Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← BTU Manual BUSE → ← BJ Department & General Merchandise Stores COST →

BURL, Burlington Stores

We are a nationally recognized off-price retailer of high-quality, branded merchandise at everyday low prices.

We opened our first store in Burlington, New Jersey in 1972, selling primarily coats and outerwear.

Since then, we have expanded our store base to 1,212 stores as of January 31, 2026, in 46 states, Washington D.C. and Puerto Rico.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
BURL · Burlington Stores
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$11.5B
+8.8% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $11.9B 5-yr avg $10.0B
Gross margin 44% 5-yr avg 42%
Operating margin 6.8% 5-yr avg 5.3%
ROIC 19% 5-yr avg 22%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 42% and operating margin about 5.7% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −7.8% to 7.6% — on a steadier 42% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 23%, above 15% in 9 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$5.6B$6.1B$6.6B$7.3B$5.8B$9.3B$8.7B$9.7B$10.6B$11.5B$11.9BRevenueRevenue
41%42%42%42%38%42%40%42%43%44%44%Gross marginGross mgn
31%31%30%31%40%31%33%34%33%33%33%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$308M$404M$482M$555M($450M)$530M$289M$447M$657M$799M$808MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.5%6.6%7.3%7.6%−7.8%5.7%3.3%4.6%6.2%6.9%6.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$216M$385M$415M$465M($216M)$230M$230M$340M$504M$610M$624MNet incomeNet inc.
35%10%18%20%37%25%27%25%25%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$616M$607M$640M$892M$219M$833M$596M$869M$863M$1.2B$1.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$184M$201M$218M$211M$220M$249M$270M$307M$348M$418M$431MDepreciationDeprec.
$201M($6M)($28M)$172M$159M$295M$28M$138M($75M)$97M$146MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$188M$268M$296M$328M$273M$352M$447M$493M$880M$1.1B$939MCapexCapex
3.4%4.4%4.5%4.5%4.8%3.8%5.2%5.1%8.3%9.2%7.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$428M$406M$422M$681M($54M)$584M$326M$562M$516M$814M$891MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.7%6.7%6.3%9.4%−0.9%6.3%3.8%5.8%4.9%7.0%7.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$428M$339M$344M$563M($54M)$481M$149M$376M($17M)$172M$383MFree cash flowFCF
7.7%5.6%5.2%7.8%−0.9%5.2%1.7%3.9%−0.2%1.5%3.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$202M$290M$229M$323M$66M$267M$317M$243M$256M$278MBuybacksBuybacks
20%34%33%39%-31%27%15%22%23%23%19%ROICROIC
444%129%88%-47%30%29%34%37%34%34%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$82M$133M$112M$403M$1.4B$1.1B$873M$925M$995M$1.2B$747MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$43M$72M$59M$92M$62M$54M$71M$74M$88M$105M$114MReceivablesReceiv.
$702M$753M$954M$777M$741M$1.0B$1.2B$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4BInventoryInvent.
$640M$736M$849M$759M$863M$1.1B$956M$956M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1BAccounts payablePayables
$105M$88M$164M$110M($60M)($6M)$297M$206M$301M$398M$508MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$928M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$2.5B$2.5B$2.3B$2.3B$2.6B$2.8B$2.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$997M$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9B$2.0B$2.3B$2.2B$2.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×1.0×1.0×1.0×1.5×1.3×1.2×1.1×1.2×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$47M$47M$47M$47M$47M$47M$47M$47M$47M$47M$47MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.6B$2.8B$3.1B$5.6B$6.8B$7.1B$7.3B$7.7B$8.8B$9.9B$9.8BTotal assetsAssets
$1.1B$1.1B$987M$1.0B$2.1B$1.6B$1.5B$1.4B$1.7B$2.1B$2.1BTotal debtDebt
$1.0B$994M$874M$602M$686M$464M$616M$483M$716M$846M$1.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.7×9.4×11.2×11.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($50M)$87M$323M$528M$465M$760M$795M$997M$1.4B$1.8B$1.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.4%0.5%0.6%1.0%0.6%0.8%0.9%0.8%0.9%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
71.7M70.3M68.7M67.3M66.0M68.1M65.9M64.9M64.6M64.1M64.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$77.61$86.57$96.73$107.90$87.19$136.61$131.78$149.56$164.36$180.11$185.55Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.01$5.48$6.04$6.91$-3.28$3.38$3.49$5.23$7.80$9.51$9.73EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.97$5.78$6.14$10.12$-0.82$8.57$4.95$8.65$7.99$12.69$13.89Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.97$4.82$5.01$8.37$-0.82$7.06$2.26$5.79$-0.26$2.68$5.97Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.61$3.82$4.31$4.88$4.14$5.17$6.79$7.59$13.63$16.53$14.64Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.69$1.23$4.70$7.85$7.05$11.16$12.06$15.36$21.22$28.18$28.63Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.8%/yr+15.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.7%/yr
EPS+13.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+22.7%/yr+31.9%/yr
Book value / share+32.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
64Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
23%low FY2021
Gross margin
44%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.0×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$814Mowner earningsvs.$610Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $814M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $418M it takes just to hold its position. It put $642M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $172M.

Reported net income$610M
Owner earnings$814M · 7% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$610M$504M$340M$230M$230M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$418M+$348M+$307M+$270M+$249M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$107M+$88M+$84M+$67M+$59M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$97M−$75M+$138M+$28M+$295M
Cash from operations$1.2B$863M$869M$596M$833M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$418M−$348M−$307M−$270M−$249M
Owner earnings$814M$516M$562M$326M$584M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$642M−$533M−$186M−$177M−$103M
Free cash flow$172M($17M)$376M$149M$481M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%5%6%4%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $418M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $642M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $107M), owner earnings is nearer $707M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $799M ÷ interest expense $71M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $846M · 1.1× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $1.2B − debt $2.1B
    What this means

    Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $846M owed, about 1.1× a year's operating profit (2.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 3 + DIO 74 − DPO 57 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -31%–39%; 23% latest = NOPAT $597M ÷ invested capital $2.7B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 23% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -1%–9%; latest $814M = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $418M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. It chose to put $642M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $172M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $107M of SBC) leaves $707M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $610M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $614M ÷ Owner Earnings $814M
    What this means

    Of $814M Owner Earnings, $614M (76%) went back to shareholders, $336M dividends, $278M buybacks. Net of $107M stock comp, the real buyback was about $172M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.54×
    Expanding
    Capex $1.1B ÷ depreciation $418M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $11.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.23×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs $522M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +43%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.70/share (latest year $9.69), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 6% early, 6% lately, median 6%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 16%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −7.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Additionally, existing competitors may consolidate with other retailers, expand their merchandise offerings, expand their e-commerce capabilities, and/or add new sales channels, change their pricing strategies, or use technology more effectively than we do, including the use of a…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$747M
  • Receivables$114M
  • Inventory$1.4B
  • Other current assets$200M
Current liabilities$2.2B
  • Debt due within a year$51M
  • Accounts payable$1.1B
  • Other current liabilities$1.1B
Current ratio1.16×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.49×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.35×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$353Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$51M due · $747M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 2, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$6.0B$4.0B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $6.0B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$658M
'27$716M
'28$677M
'29$618M
'30$540M
later$1.9B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$658Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$5.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$3.9Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.1B
Lease obligations (present value)$3.9B
Total fixed claims on the business$6.0B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $6.0B, of which the leases are 66%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $7.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$4.6B · 62%
  • Buybacks$2.5B · 34%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$310M · 4%
  • Returned to owners$2.5B

    53% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.5B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−10.6%

    The diluted count fell from 72M to 64M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained30%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($707M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $212M, so each retained $1 added about 0.30 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022O’Sullivan$13.9M$10.3M$584M
2023O’Sullivan$12.8M$2.8M$326M
2024O’Sullivan$13.9M$17.1M$562M
2025O’Sullivan$15.4M$38.2M$516M
2026O’Sullivan$17.1M$23.6M$814M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$107M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Burlington Stores is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $80M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Department & General Merchandise Stores

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MMacy's$21.8B38%5.0%13%4%
BJBJ's Wholesale$21.5B18%3.7%24%3%
DLTRDollar Tree Inc.$19.4B31%8.3%14%5%
KSSKohl's$15.5B40%4.8%11%6%
BURLBurlington Stores$11.5B42%5.9%23%6%
DDSDillard's$6.5B37%8.2%29%8%
PSMTPriceSmart Inc.$5.3B15%4.3%13%3%
FIVEFive Below$4.8B36%11.2%25%9%
Group median37%5.5%19%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Burlington Stores has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Burlington Stores earns about $729M on its 6.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $383M on 63M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-02; net debt $1.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($939M) runs well above depreciation ($431M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $904M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Burlington Stores (BURL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BURL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BTU its page in the Manual BUSE →

Industry order: ← BJ the Department & General Merchandise Stores chapter COST →