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NBR, Nabors Industries

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCapital build-outCyclical

Nabors owns and operates one of the world's largest land-based drilling rig fleets and is a provider of offshore platform rigs in the United States and numerous international markets.

Nabors also supplies performance software, tubular running services, managed pressure drilling services and innovative technologies for both its own rig fleet and those operated by third parties.

With operations in over 20 countries, we are a global provider of drilling and drilling-related services for land-based and offshore oil and natural gas wells.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

NBR · Nabors Industries

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.2B

+8.7% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.2B 5-yr avg $2.8B

Gross margin 46% 5-yr avg 38%

Operating margin 14.4% 5-yr avg 8.2%

ROIC 0% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 22% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 1.7% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −8.0% and 15% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 15% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

59% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

International59%$1.9B
United States41%$1.3B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$2.2B	$2.6B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$3.2B	RevenueRevenue
40%	33%	35%	37%	38%	36%	37%	40%	—	—	46%	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	10%	9%	9%	10%	11%	9%	8%	9%	10%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($118M)	($142M)	$59M	$89M	($171M)	($81M)	$44M	$434M	$417M	$471M	$465M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−5.3%	−5.5%	1.9%	2.9%	−8.0%	−4.0%	1.7%	14.4%	14.2%	14.8%	14.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($1.0B)	($547M)	($641M)	($703M)	($806M)	($569M)	($350M)	($12M)	($176M)	$287M	$238M	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$532M	$63M	$326M	$685M	$350M	$429M	$501M	$638M	$581M	$693M	$719M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$872M	$843M	$867M	$876M	$854M	$693M	$665M	$645M	$633M	$649M	$651M	DepreciationDeprec.
$658M	($265M)	$73M	$487M	$277M	$285M	$170M	($11M)	$108M	($266M)	($194M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$395M	$574M	$459M	$428M	$196M	$234M	$373M	$541M	$568M	$716M	$716M	CapexCapex
17.8%	22.4%	15.0%	14.1%	9.2%	11.6%	14.1%	18.0%	19.4%	22.5%	22.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$136M	($512M)	($133M)	$257M	$154M	$195M	$128M	$97M	$14M	($23M)	$3M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.1%	−20.0%	−4.4%	8.4%	7.2%	9.7%	4.8%	3.2%	0.5%	−0.7%	0.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$136M	($512M)	($133M)	$257M	$154M	$195M	$128M	$97M	$14M	($23M)	$3M	Free cash flowFCF
6.1%	−20.0%	−4.4%	8.4%	7.2%	9.7%	4.8%	3.2%	0.5%	−0.7%	0.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$22M	$0	$21M	$3M	—	—	—	—	—	$84M	$84M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$51M	$69M	—	—	$23M	$7M	$65K	$194K	$87K	—	$87K	Dividends paidDiv. paid
-1%	-2%	—	—	-4%	-2%	—	—	—	14%	0%	ROICROIC
-32%	-19%	-24%	-35%	-70%	-96%	-95%	-4%	-130%	49%	42%	Return on equityROE
−33%	−21%	—	—	−72%	−98%	−95%	−4%	−131%	—	42%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$295M	$365M	$482M	$452M	$482M	$991M	$452M	$1.1B	$397M	$941M	$501M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$508M	$698M	$756M	$453M	$363M	$288M	$327M	$348M	$388M	$392M	$418M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$104M	$166M	$166M	$176M	$161M	$126M	$128M	$148M	$130M	$95M	$90M	InventoryInvent.
$265M	$363M	$393M	$295M	$221M	$254M	$314M	$294M	$321M	$300M	$323M	Accounts payablePayables
$347M	$501M	$529M	$334M	$303M	$160M	$141M	$201M	$197M	$186M	$185M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.0B	$1.6B	$1000M	$1.6B	$1.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$822M	$919M	$832M	$657M	$515M	$525M	$596M	$1.2B	$572M	$993M	$585M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	1.6×	1.9×	1.9×	2.2×	2.9×	1.7×	1.4×	1.7×	1.6×	2.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$167M	$173M	$184M	$28M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$28M	GoodwillGoodwill
$8.2B	$8.4B	$7.9B	$6.8B	$5.5B	$5.5B	$4.7B	$5.3B	$4.5B	$4.8B	$4.4B	Total assetsAssets
$3.6B	$4.0B	$3.6B	$3.3B	$3.0B	$3.3B	$2.5B	$3.1B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$71.4B	Total debtDebt
$3.3B	$3.7B	$3.1B	$2.9B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$1.6B	$70.9B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.6×	-0.6×	0.3×	0.4×	-0.8×	-0.5×	0.2×	2.3×	2.0×	2.2×	2.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.2B	$2.9B	$2.7B	$2.0B	$1.2B	$591M	$369M	$327M	$135M	$591M	$569M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%	1.2%	0.9%	0.8%	1.2%	1.0%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	$156M	$28M	—	—	—	—	—	$28M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
10.4M	10.5M	10.0M	10.5M	10.6M	11.4M	13.3M	13.7M	13.8M	14.4M	14.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$214.88	$243.65	$304.79	$288.53	$201.54	$176.86	$198.83	$218.80	$212.28	$220.91	$227.40	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-99.32	$-51.96	$-63.89	$-66.64	$-76.09	$-49.90	$-26.24	$-0.86	$-12.76	$19.88	$16.78	EPS (diluted)EPS
$13.16	$-48.62	$-13.27	$24.35	$14.57	$17.07	$9.56	$7.06	$0.98	$-1.57	$0.21	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$13.16	$-48.62	$-13.27	$24.35	$14.57	$17.07	$9.56	$7.06	$0.98	$-1.57	$0.21	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$4.91	$6.51	—	—	$2.13	$0.65	$0.00	$0.01	$0.01	—	$0.01	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$38.14	$54.58	$45.75	$40.55	$18.47	$20.52	$27.98	$39.37	$41.14	$49.66	$50.37	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$313.18	$276.67	$269.22	$187.98	$108.74	$51.78	$27.64	$23.77	$9.78	$40.98	$40.03	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/40 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before 2025 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+0.3%/yr	+1.9%/yr
Dividends / share	−56.5%/yr (8-yr)	−76.7%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	+3.0%/yr	+21.9%/yr
Book value / share	−20.2%/yr	−17.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

14Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

14%low FY2020

Gross margin

40%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

156.0×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($23M)owner earningsvs.$287Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $287M of profit but ($23M) of owner earnings: $309M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$287M	($176M)	($12M)	($350M)	($569M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$649M	+$633M	+$645M	+$665M	+$693M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$23M	+$17M	+$16M	+$16M	+$19M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$266M	+$108M	−$11M	+$170M	+$285M
Cash from operations	$693M	$581M	$638M	$501M	$429M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$716M	−$568M	−$541M	−$373M	−$234M
Owner earnings	($23M)	$14M	$97M	$128M	$195M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-1%	0%	3%	5%	10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer ($46M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.2×

Adequate

Operating income $471M ÷ interest expense $215M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $70.4B · 149.5× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $941M + ST investments $31K − debt $71.4B

What this means
Netting $941M of cash and short-term investments against $71.4B of debt leaves $70.4B owed, about 149.5× a year's operating profit (151.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 3d

Tight

DSO 45 + DIO 19 − DPO 61 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -2%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -4%–14%; 0% latest = NOPAT $300M ÷ invested capital $71.0B

Industry peers: median 1%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -20%–10%; latest ($23M) = operating cash $693M − maintenance capex $716M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves ($46M).
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.42×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $693M ÷ net income $287M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.10×

Maintaining

Capex $716M ÷ depreciation $649M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $71.4B vs $559M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 7 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.06/share (latest year $17.96), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $37.02/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −3% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −3% early to 14% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −8.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 7 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B

Cash & short-term investments$501M
Receivables$418M
Inventory$90M
Other current assets$144M

Current liabilities$585M

Debt due within a year$377M
Accounts payable$323M

Current ratio1.97×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.82×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.86×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$567Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$377M due · $501M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 2.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$541Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.5B$40M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$76Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$4.5B · 93%
Dividends$150M · 3%
Buybacks$20M · 0%
Retained (debt / cash)$143M · 3%

Returned to owners$169M
54% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $150M as dividends and $20M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $67.8B and cash and short-term investments rose $206M.
Average price paid for buybacks$154.96
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $20M, about $154.96 each.
Net change in share count37.1%
The diluted count rose from 10M to 14M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.01/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 67% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$28M1% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity5%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$143Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $4.5B of capital spent building

$184M written down across 2 years (2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Petrello	$10.0M	$18.3M	$195M
2022	Mr. Petrello	$10.8M	$30.1M	$128M
2023	Mr. Petrello	$10.3M	−$1.9M	$97M
2024	Mr. Petrello	$12.1M	$11.3M	$14M
2025	Mr. Petrello	$29.6M	$33.0M	($23M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$23M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Nabors Industries is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.1%
Diluted shares grew 37.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $20M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.6B → $71.4B
Debt rose from $3.6B to $71.4B while owner earnings went from about ($169M) to $29M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $573M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$970M · 30% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“One customer, Saudi Aramco, accounted for approximately 30%, 31% and 26% of our consolidated operating revenues during the years ended December 31, 2025, 2024 and 2023, respectively, which operating revenues are primarily included in the results of our International Drilling reportable segment.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PTENPatterson-UTI Energy	$4.8B	—	-14.6%	-8%	9%
LBRTLiberty Energy	$4.0B	22%	7.1%	2%	4%
RIGTransocean Ltd (Switzerland)	$4.0B	37%	-13.7%	-2%	9%
HPHelmerich & Payne	$3.7B	—	0.7%	-1%	4%
NENoble Corporation plc A	$3.3B	—	16.2%	7%	11%
NBRNabors Industries	$3.2B	37%	1.8%	-2%	4%
OIIOceaneering International	$2.6B	12%	2.6%	5%	4%
SDRLSeadrill Limited	$1.1B	—	28.5%	—	-7%
Group median	—	29%	2.2%	-1%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nabors Industries has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Nabors Industries earns about $128M on its 4.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($128M) Net of stock comp (−$24M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3M on 16M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $70.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh NBR against another business →

The owners of NBR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Nabors Industries (NBR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NBR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NBIX its page in the Manual NBTB →

Industry order: ← LSE the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter NE →