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CLNE, Clean Energy Fuels Corp.

Gas Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityUnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Clean Energy Fuels Corp. is a leading renewable energy company focused on the procurement and distribution of renewable natural gas and conventional natural gas, in the form of compressed natural gas and liquefied natural gas, for the United States and Canadian transportation markets.

We are focused on developing, owning, and operating dairy RNG projects and supplying RNG (currently procured from third party sources) to our customers in the heavy and medium-duty commercial transportation sectors.

Clean Energy also sells bulk natural gas in the form of LNG and CNG to customers ranging from marine cargo ships to space aircraft to large paper mills.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CLNE · Clean Energy Fuels Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$425M

+2.2% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $439M 5-yr avg $388M

Gross margin 52%

Operating margin −8.3% 5-yr avg −22.8%

ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −9%

Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −12% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −4%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$403M	$342M	$346M	$344M	$292M	$256M	$420M	$425M	$416M	$425M	$439M	RevenueRevenue
43%	37%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	52%	Gross marginGross mgn
26%	28%	22%	21%	23%	35%	26%	26%	27%	26%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($18M)	($134M)	$4M	$10M	($10M)	($95M)	($52M)	($76M)	($36M)	($160M)	($36M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−4.4%	−39.4%	1.1%	2.9%	−3.4%	−37.2%	−12.3%	−18.0%	−8.7%	−37.6%	−8.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($12M)	($79M)	($4M)	$20M	($10M)	($93M)	($59M)	($99M)	($83M)	($222M)	($99M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$46M	($4M)	$38M	$12M	$61M	$41M	$67M	$44M	$65M	$86M	$54M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$59M	$57M	$52M	$50M	$48M	$45M	$55M	$46M	$45M	$99M	$47M	DepreciationDeprec.
($9M)	$10M	($15M)	($62M)	$20M	$74M	$44M	$74M	$92M	$200M	$97M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$24M	$36M	$25M	$27M	$13M	$23M	$45M	$101M	$65M	$26M	$25M	CapexCapex
5.9%	10.6%	7.3%	7.9%	4.5%	9.0%	10.6%	23.7%	15.6%	6.0%	5.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$23M	($41M)	$13M	($15M)	$48M	$18M	$22M	($2M)	$20M	$60M	$29M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.6%	−11.9%	3.7%	−4.3%	16.4%	7.1%	5.3%	−0.4%	4.8%	14.1%	6.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$23M	($41M)	$13M	($15M)	$48M	$18M	$22M	($57M)	($418K)	$60M	$29M	Free cash flowFCF
5.6%	−11.9%	3.7%	−4.3%	16.4%	7.1%	5.3%	−13.4%	−0.1%	14.1%	6.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$15M	$3M	$6M	$0	$0	$8M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-2%	-16%	1%	2%	-2%	-11%	-6%	-7%	-3%	-20%	-4%	ROICROIC
-3%	-19%	-1%	4%	-2%	-12%	-8%	-14%	-12%	-40%	-18%	Return on equityROE
−3%	−19%	−1%	4%	−2%	−12%	−8%	−14%	−12%	−40%	−18%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$110M	$178M	$95M	$106M	$139M	$229M	$264M	$263M	$217M	$156M	$126M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$79M	$64M	$69M	$62M	$62M	$87M	$91M	$98M	$108M	$101M	$111M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$30M	$35M	$35M	$30M	$28M	$31M	$37M	$45M	$43M	$44M	$43M	InventoryInvent.
$24M	$18M	$19M	$27M	$17M	$24M	$44M	$57M	$33M	$26M	$22M	Accounts payablePayables
$85M	$81M	$85M	$64M	$73M	$94M	$84M	$87M	$118M	$119M	$131M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$262M	$305M	$226M	$294M	$263M	$410M	$472M	$470M	$414M	$350M	$332M	Current assetsCur. assets
$89M	$203M	$80M	$163M	$80M	$126M	$148M	$164M	$155M	$151M	$135M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×	1.5×	2.8×	1.8×	3.3×	3.3×	3.2×	2.9×	2.7×	2.3×	2.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$93M	$64M	$64M	$64M	$64M	$64M	$64M	$64M	$64M	$0	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$897M	$792M	$699M	$777M	$715M	$957M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.0B	Total assetsAssets
$312M	$260M	$84M	$89M	$86M	$36M	$146M	$261M	$265M	$227M	$228M	Total debtDebt
$203M	$83M	($11M)	($17M)	($53M)	($193M)	($118M)	($2M)	$48M	$71M	$102M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	-8.2×	-3.3×	-1.1×	-3.0×	-0.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$469M	$427M	$508M	$533M	$514M	$747M	$720M	$727M	$713M	$559M	$558M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.0%	2.4%	1.5%	1.1%	1.0%	5.9%	6.3%	5.5%	2.6%	2.1%	2.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
119M	150M	181M	206M	201M	213M	222M	223M	223M	221M	220M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$3.37	$2.27	$1.92	$1.67	$1.45	$1.20	$1.89	$1.91	$1.86	$1.93	$2.00	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.10	$-0.53	$-0.02	$0.10	$-0.05	$-0.44	$-0.26	$-0.45	$-0.37	$-1.01	$-0.45	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.19	$-0.27	$0.07	$-0.07	$0.24	$0.09	$0.10	$-0.01	$0.09	$0.27	$0.13	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.19	$-0.27	$0.07	$-0.07	$0.24	$0.09	$0.10	$-0.26	$-0.00	$0.27	$0.13	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.20	$0.24	$0.14	$0.13	$0.07	$0.11	$0.20	$0.45	$0.29	$0.12	$0.11	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.93	$2.84	$2.81	$2.59	$2.56	$3.51	$3.24	$3.26	$3.19	$2.54	$2.54	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−6.0%/yr	+5.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+4.1%/yr	+2.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−5.7%/yr	+12.0%/yr
Book value / share	−4.7%/yr	−0.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

221Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

−20%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.2×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$60Mowner earningsvs.($222M)net incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $222M loss into $60M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($222M)	($83M)	($99M)	($59M)	($93M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$99M	+$45M	+$46M	+$55M	+$45M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$11M	+$23M	+$26M	+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$200M	+$92M	+$74M	+$44M	+$74M
Cash from operations	$86M	$65M	$44M	$67M	$41M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$26M	−$45M	−$46M	−$45M	−$23M
Owner earnings	$60M	$20M	($2M)	$22M	$18M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$20M	−$55M	—	—
Free cash flow	$60M	($418K)	($57M)	$22M	$18M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	14%	5%	0%	5%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $51M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -3.0×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($160M) ÷ interest expense $53M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $71M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $156M + ST investments $552K − debt $227M

What this means
Netting $156M of cash and short-term investments against $227M of debt leaves $71M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 117d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 87 + DIO 74 − DPO 44 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -20%–2%; -20% latest = NOPAT ($126M) ÷ invested capital $631M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -12%–16%; latest $60M = operating cash $86M − maintenance capex $26M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $51M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $86M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($222M) · cash from operations $86M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 13%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $8M ÷ Owner Earnings $60M

What this means
Of $60M Owner Earnings, $8M (13%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $8M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($9M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.26×

Harvesting

Capex $26M ÷ depreciation $99M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $425M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.32×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $227M vs $199M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.61/share (latest year $-1.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −14% → −21% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −14% early to −21% lately, median −12% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2017 · −39.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$332M

Cash & short-term investments$126M
Receivables$111M
Inventory$43M
Other current assets$53M

Current liabilities$135M

Debt due within a year$54K
Accounts payable$22M
Other current liabilities$113M

Current ratio2.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.14×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.93×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$197Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$54K due · $126M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.2× → 2.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$548Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($141M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$321M$93M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$15Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $455M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$385M · 85%
Buybacks$32M · 7%
Retained (debt / cash)$39M · 9%

Returned to owners$32M
22% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $32M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $84M and cash and short-term investments rose $16M.
Average price paid for buybacks$2.21
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $32M, about $2.21 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $1.62 (2025) to $6.44 (2021); its heaviest year, 2020, paid $1.89 ($15M).
Net change in share count84.0%
The diluted count rose from 119M to 220M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$10M1% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$2Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $385M of capital spent building

$64M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Littlefair	$10.8M	$9.7M	$18M
2022	Mr. Littlefair	$1.1M	$298k	$22M
2023	Mr. Littlefair	$2.0M	$22k	($2M)
2024	Mr. Littlefair	$2.7M	$1.0M	$20M
2025	Mr. Littlefair	$2.7M	$2.1M	$60M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio22:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Clean Energy Fuels Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?84.0%
Diluted shares grew 84.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $32M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?27% → 35% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $109M to $153M while revenue grew 9%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (27% of revenue then, 35% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Gas Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ALEALLETE	$1.5B	90%	12.6%	4%	11%
AWRAmerican States Water	$658M	89%	28.3%	10%	17%
SMCSummit Midstream Corporation	$562M	73%	12.9%	4%	8%
UTLUNITIL Corporation	$536M	—	16.9%	7%	-7%
GNEGenie Energy Ltd.	$502M	33%	5.8%	29%	7%
HNRGHallador Energy Company	$469M	24%	2.1%	2%	3%
CLNEClean Energy Fuels Corp.	$425M	49%	-10.5%	-4%	5%
OPALOPAL Fuels Inc.	$327M	—	3.3%	—	5%
Group median	—	61%	9.2%	4%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Clean Energy Fuels Corp. has delivered.

Clean Energy Fuels Corp.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Clean Energy Fuels Corp. earns about $21M on its 5.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($21M) Net of stock comp (−$9M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+18%/yr

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $29M on 220M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $102M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CLNE against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Clean Energy Fuels Corp. (CLNE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CLNE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CLMT its page in the Manual CLOV →

Industry order: ← BIPC the Gas Utilities chapter CPK →