Owner Scorecard


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BTU, Peabody Energy Corporation Common Stock

Coal & Consumable Fuels capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Peabody is a leading producer of metallurgical and thermal coal.

Segment and Geographic Information" to the accompanying consolidated financial statements is incorporated herein by reference and also contains segment and geographic financial information.

The mine experienced a fire in March 2023 and restarted production in June 2023.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
BTU · Peabody Energy Corporation Common Stock
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.9B
−8.9% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.9B 5-yr avg $4.3B
Operating margin −4.0% 5-yr avg 14.2%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg 23%
Owner-earnings margin −4% 5-yr avg 9%
Free cash flow margin −4% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Powder River Basin (30%) and Seaborne Metallurgical (27%), with 3 more segments behind.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 1.3% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −60% and 28% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 4 of 7 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Powder River Basin at 30%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Powder River Basin30%$1.2B
  • Seaborne Metallurgical27%$1.0B
  • Seaborne Thermal24%$909M
  • Other U.S. Thermal18%$707M
  • Corporate and Other (1)1%$56M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.6B$4.7B$5.6B$4.6B$2.9B$3.3B$5.0B$4.9B$4.2B$3.9B$3.9BRevenueRevenue
3%3%3%3%3%3%2%2%2%3%3%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($1.5B)($277M)$662M$62M($1.7B)$432M$1.4B$1.1B$445M($80M)($156M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−26.1%−5.9%11.9%1.3%−60.0%13.0%27.7%21.7%10.5%−2.1%−4.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($2.0B)($729M)$544M($211M)($1.9B)$360M$1.3B$760M$371M($53M)($120M)Net incomeNet inc.
3%6%-3%29%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($14M)($53M)$1.5B$677M($10M)$420M$1.2B$1.0B$607M$334M$244MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$572M$465M$679M$601M$346M$309M$318M$321M$343M$385M$402MDepreciationDeprec.
$1.4B$211M$231M$249M$1.5B($259M)($450M)($52M)($115M)($12M)($55M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$127M$127M$301M$285M$191M$183M$222M$348M$401M$411M$411MCapexCapex
2.3%2.7%5.4%6.2%6.6%5.5%4.4%7.0%9.5%10.7%10.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($141M)($179M)$1.2B$392M($201M)$237M$952M$687M$205M($78M)($168M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−2.5%−3.8%21.3%8.5%−7.0%7.1%19.1%13.9%4.8%−2.0%−4.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($141M)($179M)$1.2B$392M($201M)$237M$952M$687M$205M($78M)($168M)Free cash flowFCF
−2.5%−3.8%21.3%8.5%−7.0%7.1%19.1%13.9%4.8%−2.0%−4.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$387M$2M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1M$0$60M$258M$0$0$0$31M$38M$37M$37MDividends paidDiv. paid
$835M$330M$0$0$0$348M$183M$0BuybacksBuybacks
17%-77%21%61%26%10%-2%-4%ROICROIC
-262%-419%16%-8%-201%20%40%21%10%-1%-3%Return on equityROE
−262%−419%14%−18%−201%20%40%21%9%−3%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$261M$652M$1.0B$732M$709M$954M$1.3B$969M$700M$575M$568MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$229M$473M$450M$330M$245M$351M$466M$390M$359M$315M$310MReceivablesReceiv.
$308M$204M$280M$332M$262M$227M$296M$352M$393M$383M$406MInventoryInvent.
$333M$289M$282M$255M$146M$202M$241M$276M$228M$205M$796MAccounts payablePayables
$203M$388M$449M$406M$360M$376M$521M$466M$524M$493M($81M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$2.1B$2.0B$1.6B$1.4B$1.8B$2.4B$2.0B$1.8B$1.6B$1.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$7.3B$1.0B$1.1B$975M$791M$932M$919M$979M$828M$842M$810MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.2×2.1×1.8×1.7×1.8×1.9×2.6×2.1×2.2×1.9×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$10.9B$11.8B$7.4B$6.5B$4.7B$4.9B$5.6B$6.0B$6.0B$5.8B$5.7BTotal assetsAssets
$366M$287M$1.4B$1.3B$1.5B$1.1B$334M$334M$348M$336M$335MTotal debtDebt
$105M($365M)$350M$579M$839M$184M($974M)($635M)($352M)($239M)($232M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.1×-0.9×4.4×0.4×-12.4×2.4×9.8×18.0×9.5×-1.8×-3.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$750M$174M$3.4B$2.6B$930M$1.8B$3.2B$3.5B$3.7B$3.5B$3.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.6%0.8%0.5%0.3%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
2.3M2.3M2.1M104M97.7M112M157M154M142M122M122MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2479.20$2061.33$2658.00$44.58$29.49$29.63$31.69$32.06$29.86$31.70$31.95Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-868.64$-318.82$259.24$-2.04$-19.14$3.22$8.25$4.92$2.61$-0.43$-0.98EPS (diluted)EPS
$-62.41$-78.43$566.05$3.78$-2.06$2.12$6.06$4.45$1.45$-0.64$-1.37Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-62.41$-78.43$566.05$3.78$-2.06$2.12$6.06$4.45$1.45$-0.64$-1.37Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.62$0.00$28.38$2.49$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.20$0.26$0.30$0.30Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$56.04$55.34$143.33$2.75$1.96$1.63$1.41$2.26$2.83$3.38$3.37Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$331.54$76.02$1616.95$25.21$9.51$15.73$20.56$22.99$25.73$29.03$28.65Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×49.38 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.4 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−35.3%/yr+1.5%/yr
Dividends / share−7.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−24.5%/yr+11.5%/yr
Book value / share−21.6%/yr+25.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
122Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
−2%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($78M)owner earningsvs.($53M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $53M loss but ($78M) of owner earnings: $25M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($53M)$371M$760M$1.3B$360M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$385M+$343M+$321M+$318M+$309M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$14M+$7M+$7M+$8M+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$12M−$115M−$52M−$450M−$259M
Cash from operations$334M$607M$1.0B$1.2B$420M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$411M−$401M−$348M−$222M−$183M
Owner earnings($78M)$205M$687M$952M$237M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-2%5%14%19%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer ($92M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($80M) ÷ interest expense $44M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $575M − debt $336M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $239M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median, range -77%–61%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($63M) ÷ invested capital $3.3B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -7%–21%; latest ($78M) = operating cash $334M − maintenance capex $411M
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves ($92M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($53M) · cash from operations $334M

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.07×
    Maintaining
    Capex $411M ÷ depreciation $385M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.85×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $336M vs $717M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.95/share (latest year $-0.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $29.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −7% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −7% early to 10% lately, median 1% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −60.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$568M
  • Receivables$310M
  • Inventory$406M
  • Other current assets$229M
Current liabilities$810M
  • Debt due within a year$44M
  • Accounts payable$796M
Current ratio1.87×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.37×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$701Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$44M due · $568M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($659M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$174M$130M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.6B · 46%
  • Dividends$424M · 7%
  • Buybacks$1.7B · 30%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$944M · 17%
  • Returned to owners$2.1B

    69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $424M as dividends and $1.7B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$21.79

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 31M shares were bought for $678M, about $21.79 each.

  • Net change in share count5292.3%

    The diluted count rose from 2M to 122M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.30/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$8.8M$11.9M$237M
2021$4.2M$4.8M$237M
2022$3.8M$8.0M$952M
2023$5.9M$4.8M$687M
2024$7.0M$7.3M$205M
2025$9.0M$16.6M($78M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio70:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$14M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Peabody Energy Corporation Common Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5292.3%

    Diluted shares grew 5292.3% over 2015–2025, even as the company spent $1.7B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?10% → 18% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $537M to $715M while revenue grew −31%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (10% of revenue then, 18% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $3.0B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$974M · 25% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “For the year ended December 31, 2025, Peabody derived 25% of its revenue from coal supply agreements from its five largest customers.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Coal & Consumable Fuels

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CNRCore Natural Resources Inc.$4.2B4.6%4%14%
BTUPeabody Energy Corporation Common Stock$3.9B5.9%17%6%
ARLPAlliance Resource Partners L.P. Common$2.2B18.0%21%
AMRAlpha Metallurgical Resources Inc.$2.1B9.6%15%4%
HCCWarrior Met Coal Inc.$1.3B46%30.2%35%29%
METCRamaco Resources Inc.$537M21%6.5%14%9%
NCNACCO Industries Inc.$277M13%21.3%12%21%
NRPNatural Resource Partners LP$232M82.8%87%
Group median13.8%15%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Peabody Energy Corporation Common Stock has delivered.

Peabody Energy Corporation Common Stock’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Peabody Energy Corporation Common Stock earns about $231M on its 6.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−43%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($168M) on 122M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $232M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Peabody Energy Corporation Common Stock (BTU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BTU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BTSGU its page in the Manual BURL →

Industry order: ← ARLP the Coal & Consumable Fuels chapter CCJ →