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BBW, Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc.

Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc. build-A-Bear's pop-culture appeal plays a key role in expanding our total addressable market beyond children to teens and adults with sports licensing, collectible and gifting offerings, as well as to categories beyond plush.

A Bear has evolved to become a leading global "retailtainment" brand on a mission to add a little more heart to life.

Beyond its signature retail experience, our brand also offers pre stuffed plush, gifting, partnerships with best in class licensed and collectible characters, and original storytelling through Build A Bear Entertainment, LLC.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

BBW · Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$530M

+6.7% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $527M 5-yr avg $478M

Gross margin 57% 5-yr avg 54%

Operating margin 34.7% 5-yr avg 13.1%

ROIC 106% 5-yr avg 58%

Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Direct to Consumer (92%) and Commercial (7%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 53% and operating margin about 4.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −7.9% and 14% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 34%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Direct to Consumer is 92% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026

Direct to Consumer92%$486M
Commercial7%$39M
International Franchising1%$5M

By geographyNorth America85%Europe14%Other Geographic Region1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMay 2026
											Income statement
$378M	$358M	$337M	$339M	$255M	$412M	$468M	$486M	$496M	$530M	$527M	RevenueRevenue
—	47%	41%	45%	38%	53%	53%	54%	55%	56%	57%	Gross marginGross mgn
42%	43%	47%	45%	46%	41%	39%	41%	42%	43%	44%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$18M	$14M	($19M)	$2M	($20M)	$51M	$62M	$66M	$67M	$67M	$183M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.7%	3.9%	−5.5%	0.5%	−7.9%	12.3%	13.2%	13.6%	13.5%	12.7%	34.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$27M	$8M	($18M)	$261K	($23M)	$47M	$48M	$53M	$52M	$52M	$55M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	43%	—	—	—	7%	23%	20%	23%	22%	23%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$32M	$21M	$10M	$22M	$13M	$28M	$47M	$64M	$47M	$65M	$58M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$16M	$16M	$16M	$14M	$13M	$12M	$12M	$14M	$15M	$15M	$15M	DepreciationDeprec.
($14M)	($6M)	$8M	$5M	$22M	($34M)	($16M)	($4M)	($22M)	($5M)	($14M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$22M	$18M	$11M	$12M	$5M	$8M	$14M	$18M	$19M	$26M	$30M	CapexCapex
5.9%	5.0%	3.3%	3.7%	2.0%	2.0%	2.9%	3.8%	3.9%	4.8%	5.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$16M	$3M	($2M)	$9M	$8M	$20M	$34M	$51M	$32M	$50M	$43M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.1%	0.9%	−0.5%	2.7%	3.3%	4.8%	7.2%	10.4%	6.5%	9.5%	8.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$10M	$3M	($2M)	$9M	$8M	$20M	$34M	$46M	$28M	$40M	$29M	Free cash flowFCF
2.5%	0.9%	−0.5%	2.7%	3.3%	4.8%	7.2%	9.5%	5.6%	7.5%	5.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	$0	$20M	$292K	$22M	$11M	$12M	$11M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$26M	$4M	$2M	—	$0	$4M	$24M	$21M	$31M	$28M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
27%	10%	-19%	1%	-49%	78%	63%	62%	47%	41%	106%	ROICROIC
28%	7%	-19%	0%	-34%	50%	41%	41%	37%	34%	35%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	−34%	29%	40%	24%	29%	26%	27%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$34M	$30M	$18M	$27M	$35M	$33M	$42M	$44M	$28M	$27M	$26M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$13M	$13M	$11M	$12M	$8M	$12M	$15M	$9M	$16M	$21M	$32M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$52M	$53M	$58M	$53M	$47M	$72M	$70M	$63M	$70M	$82M	$78M	InventoryInvent.
$28M	$19M	$23M	$16M	$18M	$22M	$10M	$16M	$17M	$15M	$16M	Accounts payablePayables
$37M	$47M	$46M	$49M	$37M	$62M	$76M	$56M	$69M	$88M	$93M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$110M	$110M	$100M	$99M	$100M	$130M	$147M	$128M	$126M	$140M	$148M	Current assetsCur. assets
$83M	$70M	$56M	$86M	$89M	$97M	$101M	$84M	$79M	$91M	$97M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×	1.6×	1.8×	1.1×	1.1×	1.3×	1.5×	1.5×	1.6×	1.5×	1.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$200M	$198M	$172M	$297M	$261M	$266M	$281M	$272M	$290M	$345M	$354M	Total assetsAssets
($34M)	($30M)	($18M)	($27M)	($35M)	($33M)	($42M)	($44M)	($28M)	($27M)	($26M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$99M	$107M	$94M	$89M	$67M	$94M	$118M	$130M	$139M	$155M	$159M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	1.0%	1.0%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
16.9M	15.8M	14.6M	14.8M	14.9M	16.1M	15.2M	14.5M	13.6M	13.1M	12.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$22.39	$22.71	$23.07	$22.94	$17.11	$25.52	$30.68	$33.59	$36.44	$40.50	$41.67	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.62	$0.50	$-1.23	$0.02	$-1.54	$2.93	$3.15	$3.65	$3.80	$3.99	$4.37	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.93	$0.21	$-0.11	$0.63	$0.56	$1.24	$2.21	$3.50	$2.37	$3.83	$3.42	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.57	$0.21	$-0.11	$0.63	$0.56	$1.24	$2.21	$3.18	$2.04	$3.02	$2.29	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	$0.00	$1.24	$0.02	$1.52	$0.81	$0.88	$0.91	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.33	$1.13	$0.77	$0.84	$0.34	$0.50	$0.89	$1.26	$1.42	$1.95	$2.33	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.88	$6.81	$6.46	$6.00	$4.51	$5.81	$7.76	$8.96	$10.21	$11.85	$12.58	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	10-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.1%/yr	+18.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+15.2%/yr	+46.9%/yr
EPS	+9.4%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+3.9%/yr	+42.0%/yr
Book value / share	+7.3%/yr	+21.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

13Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

41%low FY2021

Gross margin

56%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$50Mowner earningsvs.$52Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $50M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $15M it takes just to hold its position. It put $11M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $40M.

Reported net income$52M

Owner earnings$50M · 9% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$52M	$52M	$53M	$48M	$47M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$15M	+$15M	+$14M	+$12M	+$12M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$3M	+$2M	+$2M	+$3M	+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$5M	−$22M	−$4M	−$16M	−$34M
Cash from operations	$65M	$47M	$64M	$47M	$28M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$15M	−$15M	−$14M	−$14M	−$8M
Owner earnings	$50M	$32M	$51M	$34M	$20M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$11M	−$5M	−$5M	—	—
Free cash flow	$40M	$28M	$46M	$34M	$20M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	9%	7%	10%	7%	5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $15M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $11M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer $47M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$28M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $27M + ST investments $1M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $28M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 119d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 15 + DIO 128 − DPO 24 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -15%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 9%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $50M = operating cash $65M − maintenance capex $15M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median -3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $11M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $40M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $47M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.25×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $65M ÷ net income $52M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 78%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $39M ÷ Owner Earnings $50M

What this means
Of $50M Owner Earnings, $39M (78%) went back to shareholders, $12M dividends, $28M buybacks. Net of $3M stock comp, the real buyback was about $25M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.71×

Expanding

Capex $26M ÷ depreciation $15M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $530M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.55×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +805%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.17/share (latest year $4.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 1% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 13% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
Owner earnings growth +16%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −7.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −2.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our use of artificial intelligence technologies presents operational, reputational, data security and legal risks that could adversely affect our business and financial performance, and any failure to effectively leverage artificial technologies in our business could negatively impact our customer engagement and compet…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$148M

Cash & short-term investments$26M
Receivables$32M
Inventory$78M
Other current assets$12M

Current liabilities$97M

Accounts payable$16M
Other current liabilities$81M

Current ratio1.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.72×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$51Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$159Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$126M$126M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2026

Over the record, the business generated $350M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$154M · 44%
Dividends$65M · 19%
Buybacks$140M · 40%

Returned to owners$205M
93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $65M as dividends and $140M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$25.66
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $140M, about $25.66 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $8.24 (2017) to $54.50 (2026); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $30.62 ($31M).
Net change in share count−25.1%
The diluted count fell from 17M to 13M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.88/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained93%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($41M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $39M, so each retained $1 added about 0.93 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Ms. John	$3.2M	$11.4M	$8M
2022	Ms. John	$3.8M	$7.9M	$20M
2023	Ms. John	$3.6M	$2.2M	$34M
2024	Ms. John	$2.9M	$5.8M	$51M
2025	Ms. John	$3.4M	$5.0M	$32M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BNEDBarnes & Noble Education Inc	$1.6B	23%	-2.3%	-8%	1%
LESLLeslie's	$1.2B	41%	13.1%	38%	3%
BBBYBed Bath & Beyond Inc.	$1.0B	23%	-4.3%	-201%	-3%
REALThe RealReal Inc.	$693M	64%	-31.6%	—	-21%
BBWBuild-A-Bear Workshop Inc.	$530M	53%	8.5%	34%	4%
HNSTThe Honest Company Inc.	$371M	33%	-11.3%	-23%	-4%
TDUPThredUp Inc.	$311M	71%	-22.5%	-54%	-13%
ELAEnvela Corporation	$241M	22%	5.1%	24%	1%
Group median	—	37%	-3.3%	-8%	-1%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc. has delivered.

Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc. earns about $24M on its 4.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($24M) Net of stock comp (−$2M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($44M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+11%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’26+18%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $29M on 13M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-09; net cash $26M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($30M) runs well above depreciation ($15M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $44M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BBW against another business →

The owners of BBW: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Build-A-Bear Workshop Inc. (BBW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BBW, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BBT its page in the Manual BBWI →

Industry order: ← ASO the Specialty Retail chapter BBWI →