.36$2.31$2.20$3.13$3.48Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$27.24$30.68$31.09$28.26$31.93$33.24$36.44$39.98$42.09$44.71Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.8%/yr+9.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+11.2%/yr+20.0%/yr
EPS+3.4%/yr
Dividends / share+7.3%/yr+7.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.5%/yr+13.2%/yr
Book value / share+5.6%/yr+8.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
299Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
11%low FY2020
Gross margin
35%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.4×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.2Bowner earningsvs.$1.8Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.8B of profit into $3.2B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.8B
Owner earnings$3.2B · 19% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.8B$3.2B$1.9B$2.4B$2.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$838M+$826M+$794M+$785M+$769M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$149M+$127M+$123M+$119M+$94M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1.3B−$669M+$305M−$864M−$448M
Cash from operations$4.1B$3.5B$3.1B$2.5B$2.7B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$936M−$680M−$732M−$768M−$690M
Owner earnings$3.2B$2.8B$2.4B$1.7B$2.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue19%18%15%10%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $149M), owner earnings is nearer $3.1B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $3.2B ÷ interest expense $77M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.4B · 1.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $1.3B − debt $5.7B
    What this means

    Netting $1.3B of cash and short-term investments against $5.7B of debt leaves $4.4B owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (1.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 72 + DIO 88 − DPO 66 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 2%–18%; 11% latest = NOPAT $1.8B ÷ invested capital $17.0B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 10%–19%; latest $3.2B = operating cash $4.1B − maintenance capex $936M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $149M of SBC) leaves $3.1B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $4.1B ÷ net income $1.8B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $2.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.2B
    What this means

    Of $3.2B Owner Earnings, $2.1B (67%) went back to shareholders, $803M dividends, $1.3B buybacks. Net of $149M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.2B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.12×
    Maintaining
    Capex $936M ÷ depreciation $838M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $17.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.7B vs $2.8B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +14%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.93/share (latest year $6.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $43.11/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 17% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 16% early, 17% lately, median 16%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 4.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our organic net sales by industry end market were as follows: Digital data networks —Our organic net sales increased 10.2% in fiscal 2024 due to growth in AI applications, partially offset by reduced demand resulting from inventory corrections in the supply chain in the first half of the year .…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 27, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
  • Receivables$3.5B
  • Inventory$3.0B
  • Other current assets$682M
Current liabilities$4.4B
  • Debt due within a year$102M
  • Accounts payable$2.2B
  • Other current liabilities$2.0B
Current ratio1.89×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.20×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.25×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.9Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$102M due · $1.1B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 27, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.1B$491M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$115Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$852M
'27$402M
'28$585M
'29$643M
'30$350M
later$2.9B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$852Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$1.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$852Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$5.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 27, 2026$1.1B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.2B
Together, against $852M due next year5.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 27, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $4.3B against the $852M due in the twelve months after the Sep 26, 2025 schedule: 5.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 26, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $25.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$6.7B · 27%
  • Dividends$6.0B · 24%
  • Buybacks$9.7B · 39%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.7B · 11%
  • Returned to owners$15.7B

    84% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $6.0B as dividends and $9.7B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$91.58

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 43M shares were bought for $3.9B, about $91.58 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $76.75 (2017) to $118.71 (2021); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $90.92 ($1.1B).

  • Net change in share count−17.3%

    The diluted count fell from 358M to 296M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.69/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained61%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.1B, so each retained $1 added about 0.61 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$9.4B37% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity57%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$4.7Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $6.7B of capital spent building

$900M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 19% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Terrence Curtin$14.7M$45.4M$2.0B
2022Terrence Curtin$15.9M$3.8M$1.7B
2023Terrence Curtin$16.7M$21.8M$2.4B
2024Terrence Curtin$16.8M$27.1M$2.8B
2025Terrence Curtin$18.3M$66.6M$3.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • CEO pay ratio621:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$149M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TE Connectivity plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trading Companies & Distributors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ARWArrow Electronics Inc.$30.9B12%3.6%10%1%
WCCWESCO Intl$23.5B20%4.5%8%2%
AVTAvnet Inc.$22.2B12%2.3%7%1%
GWWW.W. Grainger Inc.$17.9B39%11.9%29%8%
TELTE Connectivity plc$17.3B33%16.3%15%13%
RSReliance Inc.$14.3B29%8.3%11%7%
LKQLKQ Corporation$13.7B39%8.5%8%6%
HSICHenry Schein Inc.$13.2B31%6.1%13%5%
Group median30%7.2%10%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TE Connectivity plc has delivered.

TE Connectivity plc’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, TE Connectivity plc earns about $2.3B on its 13.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3.4B on 292M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net debt $4.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TE Connectivity plc (TEL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TEL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TECH its page in the Manual TEM →

Industry order: ← SUNB the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter TSCO →