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BLFS, BioLife Solutions Inc.

Medical Devices & Equipment capital-intensive Unprofitable

We are a life sciences company that develops, manufactures, and markets bioproduction products and services which are designed to improve quality and de-risk biologic manufacturing, distribution, and transportation in the cell and gene therapy industry.

Our products are used in basic and applied research and commercial manufacturing of biologic-based therapies.

Customers use our products to maintain the health and function of biologic material during sourcing, manufacturing, and distribution.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BLFS · BioLife Solutions Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$96M

+28.9% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $102M 5-yr avg $87M

Gross margin 64% 5-yr avg 64%

Operating margin −15.8% 5-yr avg −17.2%

ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −3%

Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg −6%

Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg −9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 19% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −10%) on a 65% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 31% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and what follows it. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$11M	$20M	$27M	$48M	$119M	$76M	$68M	$75M	$96M	$102M	RevenueRevenue
61%	69%	68%	—	—	—	61%	67%	65%	64%	Gross marginGross mgn
41%	30%	32%	32%	28%	44%	63%	54%	47%	46%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%	7%	12%	14%	10%	11%	8%	6%	8%	9%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($1M)	$4M	($220K)	($6M)	($35M)	($6M)	($17M)	($4M)	($17M)	($16M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−9.6%	18.5%	−0.8%	−13.0%	−29.5%	−7.8%	−25.3%	−6.0%	−17.3%	−15.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($3M)	($25M)	($2M)	$2M	($9M)	($140M)	($68M)	($20M)	($5M)	($3M)	Net incomeNet inc.
										Cash flow & returns
$605K	$2M	$1M	$7M	($5M)	($8M)	($12M)	$8M	$20M	$18M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$339K	$338K	$718K	$2M	$5M	$7M	$7M	$5M	$2M	$2M	DepreciationDeprec.
$2M	$25M	($891K)	($3M)	($14M)	$99M	$15M	($7M)	($536K)	($5M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$144K	$500K	$675K	$2M	$8M	$10M	$6M	$3M	$9M	$9M	CapexCapex
1.3%	2.5%	2.5%	4.1%	7.0%	13.6%	9.4%	4.3%	9.9%	9.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$461K	$2M	$538K	$5M	($9M)	($15M)	($19M)	$5M	$18M	$16M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.2%	10.2%	2.0%	9.7%	−7.8%	−20.0%	−27.8%	7.0%	18.6%	15.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$461K	$2M	$538K	$5M	($13M)	($19M)	($19M)	$5M	$11M	$8M	Free cash flowFCF
4.2%	9.4%	2.0%	9.7%	−10.9%	−24.8%	−27.8%	7.0%	11.1%	8.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	38%	-0%	-4%	-7%	-1%	-4%	-1%	-4%	-4%	ROICROIC
—	-171%	-4%	1%	-2%	-38%	-20%	-6%	-1%	-1%	Return on equityROE
—	−171%	−4%	1%	−2%	−38%	−20%	−6%	−1%	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$7M	$7M	$6M	$90M	$70M	$19M	$28M	$92M	$33M	$23M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1M	$1M	$5M	$8M	$23M	$34M	$8M	$8M	$8M	$13M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$2M	$11M	$12M	$28M	$35M	$27M	$29M	$30M	$33M	InventoryInvent.
$691K	$586K	$3M	$4M	$15M	$15M	$2M	$3M	$1M	$4M	Accounts payablePayables
$2M	$2M	$13M	$16M	$37M	$53M	$33M	$34M	$37M	$42M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$10M	$10M	$24M	$115M	$126M	$138M	$121M	$149M	$137M	$133M	Current assetsCur. assets
$2M	$1M	$8M	$16M	$43M	$45M	$42M	$33M	$23M	$18M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
6.6×	7.8×	3.1×	7.4×	3.0×	3.1×	2.9×	4.5×	5.9×	7.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$0	$34M	$58M	$58M	$225M	$212M	$209M	$209M	$209M	GoodwillGoodwill
$12M	$12M	$93M	$235M	$554M	$450M	$413M	$399M	$406M	$401M	Total assetsAssets
—	—	$13K	$1M	$7M	$26M	$24M	$16M	$5M	$5M	Total debtDebt
—	—	($6M)	($89M)	($63M)	$6M	($4M)	($76M)	($28M)	($18M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-5.6×	732.4×	-44.0×	—	—	—	—	—	—	-4019.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($10M)	$15M	$43M	$204M	$478M	$364M	$338M	$349M	$372M	$372M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
11.5%	7.7%	11.1%	12.4%	11.7%	33.2%	48.9%	41.4%	23.9%	23.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
13.3M	21.6M	19.5M	27.3M	38.5M	43.1M	43.7M	46.1M	48.6M	49.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.83	$0.91	$1.41	$1.76	$3.09	$1.77	$1.56	$1.62	$1.98	$2.06	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.19	$-1.16	$-0.09	$0.07	$-0.23	$-3.25	$-1.56	$-0.44	$-0.09	$-0.06	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.03	$0.09	$0.03	$0.17	$-0.24	$-0.35	$-0.43	$0.11	$0.37	$0.32	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.03	$0.09	$0.03	$0.17	$-0.34	$-0.44	$-0.43	$0.11	$0.22	$0.17	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.01	$0.02	$0.03	$0.07	$0.22	$0.24	$0.15	$0.07	$0.19	$0.19	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.72	$0.68	$2.23	$7.49	$12.42	$8.46	$7.72	$7.57	$7.64	$7.56	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.63 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.4 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.41 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+11.4%/yr	+2.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+34.3%/yr	+16.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+43.5%/yr	+22.1%/yr
Book value / share	—	+0.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

49Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−4%low FY2021

Gross margin

65%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$18Mowner earningsvs.($5M)net incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $18M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2M it takes just to hold its position. It put $7M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $11M.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($5M)	($20M)	($68M)	($140M)	($9M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2M	+$5M	+$7M	+$7M	+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$23M	+$31M	+$33M	+$25M	+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$536K	−$7M	+$15M	+$99M	−$14M
Cash from operations	$20M	$8M	($12M)	($8M)	($5M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$2M	−$3M	−$6M	−$7M	−$5M
Owner earnings	$18M	$5M	($19M)	($15M)	($9M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$7M	—	—	−$4M	−$4M
Free cash flow	$11M	$5M	($19M)	($19M)	($13M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	7%	-28%	-20%	-8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $7M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer ($5M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“Though our internal control over financial reporting for the year ended December 31, 2025 was concluded to be operating effectively, we have historically identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -3320.4×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($17M) ÷ interest expense $5K

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$28M

Net cash

Cash $33M − debt $5M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $28M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 337d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 30 + DIO 323 − DPO 16 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -4%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -7%–38%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($13M) ÷ invested capital $344M

Industry peers: median -28%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -28%–19%; latest $18M = operating cash $20M − maintenance capex $2M

Industry peers: median -43%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 9 years. It chose to put $7M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $11M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves ($5M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $20M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($5M) · cash from operations $20M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 4.21×

Expanding

Capex $9M ÷ depreciation $2M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $96M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.94×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $5M vs $114M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 8 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.63/share (latest year $-0.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 3% → −16% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −16% lately, median −10% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −8%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +32%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 32% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −29.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“AI technologies may be developed using inaccurate, incomplete, flawed or biased algorithms, training methodologies or data, which could result in competitive harm, regulatory penalties, legal liability, or brand or reputational harm.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$133M

Cash & short-term investments$23M
Receivables$13M
Inventory$33M
Other current assets$65M

Current liabilities$18M

Debt due within a year$2M
Accounts payable$4M
Other current liabilities$12M

Current ratio7.30×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio5.50×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.25×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$115Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$2M due · $23M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+24.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.9× → 7.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$160Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$105MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$17M$12M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$270Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $14M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$41M · 299%

Source of funding−$27M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $27M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Net change in share count271.3%
The diluted count rose from 13M to 49M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$213M52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity56%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$15Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $41M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2020	Michael Rice	$1.5M	$6.5M	$5M
2021	—	$2.2M	$7.3M	($9M)
2022	—	$4.7M	$5.4M	($15M)
2023	Roderick de Greef	$5.3M	$4.7M	($19M)
2024	—	$7.0M	$12.4M	$5M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

CEO pay ratio58:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$23M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 24% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why BioLife Solutions Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?271.3%
Diluted shares grew 271.3% over 2017–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?26% → 45% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $3M to $46M while revenue grew 822%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (26% of revenue then, 45% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Medical Devices & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BFLYButterfly Network Inc.	$98M	37%	-263.0%	-134%	-179%
BLFSBioLife Solutions Inc.	$96M	66%	-9.6%	-3%	4%
KMTSKestra Medical Technologies Ltd.	$95M	40%	-177.8%	-53%	-143%
LABStandard BioTools Inc.	$85M	50%	-63.7%	-28%	-43%
IRMDiRadimed Corporation	$84M	77%	26.4%	51%	25%
FOCLEDAP TMS S.A.	$71M	43%	-35.0%	-115%	-25%
APTAlpha Pro Tech Ltd.	$59M	38%	6.7%	9%	6%
SIShoulder Innovations Inc.	$47M	77%	-55.6%	-16%	-67%
Group median	—	46%	-45.3%	-22%	-34%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BioLife Solutions Inc. has delivered.

BioLife Solutions Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, BioLife Solutions Inc. earns about $4M on its 4.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($4M) Net of stock comp (−$24M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($16M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+27%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $8M on 49M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $18M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($9M) runs well above depreciation ($2M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $16M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BLFS against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BioLife Solutions Inc. (BLFS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BLFS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BLDR its page in the Manual BLK →

Industry order: ← BLCO the Medical Devices & Equipment chapter BSX →