Owner Scorecard


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BLDR, Builders FirstSource

Specialty Retail retail Serial acquirer

We deliver integrated homebuilding solutions by manufacturing, supplying, and installing a full range of structural and related building products.

Our services, which vary by market, include professional installation, turnkey framing, and shell construction.

Supported by the latest construction innovations and digital solutions, we help drive greater efficiency across homebuilding.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
BLDR · Builders FirstSource
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$15.2B
−7.4% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $14.8B 5-yr avg $18.3B
Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 32%
Operating margin 4.2% 5-yr avg 11.2%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 21%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 9%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Specialty Building Products and Services (27%) and Lumber and Lumber Sheet Goods (26%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 47% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 27% and operating margin about 5.4% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.7% to 17% — on a steadier 27% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Specialty Building Products and Services at 27%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Specialty Building Products and Services27%$4.1B
  • Lumber And Lumber Sheet Goods26%$3.9B
  • Windows Doors And Millwork25%$3.8B
  • Manufactured Products22%$3.4B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$6.4B$7.0B$7.7B$7.3B$8.6B$19.9B$22.7B$17.1B$16.4B$15.2B$14.8BRevenueRevenue
25%25%25%27%26%29%34%35%33%30%30%Gross marginGross mgn
21%21%20%22%20%17%17%22%23%25%26%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$236M$285M$369M$392M$544M$2.4B$3.8B$2.2B$1.6B$786M$618MOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.7%4.1%4.8%5.4%6.4%12.0%16.6%12.7%9.7%5.2%4.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$144M$39M$205M$222M$314M$1.7B$2.7B$1.5B$1.1B$435M$291MNet incomeNet inc.
58%21%22%23%23%23%22%22%15%13%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$158M$179M$283M$504M$260M$1.7B$3.6B$2.3B$1.9B$1.2B$1.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$110M$93M$98M$100M$117M$547M$497M$558M$562M$591M$595MDepreciationDeprec.
($106M)$33M($35M)$170M($187M)($561M)$321M$160M$170M$136M$232MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$43M$62M$101M$113M$112M$228M$340M$476M$381M$363M$309MCapexCapex
0.7%0.9%1.3%1.6%1.3%1.1%1.5%2.8%2.3%2.4%2.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$116M$116M$181M$391M$148M$1.5B$3.3B$1.8B$1.5B$853M$862MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.8%1.7%2.3%5.4%1.7%7.6%14.3%10.7%9.1%5.6%5.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$116M$116M$181M$391M$148M$1.5B$3.3B$1.8B$1.5B$853M$862MFree cash flowFCF
1.8%1.7%2.3%5.4%1.7%7.6%14.3%10.7%9.1%5.6%5.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$4M$93M$33M$1.2B$628M$239M$336M$1.1B$311MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$1M$3M$5M$10M$4M$1.7B$2.6B$1.8B$1.5B$414MBuybacksBuybacks
7%14%15%18%24%37%22%16%8%6%ROICROIC
47%10%34%27%27%36%55%33%25%10%7%Return on equityROE
47%10%34%27%27%36%55%33%25%10%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$14M$58M$10M$14M$424M$43M$80M$66M$154M$182M$98MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$569M$632M$654M$615M$823M$1.7B$1.4B$1.4B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$542M$602M$597M$561M$785M$1.6B$1.4B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2BInventoryInvent.
$410M$514M$423M$437M$600M$1.1B$803M$881M$868M$715M$925MAccounts payablePayables
$701M$719M$828M$739M$1.0B$2.2B$2.1B$1.8B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$2.2B$4.0B$3.5B$3.3B$3.1B$2.9B$3.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$755M$798M$731M$821M$1.1B$2.1B$1.8B$1.9B$1.8B$1.6B$1.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.7×1.9×1.6×2.1×1.9×1.9×1.8×1.8×1.9×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$740M$740M$740M$769M$785M$3.3B$3.5B$3.6B$3.7B$4.1B$4.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.9B$3.0B$2.9B$3.2B$4.2B$10.7B$10.6B$10.5B$10.6B$11.2B$11.3BTotal assetsAssets
$1.8B$1.6B$1.3B$1.6B$3.0B$3.0B$3.2B$3.7B$4.5B$4.6BTotal debtDebt
$1.7B$1.6B$1.3B$1.2B$2.9B$2.9B$3.1B$3.6B$4.3B$4.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.1×1.5×3.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$310M$376M$596M$825M$1.2B$4.8B$5.0B$4.7B$4.3B$4.4B$4.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.3%0.4%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
114M116M117M117M118M203M163M129M119M112M110MShares out (diluted)Shares
$56.06$60.85$66.28$62.21$72.58$97.77$139.02$132.54$137.84$135.85$134.89Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.27$0.34$1.76$1.90$2.66$8.48$16.82$11.94$9.06$3.89$2.65EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.02$1.00$1.56$3.34$1.25$7.45$19.94$14.19$12.54$7.63$7.84Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.02$1.00$1.56$3.34$1.25$7.45$19.94$14.19$12.54$7.63$7.84Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.38$0.54$0.87$0.96$0.95$1.12$2.08$3.69$3.20$3.24$2.82Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.73$3.25$5.12$7.05$9.78$23.60$30.36$36.69$36.11$38.92$36.45Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.73 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.3%/yr+13.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+25.1%/yr+43.5%/yr
EPS+13.2%/yr+7.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+27.1%/yr+27.8%/yr
Book value / share+34.4%/yr+31.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
112Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
8%low FY2017
Gross margin
30%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.0×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$853Mowner earningsvs.$435Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $435M of profit into $853M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$435M
Owner earnings$853M · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$435M$1.1B$1.5B$2.7B$1.7B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$591M+$562M+$558M+$497M+$547M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$54M+$63M+$49M+$31M+$31M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$136M+$170M+$160M+$321M−$561M
Cash from operations$1.2B$1.9B$2.3B$3.6B$1.7B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$363M−$381M−$476M−$340M−$228M
Owner earnings$853M$1.5B$1.8B$3.3B$1.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%9%11%14%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $54M), owner earnings is nearer $800M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $786M ÷ interest expense $193M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.3B · 5.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $182M − debt $4.5B
    What this means

    Netting $182M of cash and short-term investments against $4.5B of debt leaves $4.3B owed, about 5.5× a year's operating profit (5.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 25 + DIO 38 − DPO 25 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 7%–37%; 8% latest = NOPAT $668M ÷ invested capital $8.7B
    Industry peers: median 30%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–14%; latest $853M = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $363M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $54M of SBC) leaves $800M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $435M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $414M ÷ Owner Earnings $853M
    What this means

    Of $853M Owner Earnings, $414M (49%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $414M buybacks. Net of $54M stock comp, the real buyback was about $360M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.61×
    Harvesting
    Capex $363M ÷ depreciation $591M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $15.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.86×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.5B vs $1.4B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +686%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.46/share (latest year $4.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $40.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 9% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 16%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +29%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 29% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 3.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.2%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“As a result, it may be difficult for you to resell your shares of common stock in the future. 22 Emerging issues related to our development, integration and use of artificial intelligence ("AI") could give rise to legal or regulatory action, damage our reputation or otherwise mat…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$98M
  • Receivables$1.2B
  • Inventory$1.2B
  • Other current assets$665M
Current liabilities$1.8B
  • Debt due within a year$55M
  • Accounts payable$925M
  • Other current liabilities$792M
Current ratio1.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.09×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$55M due · $98M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−10.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.2B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$654M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.1B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$181Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$146M
'27$136M
'28$124M
'29$102M
'30$73M
later$225M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$146Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$807Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$660Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$4.5B
Lease obligations (present value)$660M
Total fixed claims on the business$5.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.1B, of which the leases are 13%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $12.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$2.2B · 18%
  • Buybacks$8.1B · 67%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.8B · 15%
  • Returned to owners$8.1B

    82% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $8.1B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$80.61

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 100M shares were bought for $8.1B, about $80.61 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $20.78 (2019) to $170.46 (2024); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $61.89 ($2.6B).

  • Net change in share count−3.3%

    The diluted count fell from 114M to 110M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.3B47% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity95%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.2B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Chad Crow$258k$22.9M$1.5B
2021Dave Flitman$10.1M$15.9M$1.5B
2022Dave Flitman$6.4M−$9.3M$3.3B
2022Dave Rush$4.1M$1.1M$3.3B
2023Dave Rush$8.1M$13.9M$1.8B
2024Dave Rush$8.3M$5.7M$1.5B
2024Peter Jackson$3.2M$2.6M$1.5B
2025Peter Jackson$8.1M$4.0M$853M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio109:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$54M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Builders FirstSource is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HDHome Depot Inc.$164.7B34%14.3%41%10%
LOWLowe's Cos Inc.$86.3B33%10.6%33%7%
SHWSherwin-Williams Company (The)$23.6B46%15.9%23%11%
TSCOTractor Supply Company$15.5B35%9.5%31%7%
BLDRBuilders FirstSource$15.2B28%5.9%16%5%
FASTFastenal Company$8.2B46%20.2%30%12%
FNDFloor & Decor$4.7B42%7.7%16%6%
Group median35%10.6%30%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Builders FirstSource has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Builders FirstSource earns about $835M on its 5.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $862M on 108M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $4.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Builders FirstSource (BLDR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BLDR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BLD its page in the Manual BLFS →

Industry order: ← BKE the Specialty Retail chapter BNED →