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LESL, Leslie's
We offer an extensive assortment of professional-grade products, the majority of which are exclusive to Leslie's, manufacturer certified installation and repair services, and in some markets, weekly pool maintenance services.
The considerable scale of our integrated marketing and distribution ecosystem, which is powered by our direct-to-consumer network, uniquely enables us to efficiently reach and service nearly every pool and spa in the continental United States.
More than 85% of our product assortment is comprised of non-discretionary products essential to the care of residential and commercial pools and spas.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 41% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −14% to 16% — on a steadier 41% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 38%, above 15% in 3 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $928M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 41% | 41% | 44% | 43% | 38% | 36% | 35% | 35% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 28% | 28% | 29% | 28% | 31% | 32% | 34% | 35% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $122M | $146M | $209M | $239M | $102M | $57M | ($170M) | ($188M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 13.1% | 13.2% | 15.6% | 15.3% | 7.0% | 4.3% | −13.7% | −15.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $702K | $59M | $127M | $159M | $27M | ($23M) | ($237M) | ($277M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 4% | 22% | 24% | 26% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $58M | $102M | $169M | $67M | $6M | $107M | $9M | $27M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $28M | $29M | $27M | $28M | $30M | $29M | $29M | $28M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $27M | $13M | ($8M) | ($132M) | ($62M) | $93M | $210M | $270M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $27M | $21M | $29M | $32M | $39M | $47M | $25M | $24M | CapexCapex |
| 3.0% | 1.9% | 2.2% | 2.0% | 2.7% | 3.6% | 2.1% | 1.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $30M | $82M | $140M | $35M | ($23M) | $78M | ($17M) | $3M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.3% | 7.3% | 10.5% | 2.2% | −1.6% | 5.9% | −1.3% | 0.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $30M | $82M | $140M | $35M | ($32M) | $60M | ($17M) | $3M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.3% | 7.3% | 10.5% | 2.2% | −2.2% | 4.5% | −1.3% | 0.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $10M | $6M | $9M | $108M | $16M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | $0 | $0 | $152M | $0 | $0 | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 69% | 70% | 38% | 13% | — | -48% | -76% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| — | $157M | $343M | $112M | $55M | $109M | $64M | $17M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $31M | $39M | $45M | $29M | $45M | $23M | $23M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $149M | $199M | $362M | $312M | $234M | $208M | $262M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $92M | $101M | $156M | $59M | $68M | $52M | $94M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $88M | $137M | $251M | $283M | $212M | $179M | $191M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $360M | $602M | $542M | $420M | $422M | $329M | $340M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $258M | $310M | $348M | $226M | $247M | $209M | $234M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.4× | 1.9× | 1.6× | 1.9× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $90M | $93M | $101M | $174M | $181M | $181M | $0 | $0 | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $746M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $741M | $715M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.2B | $794M | $788M | $781M | $777M | $752M | $753M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $1.0B | $451M | $676M | $726M | $669M | $688M | $736M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.2× | 1.7× | 6.1× | 7.9× | 1.6× | 0.8× | -2.7× | -3.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($887M) | ($827M) | ($218M) | ($198M) | ($161M) | ($177M) | ($408M) | ($541M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.2% | 1.8% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 7.8M | 7.8M | 9.5M | 9.3M | 9.2M | 9.2M | 9.3M | 9.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $118.62 | $142.14 | $141.35 | $167.84 | $157.16 | $144.05 | $134.00 | $131.17 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.09 | $7.48 | $13.33 | $17.09 | $2.95 | $-2.53 | $-25.57 | $-29.70 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.88 | $10.42 | $14.77 | $3.75 | $-2.53 | $8.48 | $-1.80 | $0.30 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.88 | $10.42 | $14.77 | $3.75 | $-3.48 | $6.52 | $-1.80 | $0.30 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $3.51 | $2.64 | $3.05 | $3.41 | $4.18 | $5.12 | $2.75 | $2.56 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-113.40 | $-105.69 | $-22.90 | $-21.27 | $-17.47 | $-19.18 | $-44.02 | $-58.13 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/20 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.1%/yr | −1.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −4.0%/yr | +0.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $237M loss into ($17M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($237M) | ($23M) | $27M | $159M | $127M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$29M | +$29M | +$30M | +$28M | +$27M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$6M | +$9M | +$12M | +$11M | +$24M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$210M | +$93M | −$62M | −$132M | −$8M |
| Cash from operations | $9M | $107M | $6M | $67M | $169M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$25M | −$29M | −$30M | −$32M | −$29M |
| Owner earnings | ($17M) | $78M | ($23M) | $35M | $140M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$18M | −$9M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ($17M) | $60M | ($32M) | $35M | $140M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -1% | 6% | -2% | 2% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $6M), owner earnings is nearer ($23M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2.7×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($170M) ÷ interest expense $63M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $64M − debt $752M
What this means
Netting $64M of cash and short-term investments against $752M of debt leaves $688M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 7 + DIO 95 − DPO 24 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle5-yr median, range -48%–70%; -48% latest = NOPAT ($134M) ÷ invested capital $280MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -48% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -2%–10%; latest ($17M) = operating cash $9M − maintenance capex $25MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $6M of SBC) leaves ($23M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($237M) · cash from operations $9M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.87×MaintainingCapex $25M ÷ depreciation $29M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.57×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $752M vs $120M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −225%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-8.30/share (latest year $-25.32), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-43.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to −1% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Owner earnings growth −9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −13.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$17M
- Receivables$23M
- Inventory$262M
- Other current assets$38M
- Accounts payable$94M
- Other current liabilities$140M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $519M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$220M · 42%
- Dividends$1M · 0%
- Buybacks$152M · 29%
- Retained (debt / cash)$145M · 28%
- Returned to owners$153M
47% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1M as dividends and $152M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $152M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count19.0%
The diluted count rose from 8M to 9M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.16/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$181M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$6M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Leslie's is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.0% vs 7.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.0% early in the record and 1.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?19.0%
Diluted shares grew 19.0% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $152M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Specialty Retail
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SBHSally Beauty Holdings | $3.7B | 50% | 9.8% | 20% | 5% |
| TITNTitan Machinery Inc. | $2.4B | 18% | 1.9% | 7% | 5% |
| SGUStar Group L.P. | $1.8B | 62% | 4.1% | — | 4% |
| GCTGigaCloud Technology Inc | $1.3B | — | 11.2% | 84% | 13% |
| EZPWEZCORP Inc. Class A Non Voting | $1.3B | 79% | 7.7% | 6% | 7% |
| SFIXStitch Fix Inc. | $1.3B | 44% | -3.0% | -35% | 3% |
| LESLLeslie's | $1.2B | 41% | 13.1% | 38% | 3% |
| RVLVRevolve Group | $1.2B | 53% | 6.6% | 39% | 4% |
| Group median | — | 50% | 7.2% | 20% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Leslie's has delivered.
Through the cycle, Leslie's earns about $41M on its 3.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $3M on 9M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $736M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← LEN its page in the Manual LEU →
Industry order: ← LE the Specialty Retail chapter LOW →