Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← ASMB Manual ASPI → ← ARHS Specialty Retail BBW →

ASO, Academy Sports and Outdoors

Specialty Retail retail Cyclical

We sit in a sweet-spot of consumer demand, offering a broad, value-based assortment of sporting goods and outdoor recreation products, so our customers can participate and have fun, no matter their budget.

Our product assortment focuses on key categories of outdoor, sports & recreation, apparel, and footwear (representing 31%, 22%, 27% and 20% of our 2025 net sales, respectively) through both leading national brands and a portfolio of 19 private label brands, which go well beyond traditional sporting goods and apparel offerings.

Broad assortment that extends beyond sporting goods and apparel to outdoor recreation and is localized for individual stores.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
ASO · Academy Sports and Outdoors
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$6.1B
+2.0% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.1B 5-yr avg $6.3B
Gross margin 35% 5-yr avg 34%
Operating margin 8.4% 5-yr avg 11.0%
ROIC 18% 5-yr avg 28%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Outdoors (30%) and Apparel (27%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 8.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.7% to 13% — on a steadier 34% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 25%, above 15% in 6 of 6 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Outdoors at 30%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Outdoors30%$1.8B
  • Apparel27%$1.6B
  • Sports and recreation22%$1.3B
  • Footwear20%$1.2B
  • Other1%$36M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$4.8B$4.8B$5.7B$6.8B$6.4B$6.2B$5.9B$6.1B$6.1BRevenueRevenue
29%30%30%35%35%34%34%35%35%Gross marginGross mgn
26%26%23%21%21%23%25%26%26%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$129M$179M$420M$908M$847M$678M$539M$512M$518MOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.7%3.7%7.4%13.4%13.2%11.0%9.1%8.5%8.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$21M$120M$309M$671M$628M$519M$418M$377M$383MNet incomeNet inc.
8%2%9%22%23%22%22%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$198M$264M$1.0B$673M$552M$536M$528M$435M$438MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$133M$117M$105M$105M$107M$111M$118M$123M$123MDepreciationDeprec.
$40M$18M$566M($143M)($204M)($119M)($35M)($86M)($94M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$108M$63M$41M$76M$108M$208M$200M$213M$201MCapexCapex
2.3%1.3%0.7%1.1%1.7%3.4%3.4%3.5%3.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$91M$201M$970M$597M$444M$425M$410M$312M$314MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.9%4.2%17.1%8.8%6.9%6.9%6.9%5.2%5.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$91M$201M$970M$597M$444M$328M$328M$222M$237MFree cash flowFCF
1.9%4.2%17.1%8.8%6.9%5.3%5.5%3.7%3.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$25M$27M$31M$35M$36MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$411M$489M$203M$365M$199MBuybacksBuybacks
25%43%35%25%19%17%18%ROICROIC
28%46%39%27%21%17%18%Return on equityROE
28%46%37%25%19%16%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$76M$149M$378M$486M$337M$348M$289M$330M$338MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$14M$17M$20M$17M$19M$17M$35M$18MReceivablesReceiv.
$1.1B$990M$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.7BInventoryInvent.
$429M$791M$738M$686M$541M$612M$638M$826MAccounts payablePayables
$685M$216M$454M$614M$672M$713M$901M$846MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$1.4B$1.7B$1.7B$1.6B$1.7B$2.0B$2.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$751M$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$880M$961M$1.0B$1.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.2×1.5×1.6×1.9×1.8×1.9×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$862M$862M$862M$862M$862M$862M$862M$862MGoodwillGoodwill
$4.3B$4.4B$4.6B$4.6B$4.7B$4.9B$5.3B$5.5BTotal assetsAssets
$1.5B$785M$687M$587M$488M$486M$484M$483MTotal debtDebt
$1.3B$408M$201M$250M$140M$197M$153M$146MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.1B$1.5B$1.6B$2.0B$2.0B$2.2B$2.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.2%0.6%0.6%0.3%0.4%0.4%0.3%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
75.2M74.8M81.4M94.3M83.9M77.5M73.0M68.0M65.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$63.62$64.58$69.87$71.84$76.23$79.51$81.23$88.98$93.17Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.29$1.60$3.79$7.12$7.49$6.70$5.73$5.54$5.81EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.20$2.69$11.92$6.34$5.29$5.48$5.61$4.58$4.77Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.20$2.69$11.92$6.34$5.29$4.23$4.50$3.26$3.60Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.29$0.35$0.43$0.51$0.54Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.43$0.84$0.51$0.80$1.29$2.68$2.73$3.13$3.04Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.66$15.56$19.41$25.23$27.43$31.92$32.16Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.9%/yr+5.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+21.0%/yr−17.4%/yr
EPS+52.8%/yr+7.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.8%/yr+43.9%/yr
Book value / share+18.5%/yr (5-yr)+18.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
68Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
17%low FY2026
Gross margin
35%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.5×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$312Mowner earningsvs.$377Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $312M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $123M it takes just to hold its position. It put $90M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $222M.

Reported net income$377M
Owner earnings$312M · 5% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$377M$418M$519M$628M$671M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$123M+$118M+$111M+$107M+$105M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$21M+$27M+$24M+$21M+$39M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$86M−$35M−$119M−$204M−$143M
Cash from operations$435M$528M$536M$552M$673M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$123M−$118M−$111M−$108M−$76M
Owner earnings$312M$410M$425M$444M$597M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$90M−$82M−$97M
Free cash flow$222M$328M$328M$444M$597M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%7%7%7%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $123M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $90M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $21M), owner earnings is nearer $291M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $153M · 0.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $330M − debt $484M
    What this means

    Netting $330M of cash and short-term investments against $484M of debt leaves $153M owed, about 0.3× a year's operating profit (0.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 2 + DIO 139 − DPO 59 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    6-yr median, range 17%–43%; 17% latest = NOPAT $397M ÷ invested capital $2.3B
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 2%–17%; latest $312M = operating cash $435M − maintenance capex $123M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 8 years. It chose to put $90M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $222M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $21M of SBC) leaves $291M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $435M ÷ net income $377M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $234M ÷ Owner Earnings $312M
    What this means

    Of $312M Owner Earnings, $234M (75%) went back to shareholders, $35M dividends, $199M buybacks. Net of $21M stock comp, the real buyback was about $178M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.73×
    Expanding
    Capex $213M ÷ depreciation $123M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.89×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $484M vs $922M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +192%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.06/share (latest year $6.08), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $35.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 8
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 10% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 43%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 2.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$338M
  • Receivables$18M
  • Inventory$1.7B
  • Other current assets$96M
Current liabilities$1.3B
  • Debt due within a year$3M
  • Accounts payable$826M
  • Other current liabilities$427M
Current ratio1.68×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$850Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $338M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 2, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$679Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$1.5B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.9B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$92Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$255M
'27$246M
'28$229M
'29$212M
'30$193M
later$915M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$255Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$2.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.4Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$484M
Lease obligations (present value)$1.4B
Total fixed claims on the business$1.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.9B, of which the leases are 74%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2019–2026

Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.0B · 24%
  • Dividends$118M · 3%
  • Buybacks$1.7B · 40%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.4B · 33%
  • Returned to owners$1.8B

    52% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $118M as dividends and $1.7B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$45.57

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 37M shares were bought for $1.7B, about $45.57 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $38.93 (2022) to $55.76 (2025); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $41.12 ($489M).

  • Net change in share count−12.3%

    The diluted count fell from 75M to 66M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.51/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−3%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $38M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.03 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.4B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity40%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 8 years buying other businesses, against $1.0B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Ken Hicks$11.5M$24.3M$597M
2023Ken Hicks$11.4M$23.1M$444M
2024Ken Hicks$9.1M$11.6M$425M
2024Steve Lawrence$8.6M$11.8M$425M
2025Steve Lawrence$8.7M$1.5M$410M
2026Steve Lawrence$9.6M$6.9M$312M
2026Steve Lawrence$9.6M$6.9M$312M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio423:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$21M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Academy Sports and Outdoors is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.3% vs 7.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.7% early in the record and 6.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DKSDick's Sporting Goods$17.2B32%7.1%28%6%
NSITInsight Enterprises$8.2B15%3.4%13%2%
BBWIBath & Body Works$7.3B44%17.3%56%11%
SIGSignet Jewelers$6.8B38%6.7%15%8%
ASOAcademy Sports and Outdoors$6.1B34%8.8%25%7%
WOOFPetco Health and Wellness$6.0B40%2.5%4%2%
SBHSally Beauty Holdings$3.7B50%9.8%20%5%
BNEDBarnes & Noble Education Inc$1.6B23%-2.3%-8%1%
Group median36%6.9%18%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Academy Sports and Outdoors has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Academy Sports and Outdoors earns about $418M on its 6.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−9%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’26+10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $237M on 62M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-03; net debt $146M. The if-converted diluted count is 66M, 6% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($201M) runs well above depreciation ($123M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $315M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Academy Sports and Outdoors (ASO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ASMB its page in the Manual ASPI →

Industry order: ← ARHS the Specialty Retail chapter BBW →