Share count
769Mpeak FY2024
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BTE, Baytex Energy Corp
Baytex competes with other companies for all of its business inputs, including development prospects, access to commodity markets, acquisition opportunities, available capital and staffing.
Approximately 85% of our production is weighted toward crude oil and NGLs.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
C$1.5B
−8.2% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue C$1.5B 5-yr avg C$1.9B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 81% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 3.2% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −305% and 118% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 37% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| C$1.5B | C$812M | C$1.5B | C$2.3B | C$2.7B | C$1.6B | C$1.5B | C$1.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| C$47M | (C$2.5B) | C$1.8B | C$996M | (C$324M) | C$562M | (C$158M) | (C$158M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.2% | −304.8% | 118.1% | 42.8% | −12.0% | 34.9% | −10.7% | −10.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (C$12M) | (C$2.4B) | C$1.6B | C$856M | (C$233M) | C$237M | (C$604M) | (C$604M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 5% | 4% | — | 25% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| C$835M | C$353M | C$712M | C$1.2B | C$1.3B | C$1.9B | C$1.5B | C$1.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| C$732M | C$486M | C$465M | C$587M | C$1.0B | C$1.4B | C$1.3B | C$1.3B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| C$116M | C$2.3B | (C$1.4B) | (C$270M) | C$481M | C$286M | C$825M | C$825M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| C$549M | C$276M | C$310M | C$515M | C$1.0B | C$1.3B | C$1.2B | C$1.2B | CapexCapex |
| 37.0% | 34.0% | 20.3% | 22.1% | 37.3% | 77.9% | 81.4% | 81.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| C$286M | C$77M | C$402M | C$658M | C$283M | C$652M | C$281M | C$281M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 19.2% | 9.5% | 26.3% | 28.3% | 10.4% | 40.4% | 19.0% | 19.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| C$286M | C$77M | C$402M | C$658M | C$283M | C$652M | C$281M | C$281M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 19.2% | 9.5% | 26.3% | 28.3% | 10.4% | 40.4% | 19.0% | 19.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | C$0 | C$38M | C$72M | C$69M | C$69M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | C$0 | C$159M | C$222M | C$222M | C$29M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -0% | -422% | 73% | 28% | -6% | 6% | -25% | -25% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | 28% | −7% | 4% | −28% | −28% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| C$6M | C$0 | C$0 | C$5M | C$56M | C$17M | C$953M | C$953M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| C$174M | C$107M | C$173M | C$222M | C$339M | C$387M | C$135M | C$135M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | C$191M | C$227M | C$477M | C$512M | C$236M | C$236M | Accounts payablePayables |
| C$174M | C$107M | (C$17M) | (C$5M) | (C$138M) | (C$125M) | (C$101M) | (C$101M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| C$185M | C$113M | C$182M | C$244M | C$440M | C$450M | C$1.2B | C$1.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| C$233M | C$199M | C$339M | C$289M | C$558M | C$574M | C$330M | C$330M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.8× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 3.6× | 3.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| C$5.9B | C$3.4B | C$4.8B | C$5.1B | C$7.5B | C$7.8B | C$3.3B | C$3.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| 0.4× | -19.7× | 16.2× | 9.5× | -1.7× | 2.3× | -0.5× | -0.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| C$2.9B | C$578M | C$2.2B | C$3.0B | C$3.8B | C$4.2B | C$2.4B | C$2.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 557M | 561M | 564M | 558M | 705M | 803M | 769M | 769M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| C$2.67 | C$1.45 | C$2.71 | C$4.17 | C$3.85 | C$2.01 | C$1.93 | C$1.93 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| C$-0.02 | C$-4.35 | C$2.86 | C$1.53 | C$-0.33 | C$0.29 | C$-0.78 | C$-0.78 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| C$0.51 | C$0.14 | C$0.71 | C$1.18 | C$0.40 | C$0.81 | C$0.37 | C$0.37 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| C$0.51 | C$0.14 | C$0.71 | C$1.18 | C$0.40 | C$0.81 | C$0.37 | C$0.37 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | C$0.00 | C$0.05 | C$0.09 | C$0.09 | C$0.09 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| C$0.99 | C$0.49 | C$0.55 | C$0.92 | C$1.44 | C$1.56 | C$1.57 | C$1.57 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| C$5.29 | C$1.03 | C$3.92 | C$5.43 | C$5.43 | C$5.19 | C$3.11 | C$3.11 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −5.3%/yr | +5.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −5.5%/yr | +21.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +8.0%/yr | +26.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | −8.5%/yr | +24.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
C$281Mowner earningsvs.(C$604M)net incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a C$604M loss into C$281M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (C$604M) | C$237M | (C$233M) | C$856M | C$1.6B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +C$1.3B | +C$1.4B | +C$1.0B | +C$587M | +C$465M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +C$825M | +C$286M | +C$481M | −C$270M | −C$1.4B |
| Cash from operations | C$1.5B | C$1.9B | C$1.3B | C$1.2B | C$712M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −C$1.2B | −C$1.3B | −C$1.0B | −C$515M | −C$310M |
| Owner earnings | C$281M | C$652M | C$283M | C$658M | C$402M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 40% | 10% | 28% | 26% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income (C$158M) ÷ interest expense C$322M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 10%–40%; latest C$281M = operating cash C$1.5B − maintenance capex C$1.2BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 7 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? C$1.5BLoss, but cash-generativeNet income (C$604M) · cash from operations C$1.5B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks C$99M ÷ Owner Earnings C$281M
What this means
Of C$281M Owner Earnings, C$99M (35%) went back to shareholders, C$69M dividends, C$29M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.95×MaintainingCapex C$1.2B ÷ depreciation C$1.3B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · C$1.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.61×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 3 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are C$-0.26/share (latest year C$-0.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is C$3.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −61% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −61% early to 4% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +17%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −304.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“The Company's IT systems may incorporate artificial intelligence ( AI ), and development of these capabilities is ongoing.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsC$1.2B
- Cash & short-term investmentsC$953M
- ReceivablesC$135M
- Other current assetsC$102M
Current liabilitiesC$330M
- Accounts payableC$236M
- Other current liabilitiesC$94M
Current ratio3.61×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio—inventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio2.89×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalC$860Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueC$2.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueC$234MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesC$23MC$23M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated C$7.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- ReinvestedC$5.1B · 66%
- DividendsC$179M · 2%
- BuybacksC$633M · 8%
- Retained (debt / cash)C$1.8B · 24%
- Returned to ownersC$811M
31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, C$179M as dividends and C$633M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran C$633M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count38.1%
The diluted count rose from 557M to 769M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend recordC$0.09/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Baytex Energy Corp is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?38.1%
Diluted shares grew 38.1% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent C$633M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NENoble Corporation plc A | $3.3B | — | 16.2% | 7% | 11% |
| NBRNabors Industries | $3.2B | 37% | 1.8% | -2% | 4% |
| BTEBaytex Energy Corp | C$1.5B | — | 3.2% | — | 19% |
| WTTRSelect Water Solutions | $1.4B | 12% | 1.9% | -0% | 6% |
| VNOMViper Energy | $1.3B | — | 66.4% | 18% | — |
| PUMPProPetro Holding Corp. | $1.3B | — | 0.1% | 0% | 7% |
| SDRLSeadrill Limited | $1.1B | — | 28.5% | — | -7% |
| HPKHighPeak Energy Inc. | $863M | — | 34.0% | 13% | 59% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.7% | — | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Baytex Energy Corp's US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at CAD 1 = $0.712 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CAD.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Baytex Energy Corp has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Baytex Energy Corp earns about $203M on its 19.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $200M on 766M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $679M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Baytex Energy Corp (BTE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BTE, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BTDR its page in the Manual BTG →
Industry order: ← BORR the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter CLB →