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WTTR, Select Water Solutions

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCapital build-outCyclical

Select Water Solutions, Inc. and its consolidated subsidiaries is a leading provider of sustainable water-management solutions to the energy industry in the U.S.

By prioritizing recycling, we effectively create synthetic disposal capacity without needing new wells, helping customers manage seismicity concerns and pore space limitations.

Elsewhere, Select has maintained and grown market leading infrastructure positions in other major U.S. basins including market leading disposal positions in the Haynesville and Northeast regions as well as a leading solids management position in the Bakken region.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

WTTR · Select Water Solutions

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.4B

−3.1% YoY · 18% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $1.3B

Gross margin 15% 5-yr avg 12%

Operating margin 2.2% 5-yr avg 0.8%

ROIC 3% 5-yr avg 0%

Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin −7% 5-yr avg −0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 21% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 12% and operating margin about 1.8% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −99% and 4.0% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 8.6% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 regions, the largest Permian Basin at 51%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

Permian Basin51%$724M
Rockies12%$165M
Marcellus Utica11%$157M
Eagle Ford10%$135M
Mid Continent6%$91M
Bakken6%$87M
Other3%$48M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$302M	$692M	$1.5B	$1.3B	$605M	$765M	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.4B	RevenueRevenue
−15%	8%	13%	12%	−5%	3%	12%	15%	15%	14%	15%	Gross marginGross mgn
11%	12%	7%	9%	12%	11%	9%	10%	11%	11%	12%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($299M)	($30M)	$62M	$23M	($395M)	($66M)	$39M	$61M	$54M	$29M	$31M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−98.9%	−4.3%	4.0%	1.8%	−65.2%	−8.6%	2.8%	3.9%	3.8%	2.0%	2.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($1M)	($17M)	$37M	$3M	($339M)	($42M)	$48M	$74M	$31M	$21M	$22M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	4%	41%	—	—	2%	—	31%	-8%	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$5M	($3M)	$232M	$204M	$106M	($16M)	$33M	$285M	$235M	$215M	$230M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$97M	$103M	$134M	$121M	$102M	$92M	$116M	$2M	$3M	$5M	$13M	DepreciationDeprec.
($91M)	($97M)	$52M	$65M	$337M	($76M)	($146M)	$191M	$174M	$168M	$174M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$36M	$99M	$165M	$110M	$21M	$40M	$72M	$136M	$173M	$295M	$325M	CapexCapex
12.0%	14.3%	10.8%	8.5%	3.5%	5.2%	5.2%	8.6%	11.9%	20.9%	23.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($31M)	($102M)	$67M	$94M	$85M	($56M)	($39M)	$283M	$231M	$209M	$217M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−10.3%	−14.7%	4.4%	7.3%	14.0%	−7.4%	−2.8%	17.9%	15.9%	14.9%	15.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($31M)	($102M)	$67M	$94M	$85M	($56M)	($39M)	$149M	$62M	($80M)	($95M)	Free cash flowFCF
−10.3%	−14.7%	4.4%	7.3%	14.0%	−7.4%	−2.8%	9.4%	4.3%	−5.7%	−6.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$65M	$17M	$10M	—	$35M	$7M	$18M	$161M	$54M	$40M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	$6M	$25M	$30M	$34M	$34M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	$297K	$17M	$19M	$11M	$1M	$20M	$62M	$8M	$7M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-325%	-3%	7%	—	-74%	-10%	5%	—	4%	3%	3%	ROICROIC
-1%	-3%	4%	0%	-57%	-7%	6%	10%	4%	3%	2%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	—	—	—	6%	6%	0%	−2%	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$40M	$3M	$17M	$79M	$169M	$86M	$7M	$57M	$20M	$18M	$56M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$76M	$374M	$342M	$268M	$129M	$233M	$430M	—	—	—	$493M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1M	$45M	$45M	$38M	$33M	$44M	$41M	$39M	$38M	$34M	$37M	InventoryInvent.
$11M	$53M	$54M	$36M	$13M	$36M	$62M	$43M	$39M	$50M	$50M	Accounts payablePayables
$66M	$366M	$333M	$269M	$150M	$241M	$410M	($4M)	($742K)	($15M)	$480M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$125M	$447M	$432M	$416M	$352M	$395M	$518M	$454M	$385M	$354M	$444M	Current assetsCur. assets
$46M	$185M	$180M	$152M	$89M	$162M	$231M	$212M	$233M	$226M	$232M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×	2.4×	2.4×	2.7×	4.0×	2.4×	2.2×	2.1×	1.7×	1.6×	1.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$12M	$273M	$274M	$267M	—	—	—	$5M	$18M	$48M	$48M	GoodwillGoodwill
$405M	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$875M	$950M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	Total assetsAssets
—	$77M	$46M	—	—	—	$16M	$0	$85M	$316M	$247M	Total debtDebt
—	$74M	$29M	—	—	—	$9M	($57M)	$65M	$298M	$191M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-18.5×	-4.5×	11.6×	8.6×	-184.8×	-38.3×	14.5×	13.9×	7.8×	1.2×	1.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$113M	$657M	$833M	$937M	$593M	$592M	$766M	$772M	$794M	$806M	$991M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	1.1%	0.7%	1.2%	1.0%	1.2%	1.1%	1.1%	1.8%	1.4%	1.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$139M	—	$18M	$4M	$267M	—	—	—	—	—	$267M	Goodwill written downGW imp.

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

ROIC

3%low FY2016

Gross margin

14%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.4×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$209Mowner earningsvs.$21Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $209M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $5M it takes just to hold its position. It put $289M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($80M).

Reported net income$21M

Owner earnings$209M · 15% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$21M	$31M	$74M	$48M	($42M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$5M	+$3M	+$2M	+$116M	+$92M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$20M	+$26M	+$17M	+$16M	+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$168M	+$174M	+$191M	−$146M	−$76M
Cash from operations	$215M	$235M	$285M	$33M	($16M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$5M	−$3M	−$2M	−$72M	−$40M
Owner earnings	$209M	$231M	$283M	($39M)	($56M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$289M	−$170M	−$134M	—	—
Free cash flow	($80M)	$62M	$149M	($39M)	($56M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	15%	16%	18%	-3%	-7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $5M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $289M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer $189M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.2×

Thin

Operating income $29M ÷ interest expense $23M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $298M · 10.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $18M − debt $316M

What this means
Netting $18M of cash and short-term investments against $316M of debt leaves $298M owed, about 10.4× a year's operating profit (11.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 107d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 112 + DIO 10 − DPO 15 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -3%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -325%–7%; 3% latest = NOPAT $29M ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median 1%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 15%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $209M = operating cash $215M − maintenance capex $5M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $289M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($80M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves $189M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 10.12×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $215M ÷ net income $21M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 20%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $41M ÷ Owner Earnings $209M

What this means
Of $209M Owner Earnings, $41M (20%) went back to shareholders, $34M dividends, $7M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($20M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 55.36×

Expanding

Capex $295M ÷ depreciation $5M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.57×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $316M vs $129M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +577%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.30/share (latest year $0.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −33% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −33% early to 3% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2016 · −98.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$444M

Cash & short-term investments$56M
Receivables$493M
Inventory$37M

Current liabilities$232M

Debt due within a year$47M
Accounts payable$50M
Other current liabilities$135M

Current ratio1.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.76×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$213Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$47M due · $56M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$841Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($143M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$285M$38M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.1B · 88%
Dividends$94M · 7%
Buybacks$145M · 11%

Returned to owners$239M
32% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $94M as dividends and $145M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$90M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $90M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $145M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count—
No continuous share count across the span.
Dividend recordPays
Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$155M10% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity6%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$367Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

$428M written down across 4 years (2016, 2018, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Schmitz	$7.8M	$7.3M	($56M)
2021	Mr. Schmitz	$3.3M	$3.2M	($56M)
2022	Mr. Schmitz	$7.6M	$10.7M	($39M)
2023	Mr. Schmitz	$4.4M	$721k	$283M
2024	Mr. Schmitz	$4.9M	$10.5M	$231M
2025	Mr. Schmitz	$4.9M	$3.1M	$209M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership6.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$20M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 69% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Select Water Solutions is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?25% → 38% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $77M to $530M while revenue grew 363%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (25% of revenue then, 38% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $526M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$140M · 10% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“Significant Customers There was one customer that accounted for 10% of our consolidated revenues for the year ended December 31, 2025.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OIIOceaneering International	$2.6B	12%	2.6%	5%	4%
ACDCProFrac Holding Corp.	$1.9B	—	-2.5%	-3%	3%
RESRPC	$1.6B	26%	4.8%	7%	5%
XPROExpro Group Holdings N.V.	$1.6B	95%	-12.2%	-8%	-1%
WTTRSelect Water Solutions	$1.4B	12%	1.9%	-0%	6%
NESRNational Energy Services Reunited Corp	$1.3B	13%	7.4%	8%	9%
HLXHelix Energy Solutions Group Inc.	$1.3B	12%	3.3%	1%	9%
PUMPProPetro Holding Corp.	$1.3B	—	0.1%	0%	7%
Group median	—	12%	2.3%	0%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Select Water Solutions has delivered.

Select Water Solutions’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Select Water Solutions earns about $82M on its 5.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($82M) Net of stock comp (−$22M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($225M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−14%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($95M) on 138M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $191M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($325M) runs well above depreciation ($13M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $225M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh WTTR against another business →

The owners of WTTR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Select Water Solutions (WTTR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WTTR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WTS its page in the Manual WTW →

Industry order: ← WHD the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter XPRO →