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BPYPP, Brookfield Property Partners L.P.
Our diversified Office portfolio consists of 67 million leasable square feet across 110 office assets in some of the world's leading commercial markets such as New York, London, Dubai, Toronto, and Berlin.
With approximately 24,000 employees involved in Brookfield's real estate businesses around the globe, we have built operating platforms in various real estate sectors.
Similar to our Office portfolio, within our Retail portfolio are 18 Super Core irreplaceable retail centers in attractive markets across the U.S., such as Honolulu and Las Vegas, which collectively represent the majority of equity attributable to Unitholders in our Retail portfolio.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by LP Investments (51%) and Office (26%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 7%, above 12% in only 3 of 10 years). A mortgage REIT lives on the spread between what its mortgages earn and what its borrowing costs, levered many times over; weigh the worst rate and credit years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest LP Investments at 51%.
- LP Investments51%$3.7B
- Office26%$1.8B
- Retail21%$1.5B
- Corporate2%$154M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $5.4B | $6.1B | $7.2B | $8.2B | $6.6B | $7.1B | $7.4B | $9.5B | $9.1B | $7.1B | $7.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| ($1.6B) | ($1.9B) | ($2.4B) | ($2.8B) | ($2.5B) | ($2.6B) | ($2.6B) | ($4.6B) | ($4.6B) | ($3.5B) | ($3.5B) | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| $12M | $18M | $10M | $6M | $44M | $77M | $114M | $66M | $77M | $168M | $168M | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| $2.7B | $2.5B | $3.7B | $3.2B | ($2.1B) | $3.5B | $996M | ($1.8B) | ($2.0B) | ($305M) | ($305M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 7% | 2% | 6% | — | 12% | 22% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| 3.5% | 2.9% | 3.0% | 2.8% | -1.9% | 3.1% | 0.9% | -1.4% | -1.9% | -0.3% | -0.3% | Return on assetsROA |
| 12% | 11% | 13% | 11% | -8% | 14% | 2% | -4% | -5% | -1% | -1% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | −5% | −1% | −5% | −17% | −3% | −9% | −13% | −13% | −7% | −12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 13% | 12% | 14% | 12% | -9% | 15% | 3% | -4% | -5% | -1% | -1% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $78.1B | $84.3B | $122.5B | $111.6B | $108.0B | $112.0B | $112.5B | $131.6B | $102.6B | $99.3B | $99.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $761M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $832M | $946M | $1.4B | $931M | $1.2B | $1.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $22.4B | $22.2B | $28.3B | $28.5B | $25.1B | $25.5B | $41.7B | $48.6B | $38.2B | $42.6B | $25.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -1%Loss on equityNet income ($305M) ÷ equity $25.5BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $1.2B − intangibles $1.1B)Industry peers: median 13%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 62%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 25.7%Well capitalizedEquity $25.5B ÷ assets $99.3B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Borrowed against bookAssets $99.3B ÷ equity $25.5B
What this means
A mortgage REIT finances a pool of mortgages with borrowed money — mostly short-term repo, which sits in liabilities rather than as tagged debt — so its true leverage is the whole balance sheet against the owners' equity, not just labeled debt. That leverage magnifies both the spread it earns and the loss when rates or credit move against it; read it beside the book value, the question being whether the spread compensated for the leverage through a cycle.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2020Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.9B
- Receivables$2.0B
- Inventory$510M
- Other current assets$84M
- Accounts payable$5.5B
- Other current liabilities$12.3B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Dec 31, 2020 comes to $1.9B against the $8.0B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 23% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (reit / real estate), compared on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FCNCAFirst Citizens BancShares Inc. | $9.5B | 12% | 13% | 64% | 3.0% |
| FITBFifth Third Bancorp | $9.0B | 12% | 16% | 58% | 2.7% |
| CFGCitizens Financial Group Inc. | $8.2B | 8% | 11% | 61% | 2.6% |
| HBANHuntington Bancshares Incorporated | $8.2B | 10% | 14% | 62% | 2.8% |
| NTRSNorthern Trust Corporation | $8.1B | 12% | 13% | 70% | 1.2% |
| KEYKeyCorp | $7.5B | 9% | 11% | 62% | 2.4% |
| BPYPPBrookfield Property Partners L.P. | $7.1B | 7% | 7% | — | -2.3% |
| SFStifel Financial | $6.3B | 12% | 17% | — | — |
| Group median | — | 11% | 13% | — | 2.6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Brookfield Property Partners L.P.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
A reit / real estate isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← BPYPO its page in the Manual BRAG →
Industry order: ← BPYPO the Real Estate Development & Services chapter CBRE →