Gross margin
64%low FY2024
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BIPC, BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION
Brookfield Infrastructure Corporation 61 Strategic Position Our regulated gas transmission operation in Brazil provides the backbone of Brazil's southeast natural gas transportation system, supplying natural gas to a region responsible for approximately 50% of Brazil's demand, including Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.
Our rate base increases with capital that we invest to upgrade and expand our systems.
The objectives for our businesses are to invest capital in the expansion of our rate base, as well as to provide safe and reliable service for our customers on a cost-efficient basis.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$3.7B
+0.1% YoY · 21% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.7B 5-yr avg $2.7B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Gas Transmission (39%) and Leasing (37%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 66% and operating margin about 63% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (60%–68% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −249 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Gas Transmission at 39%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Gas Transmission39%$1.4B
- Leasing37%$1.4B
- Distribution16%$592M
- Connections7%$244M
- Other1%$28M
By geographyBrazil39%United Kingdom24%Switzerland8%Singapore8%France7%Denmark4%Other10%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.5B | $3.7B | $3.7B | $3.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 85% | 66% | 63% | 68% | 71% | 69% | 62% | 64% | 64% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $982M | $1.0B | $870M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 62.9% | 64.1% | 60.8% | 65.0% | 67.6% | 66.2% | 60.4% | 61.5% | 61.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $202M | $197M | ($552M) | ($368M) | $1.1B | $111M | ($608M) | ($241M) | ($241M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 54% | 58% | — | — | 19% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $1.1B | $1.1B | $730M | $839M | $893M | $1.1B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $319M | $308M | $283M | $236M | $211M | $365M | $775M | $668M | $668M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $544M | $578M | $999M | $971M | ($412M) | $583M | $1.6B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | — | — | $594M | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.6B | CapexCapex |
| — | — | — | — | — | 23.7% | 38.3% | 43.8% | 43.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | $694M | $968M | $940M | $940M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | — | — | — | 27.7% | 26.4% | 25.6% | 25.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | $465M | $340M | $2M | $2M | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | — | — | — | 18.6% | 9.3% | 0.1% | 0.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $66M | $115M | $158M | $178M | $213M | $228M | $228M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $99M | $204M | $192M | $469M | $445M | $539M | $674M | $431M | $431M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $390M | $394M | $448M | $499M | $939M | $786M | $928M | $928M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $487M | $505M | $605M | $781M | $1.1B | $994M | $1.2B | $1.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($97M) | ($111M) | ($157M) | ($282M) | ($160M) | ($208M) | ($280M) | ($280M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $594M | $586M | $2.0B | $1.6B | $2.8B | $4.8B | $2.9B | $2.9B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $493M | $2.8B | $6.2B | $4.6B | $6.4B | $7.6B | $7.7B | $7.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.2× | 0.2× | 0.3× | 0.3× | 0.4× | 0.6× | 0.4× | 0.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $667M | $528M | $489M | $518M | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $9.9B | $9.3B | $10.1B | $10.2B | $23.9B | $23.6B | $24.0B | $24.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| 7.7× | 6.6× | 4.1× | 3.6× | 2.3× | 2.4× | 2.1× | 2.0× | 2.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.2B | $1.7B | ($1.7B) | ($2.1B) | ($1.1B) | ($399M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.3B) | ($1.3B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$940Mowner earningsvs.($241M)net incomelow FY2023
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $940M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $668M it takes just to hold its position. It put $938M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $2M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($241M) | ($608M) | $111M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$668M | +$775M | +$365M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.2B | +$1.6B | +$583M |
| Cash from operations | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.1B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$668M | −$775M | −$365M |
| Owner earnings | $940M | $968M | $694M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$938M | −$628M | −$229M |
| Free cash flow | $2M | $340M | $465M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 26% | 26% | 28% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $668M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $938M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $2.3B ÷ interest expense $1.2B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 92 + DIO 0 − DPO 331 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- High through the cycle3-yr median margin, range 26%–28%; latest $940M = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $668MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 3 years. It chose to put $938M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $2M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($241M) · cash from operations $1.6B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $228M ÷ Owner Earnings $940M
What this means
Of $940M Owner Earnings, $228M (24%) went back to shareholders, $228M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.40×ExpandingCapex $1.6B ÷ depreciation $668M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.38×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 6 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.05/share (latest year $-2.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-10.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 63% → 63% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 63% early, 63% lately, median 63%.
- Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 60.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.9B
- Cash & short-term investments$431M
- Receivables$928M
- Other current assets$1.6B
Current liabilities$7.7B
- Accounts payable$1.2B
- Other current liabilities$6.5B
Current ratio0.38×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.38×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($4.7B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($6.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($19.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Gas Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WESWestern Midstream Partners LP Common | $3.8B | 73% | 43.1% | — | 38% |
| BIPCBROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION | $3.7B | 67% | 63.5% | — | 26% |
| NGLNGL ENERGY PARTNERS LP Common | $3.2B | 14% | 2.8% | — | 1% |
| CTRICenturi Holdings Inc. | $3.0B | 8% | 3.1% | 5% | 2% |
| OGSONE Gas | $2.6B | 57% | 17.9% | 6% | -6% |
| SRSpire | $2.5B | 53% | 18.5% | 6% | 12% |
| NFGNational Fuel Gas | $2.2B | 86% | 31.4% | 11% | 27% |
| SWXSouthwest Gas Holdings | $1.9B | 51% | 12.6% | 6% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 55% | 18.2% | — | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−93%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’23→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $2M on 120M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net cash $431M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.6B) runs well above depreciation ($668M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $940M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BROOKFIELD INFRASTRUCTURE CORPORATION (BIPC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BIPC, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BIP its page in the Manual BIPH →
Industry order: ← ATO the Gas Utilities chapter CLNE →