Owner Scorecard


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BFAM, Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc.

Education Services diversified Serial acquirer

We are a leading provider of high-quality early education and child care, comprehensive back-up care solutions and educational advisory services.

For 40 years, Bright Horizons has been a champion for working families — designing and delivering innovative education and care solutions.

Our offerings support both working families and employers' workforce strategies by supporting their employees across life and career stages, and improving employee recruitment, engagement, productivity, retention, and career advancement.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
BFAM · Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.9B
+9.2% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.0B 5-yr avg $2.4B
Gross margin 24% 5-yr avg 23%
Operating margin 10.6% 5-yr avg 8.4%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Full-Service Center Based Care (71%), Back-up care (25%) and Educational advisory services (4%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 52% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 24% and operating margin about 9.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 3.5% to 13% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Full-Service Center Based Care is 71% of revenue, with Back-up care the other meaningful segment at 25%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Full-Service Center Based Care71%$2.1B
  • Back-up care25%$728M
  • Educational advisory services4%$125M
By geographyNorth America71%Outside North America29%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.6B$1.7B$1.9B$2.1B$1.5B$1.8B$2.0B$2.4B$2.7B$2.9B$3.0BRevenueRevenue
25%25%25%25%20%24%24%22%23%24%24%Gross marginGross mgn
10%11%11%11%14%15%14%14%13%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$197M$205M$239M$268M$53M$129M$158M$171M$247M$315M$317MOperating incomeOp. inc.
12.6%11.8%12.6%13.0%3.5%7.4%7.8%7.1%9.2%10.7%10.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$95M$157M$158M$180M$27M$70M$81M$74M$140M$193M$189MNet incomeNet inc.
34%3%18%19%22%28%38%29%28%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$213M$248M$295M$330M$210M$227M$188M$256M$337M$351M$372MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$85M$95M$101M$108M$112M$109M$106M$111M$98M$93M$95MDepreciationDeprec.
$22M($16M)$22M$24M$50M$25M($26M)$42M$66M$34M$58MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$75M$88M$92M$112M$85M$63M$71M$91M$97M$92M$97MCapexCapex
4.8%5.1%4.9%5.4%5.6%3.6%3.5%3.8%3.6%3.1%3.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$138M$160M$202M$219M$125M$164M$118M$165M$240M$259M$275MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.8%9.2%10.6%10.6%8.2%9.3%5.8%6.8%8.9%8.8%9.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$138M$160M$202M$219M$125M$164M$118M$165M$240M$259M$275MFree cash flowFCF
8.8%9.2%10.6%10.6%8.2%9.3%5.8%6.8%8.9%8.8%9.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$229M$21M$67M$53M$8M$54M$210M$40M$8M$7M$7MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$113M$162M$127M$32M$33M$214M$183M$0$85M$225MBuybacksBuybacks
8%11%11%11%3%5%6%5%8%12%12%ROICROIC
14%21%20%19%2%6%7%6%11%14%17%Return on equityROE
14%21%20%19%2%6%7%6%11%14%17%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$15M$23M$15M$28M$384M$261M$36M$72M$110M$140M$133MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$97M$117M$131M$149M$177M$211M$217M$282M$283M$294M$216MReceivablesReceiv.
$26M$32M$36M$32M$30M$9M$25M$25M$33M$28M$267MAccounts payablePayables
$71M$85M$95M$117M$147M$202M$193M$257M$250M$266M($51M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$154M$192M$194M$229M$624M$540M$348M$447M$496M$504M$430MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$388M$461M$484M$483M$531M$622M$786M$799M$779M$966M$928MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.4×0.4×0.4×0.5×1.2×0.9×0.4×0.6×0.6×0.5×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B$2.5B$2.5B$3.3B$3.7B$3.6B$3.8B$3.9B$3.9B$3.9B$3.8BTotal assetsAssets
$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$992M$978M$963M$947M$748M$898MTotal debtDebt
$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$647M$731M$941M$891M$837M$608M$764MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.6×4.7×5.0×4.0×3.3×5.1×7.0×6.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$688M$749M$779M$971M$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.7%0.7%0.8%1.4%1.3%1.4%1.2%1.3%1.0%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
60.6M60.3M59.0M58.9M60.3M60.9M58.5M57.9M58.5M57.4M54.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$25.91$28.89$32.26$34.98$25.12$28.84$34.54$41.74$45.94$51.09$54.48Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.56$2.61$2.68$3.06$0.45$1.16$1.38$1.28$2.40$3.36$3.46EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.28$2.66$3.43$3.71$2.07$2.69$2.02$2.85$4.11$4.50$5.03Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.28$2.66$3.43$3.71$2.07$2.69$2.02$2.85$4.11$4.50$5.03Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.24$1.46$1.57$1.90$1.41$1.04$1.21$1.57$1.66$1.61$1.77Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.35$12.43$13.21$16.48$21.29$19.37$18.47$20.93$21.86$23.32$20.94Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.8%/yr+15.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.9%/yr+16.8%/yr
EPS+8.9%/yr+49.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.9%/yr+2.7%/yr
Book value / share+8.3%/yr+1.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
57Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
12%low FY2020
Gross margin
24%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.3×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$259Mowner earningsvs.$193Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $193M of profit into $259M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$193M
Owner earnings$259M · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$193M$140M$74M$81M$70M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$93M+$98M+$111M+$106M+$109M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$31M+$34M+$29M+$28M+$23M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$34M+$66M+$42M−$26M+$25M
Cash from operations$351M$337M$256M$188M$227M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$92M−$97M−$91M−$71M−$63M
Owner earnings$259M$240M$165M$118M$164M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%9%7%6%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $31M), owner earnings is nearer $228M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $315M ÷ interest expense $45M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $608M · 1.9× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $140M − debt $748M
    What this means

    Netting $140M of cash and short-term investments against $748M of debt leaves $608M owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (2.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 37 + DIO 0 − DPO 5 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–12%; 12% latest = NOPAT $225M ÷ invested capital $1.9B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 6%–11%; latest $259M = operating cash $351M − maintenance capex $92M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $31M of SBC) leaves $228M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $351M ÷ net income $193M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $225M ÷ Owner Earnings $259M
    What this means

    Of $259M Owner Earnings, $225M (87%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $225M buybacks. Net of $31M stock comp, the real buyback was about $195M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.99×
    Maintaining
    Capex $92M ÷ depreciation $93M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.52×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $748M vs ($462M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −1%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.58/share (latest year $3.67), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 9% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 3.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We may not successfully incorporate AI into our business or adapt to a rapidly changing marketplace to meet client needs and expectations and compete in our business sector.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$430M
  • Cash & short-term investments$133M
  • Receivables$216M
  • Other current assets$81M
Current liabilities$928M
  • Accounts payable$267M
  • Other current liabilities$661M
Current ratio0.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.46×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($498M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($871M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.7B$790M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.6B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$334Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$152M
'27$156M
'28$142M
'29$126M
'30$105M
later$432M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$152Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$813Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$748M
Lease obligations (present value)$813M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.6B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.6B, of which the leases are 52%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$867M · 33%
  • Buybacks$1.2B · 44%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$617M · 23%
  • Returned to owners$1.2B

    66% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.2B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$111.68

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $771M, about $111.68 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $91.28 (2022) to $163.29 (2020); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $107.34 ($225M).

  • Net change in share count−9.7%

    The diluted count fell from 61M to 55M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.0B52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$698Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $867M of capital spent building

$4M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Kramer$4.2M−$70k$164M
2022Mr. Kramer$3.3M−$3.3M$118M
2023Mr. Kramer$4.9M$8.1M$165M
2024Mr. Kramer$5.2M$6.6M$240M
2025Mr. Kramer$5.3M$4.2M$259M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$31M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $175M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UWMCUWM Holdings Corporation$3.2B13.9%4%-86%
KFYKorn Ferry$2.9B10.0%14%10%
BFAMBright Horizons Family Solutions Inc.$2.9B24%10.0%8%9%
STGWStagwell Inc.$2.9B35%5.1%4%5%
UVVUniversal Corporation$2.9B18%7.6%8%3%
CNXNPC Connection Inc.$2.9B16%3.4%12%2%
VSTSVestis Corporation$2.7B6.4%6%6%
MBCMasterBrand Inc.$2.7B30%8.2%8%5%
Group median24%7.9%8%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. earns about $260M on its 8.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $275M on 53M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $764M. The if-converted diluted count is 55M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Bright Horizons Family Solutions Inc. (BFAM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BFAM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BF-B its page in the Manual BFC →

Industry order: ← APEI the Education Services chapter COE →