Share count
512Mpeak FY2025
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CLOV, Clover Health Investments Corp.
We strongly believe in providing our members with provider choice and consider our PPO plans to be our flagship insurance product.
At Clover Health, our vision is to empower every physician with technology to identify, manage, and treat chronic diseases earlier.
Our proprietary software platform, Clover Assistant (licensed externally as Counterpart Assistant), supports clinical real-time decision making at the point of care by equipping the clinical with data and insights.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
+40.3% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.2B 5-yr avg $1.4B
Revenue $749M +62.0% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 3.6% yr-ago −0.3%
Net income $27M yr-ago ($1M)
Net margin 3.6% yr-ago −0.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- The medical loss ratio and membership. What decides it: keeping medical costs below the premiums collected, where a regulated floor sets how much must be paid out as care, so the spread is thin; membership growth across commercial, Medicare and Medicaid; and the cost discipline on what little is left. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- It pays out about 83% of premiums as medical care across the record (the medical loss ratio), keeping the rest to cover administration and profit against a regulated floor. That leaves a thin operating margin, a median of about −16.3%, the sign of a volume-and-cost-control business rather than a high-margin one, though turns that sliver over fast enough to earn roughly −74% on equity. Whether membership keeps growing and medical costs stay below premiums, especially as the Medicare Advantage and Medicaid mix shifts, is what the 10-K decides, not an earnings multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $462M | $673M | $1.5B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| $457M | $666M | $799M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.2B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| — | 89% | — | 92% | 81% | 75% | 83% | 83% | Medical loss ratioMLR |
| −39.6% | −13.8% | −43.3% | −26.1% | −16.3% | −3.3% | −4.4% | −2.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($364M) | ($136M) | ($588M) | ($340M) | ($213M) | ($43M) | ($86M) | ($57M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| — | — | -110% | -98% | -74% | -13% | -28% | -17% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −110% | −98% | −74% | −13% | −28% | −17% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $100K | $267M | $951M | $809M | $571M | $581M | $541M | $698M | Total assetsAssets |
| $0 | ($617M) | $535M | $348M | $286M | $341M | $309M | $339M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 87.8M | 88.7M | 413M | 476M | 482M | 490M | 512M | 533M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.26 | $7.59 | $3.56 | $2.30 | $2.61 | $2.80 | $3.76 | $4.15 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.14 | $-1.54 | $-1.42 | $-0.71 | $-0.44 | $-0.09 | $-0.17 | $-0.11 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.00 | $-6.96 | $1.30 | $0.73 | $0.59 | $0.70 | $0.60 | $0.64 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×4.66 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −5.5%/yr | −13.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +57.5%/yr | −12.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$1.9Blow FY2019
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Medical loss ratio 82.9%Profitable bandMedical costs $1.6B ÷ premiums earned $1.9BIndustry peers: median 87%
What this means
The number that runs a health plan: cents of every premium dollar paid back out as medical care. A regulated floor (about 80-85% under the ACA, or rebates are owed) means the plan keeps only a thin sliver, so the discipline is in pricing premiums ahead of medical cost trend. Read it across years, because a single bad cost trend, like the recent Medicare Advantage squeeze, shows up here first.
- Operating margin −4.4%Very thin (<2%)Operating income ($86M) ÷ revenue $1.9BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
Health plans earn a sliver on enormous revenue, so a few points of margin is the norm and the business is really a volume-and-cost-control game. Because the margin is so thin, a small miss on medical costs swings profit hard, which is why membership scale and cost management matter more than price.
- Return on equity −28%Loss on equityNet income ($86M) ÷ equity $309MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The thin margin turns over fast on a modest capital base, so a plan earning its keep still shows a good return on equity. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds value; a year below it usually means medical costs outran premiums.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“AI technologies are complex and rapidly evolving, and we face significant competition from other companies as well as an evolving regulatory landscape under existing and proposed federal, state and international regulations.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$448M
- Cash & short-term investments$178M
- Other current assets$270M
Current liabilities$337M
- Accounts payable$39M
- Other current liabilities$297M
Current ratio1.33×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.33×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.53×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$111Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+62.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$339Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$90MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4M$4M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$17Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Vivek Garipalli | $389.6M | $62.4M | ($283M) |
| 2023 | Andrew Toy | $10.2M | $10.7M | ($145M) |
| 2024 | Andrew Toy | $9.5M | $23.9M | $35M |
| 2025 | Andrew Toy | $1.3M | −$3.1M | ($67M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$104M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Managed Care
The same industry, side by side on the medical-loss-ratio lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Medical loss ratio | Op. margin | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ELVElevance Health Inc. | $199.1B | 87% | 5.3% | 14% |
| CNCCentene Corporation | $194.8B | — | 2.2% | 9% |
| HUMHumana Inc. | $129.7B | 89% | 3.9% | 17% |
| MOHMolina Healthcare | $45.4B | — | 3.9% | 26% |
| OSCROscar Health | $11.7B | 85% | -14.9% | -41% |
| ALHCAlignment Healthcare | $3.9B | — | -3.9% | -69% |
| CLOVClover Health Investments Corp. | $1.9B | 83% | -16.3% | -74% |
| TRUPTrupanion Inc. | $1.4B | — | -1.0% | -3% |
| Group median | — | 86% | 0.6% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Clover Health Investments Corp. has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $55M on 522M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $211M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3M) runs well above depreciation (($2M)), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $57M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Clover Health Investments Corp. (CLOV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CLOV, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CLNE its page in the Manual CLPT →
Industry order: ← CI the Managed Care chapter CNC →