Share count
15Mpeak FY2022
← All companies ← BETA Manual BF-B → ← AGM Mortgage & Specialty Finance CMTG →
BETR, Better Home & Finance Holding Company
Home Finance Home Finance offers a range of residential mortgage loan products for home purchase and refinance, including cash-out refinance and debt consolidation, and home equity, across various maturities and interest rate structures.
On March 13, 2024, the listing of the Company's Class A common stock and warrants transferred from the Nasdaq Global Market to the Nasdaq Capital Market.
We are a technology-enabled homeownership company that offers mortgage, home equity, and other homeownership products through a digital platform.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$165M
+52.0% YoY · 137% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $168M
Cash burn · annual $235M
Runway 9 mo
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -146%, above 12% in only 2 of 4 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →16% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- United States84%$139M
- International16%$26M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $12M | $0 | $108M | $165M | $162M | RevenueRevenue |
| $10M | ($3M) | $18M | $17M | $16M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| ($877M) | ($536M) | ($206M) | ($166M) | ($186M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| -81.0% | -59.2% | -22.6% | -11.0% | -11.8% | Return on assetsROA |
| — | -438% | — | -446% | -2170% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −438% | — | −446% | n/m | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| — | -1030% | — | -3947% | — | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $1.1B | $906M | $913M | $1.5B | $1.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $0 | $12M | $134M | $763M | $755M | DepositsDeposits |
| $17M | $32M | $24M | $11M | $11M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ($604M) | $123M | ($58M) | $37M | $9M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 291M | 9.2M | 15.1M | 15.4M | 16.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-3.01 | $-58.09 | $-13.65 | $-10.80 | $-11.31 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-2.07 | $13.28 | $-3.85 | $2.42 | $0.52 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $-2.35 | $5.64 | $-6.80 | $0.27 | $-1.24 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/31.55 into 2023 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.64 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +533.3%/yr | +533.3%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +24.5%/yr | +24.5%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$165Mlow FY2023
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -446%Loss on equityNet income ($166M) ÷ equity $37MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Return on tangible equity -3947%LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $11M − intangibles $22M)Industry peers: median 6%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough data
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 2.5%ThinEquity $37M ÷ assets $1.5B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 51%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits $763M ÷ assets $1.5B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We may be unable to develop and implement AI, both for internal operations and external support, that keeps pace with the rapid proliferation of AI systems by competitors in our industry or in a manner that our customers, users, and business partners see as sufficient, which may negatively impact our business and finan…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2023Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$3M
- Cash & short-term investments$168M
- Receivables$1M
Current liabilities$20M
- Accounts payable$4M
- Other current liabilities$17M
Current ratio0.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.13×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio8.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($18M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway0.7 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−68.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($20M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Deferred revenue$763Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$33M2% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity30%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$17Mover 4 years buying other businesses, against $17M of capital spent building
$21M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$20M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 12% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Mortgage & Specialty Finance
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TREELendingTree Inc. | $1.1B | 5% | — | — | -2.2% |
| KEELKeel Infrastructure Corp. | $229M | -17% | -17% | — | 0.5% |
| ABTCAmerican Bitcoin Corp. | $185M | -38% | -152% | — | 0.0% |
| BETRBetter Home & Finance Holding Company | $165M | -446% | -3947% | — | 1.0% |
| ECPGEncore Capital Group Inc | $88M | 15% | 58% | — | 0.5% |
| VELVelocity Financial Inc. | $186M | 16% | 16% | — | 2.5% |
| RKTRocket Companies Inc. | $125M | -0% | -1% | — | 0.2% |
| AGMFederal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation | $408M | 12% | 12% | 24% | 1.1% |
| Group median | — | 2% | -1% | — | 0.5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Better Home & Finance Holding Company (BETR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BETR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BETA its page in the Manual BF-B →
Industry order: ← AGM the Mortgage & Specialty Finance chapter CMTG →