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TREE, LendingTree Inc.
LendingTree Inc. operates what we believe to be the leading online consumer platform that connects consumers with the choices they need to be confident in their financial decisions.
Services include mortgage loans, mortgage refinances, home equity loans and lines of credit, auto loans, credit cards, deposit accounts, personal loans, small business loans, insurance quotes and other related offerings.
Our marketing efforts are designed to attract consumers to our websites, mobile applications and toll-free telephone numbers.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Insurance (64%) and Home (14%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 5%, above 12% in only 3 of 10 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Insurance is 64% of revenue, with Home the other meaningful segment at 14%.
- Insurance64%$712M
- Home14%$152M
- Other Consumer12%$139M
- Personal loans10%$114M
- Other0%$310K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $384M | $618M | $765M | $1.1B | $910M | $1.1B | $985M | $673M | $900M | $1.1B | $1.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | ($47M) | ($26M) | $22M | — | — | $22M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| $27M | $16M | $96M | $18M | ($48M) | $69M | ($188M) | ($122M) | ($42M) | $151M | $181M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 43% | 29% | — | — | — | 14% | — | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 8.5% | 2.2% | 10.8% | 1.9% | -4.1% | 5.3% | -15.7% | -15.2% | -5.4% | 17.7% | 20.9% | Return on assetsROA |
| 12% | 5% | 28% | 4% | -13% | 15% | -90% | -99% | -38% | 53% | 59% | Return on equityROE |
| 12% | 5% | 28% | 4% | −13% | 15% | −90% | −99% | −38% | 53% | 59% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $323M | $693M | $896M | $948M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $803M | $768M | $856M | $864M | Total assetsAssets |
| $56M | $113M | $348M | $420M | $420M | $420M | $420M | $382M | $382M | $382M | $382M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $231M | $295M | $346M | $402M | $365M | $448M | $208M | $124M | $109M | $287M | $305M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 12.8M | 13.7M | 14.1M | 14.6M | 13.0M | 13.7M | 12.8M | 12.9M | 13.3M | 14.1M | 14.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.15 | $1.14 | $6.85 | $1.22 | $-3.71 | $5.05 | $-14.69 | $-9.46 | $-3.14 | $10.76 | $12.80 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $18.12 | $21.55 | $24.56 | $27.52 | $28.04 | $32.71 | $16.25 | $9.59 | $8.20 | $20.40 | $21.56 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $8.09 | $7.34 | $-14.74 | $-13.64 | $-14.14 | $-4.23 | $-21.15 | $-23.80 | $-23.81 | $-9.45 | $-8.04 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +11.4%/yr | +2.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −0.8%/yr | −10.4%/yr |
| EPS | +19.6%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −10.9%/yr | −22.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.3%/yr | −6.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 53%Very high (≥17%)Net income $151M ÷ equity $287MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
Equity, goodwill or intangibles missing.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 33%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 33.5%Well capitalizedEquity $287M ÷ assets $856M
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
What this means
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our AI initiatives also rely, in part, on third-party technologies, data sources, and model providers, which may be subject to service disruptions, intellectual property claims, data usage restrictions, or changes in pricing or terms.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$86M
- Receivables$117M
- Other current assets$41M
- Debt due within a year$4M
- Accounts payable$8M
- Other current liabilities$118M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$39M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 48% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $1.4M | −$148.5M | $113M |
| 2022 | $986k | −$19.8M | $32M |
| 2023 | $1.2M | $1.5M | $55M |
| 2024 | $4.7M | $5.3M | $51M |
| 2025 | $6.6M | $7.5M | $61M |
| 2025 | $4.9M | $6.1M | $61M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio35:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$29M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 45% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Mortgage & Specialty Finance
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BKKTBakkt Inc. | $2.3B | -146% | -252% | — | 0.5% |
| GDOTGreen DOT Corp | $2.0B | 5% | 13% | — | -0.1% |
| ATLCAtlanticus Holdings Corporation | $2.0B | 42% | 42% | 55% | 21.3% |
| TREELendingTree Inc. | $1.1B | 5% | — | — | -2.2% |
| UPSTUpstart | $1.0B | -7% | -8% | — | 0.0% |
| BETRBetter Home & Finance Holding Company | $165M | -446% | -3947% | — | 1.0% |
| SLMSLM Corporation | $2.0B | 30% | 31% | 33% | 5.0% |
| AGMFederal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation | $408M | 12% | 12% | 24% | 1.1% |
| Group median | — | 5% | — | — | 0.8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← TRC its page in the Manual TREX →
Industry order: ← RKT the Mortgage & Specialty Finance chapter UWMC →