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CLPS, CLPS Incorporation
We are a global information technology, consulting and solutions service provider focused on delivering services primarily to global institutions, including banking, wealth management, e-commerce, and automotive areas both in China and globally.
Our diverse business lines span sectors including fintech, payment and credit services, e-commerce, education and study abroad programs, and global tourism integrated with transportation services.
Through its diversified offerings, CLPS is committed to providing comprehensive services, solutions, and products for our clients.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 32% and operating margin about 2.1% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.8% and 6.6% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 2 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →China is 74% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
- China74%$122M
- Singapore13%$22M
- Hong Kong SAR China9%$14M
- United States2%$4M
- Japan1%$2M
- India0%$214K
- Others0%$116K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $29M | $31M | $49M | $65M | $89M | $126M | $152M | $150M | $143M | $164M | $164M | RevenueRevenue |
| 40% | 40% | 36% | 37% | 35% | 32% | 27% | 23% | 23% | 22% | 22% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $614K | $2M | $2M | ($3M) | $3M | $8M | $7M | $76K | ($3M) | ($5M) | ($5M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 2.1% | 5.1% | 3.5% | −4.8% | 3.6% | 6.6% | 4.9% | 0.1% | −1.8% | −3.3% | −3.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $2M | $2M | $3M | ($3M) | $3M | $7M | $5M | $166K | ($2M) | ($6M) | ($6M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 13% | -6% | -4% | — | 21% | 15% | 40% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $4M | $624K | ($5M) | $401K | $6M | ($3M) | $3M | $10M | $9M | ($3M) | ($3M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $54K | $144K | $206K | $404K | $593K | $677K | $912K | $1M | $1M | $2M | $1M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $3M | ($2M) | ($8M) | $3M | $2M | ($10M) | ($2M) | $8M | $10M | $2M | $3M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $328K | $63K | $231K | $500K | $168K | $1M | $21M | $519K | $2M | $1M | $1M | CapexCapex |
| 1.1% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 0.9% | 13.6% | 0.3% | 1.5% | 0.8% | 0.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $4M | $562K | ($5M) | ($98K) | $6M | ($3M) | $2M | $9M | $8M | ($4M) | ($4M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 15.2% | 1.8% | −10.2% | −0.2% | 6.4% | −2.6% | 1.5% | 6.1% | 5.4% | −2.3% | −2.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $4M | $562K | ($5M) | ($98K) | $6M | ($4M) | ($18M) | $9M | $7M | ($4M) | ($4M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 14.2% | 1.8% | −10.2% | −0.2% | 6.4% | −2.9% | −11.5% | 6.1% | 4.8% | −2.3% | −2.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $5M | $736K | $613K | — | — | $34K | — | $1M | $3M | $4M | $4M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | 21% | -15% | 17% | — | 7% | 0% | -4% | -7% | -16% | ROICROIC |
| — | 46% | 15% | -17% | 11% | — | 7% | 0% | -3% | -12% | -12% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 31% | 12% | — | — | — | — | −2% | −7% | −18% | −18% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $5M | $5M | $10M | $8M | $13M | $29M | $18M | $22M | $31M | $29M | $29M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $7M | $16M | $19M | $26M | $44M | $54M | $49M | $39M | $45M | $45M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | $344K | $690K | $949K | $3M | $3M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $7M | $16M | $19M | $26M | $44M | $53M | $48M | $38M | $42M | $42M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $12M | $29M | $30M | $41M | $76M | $77M | $73M | $78M | $86M | $86M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $8M | $13M | $11M | $16M | $23M | $30M | $26M | $40M | $54M | $54M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.5× | 2.3× | 2.6× | 2.5× | 3.3× | 2.5× | 2.8× | 2.0× | 1.6× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $195K | $174K | $448K | $2M | $2M | $2M | — | $1M | $1M | $1M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $14M | $31M | $33M | $45M | $83M | $102M | $95M | $110M | $118M | $118M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $2M | $23K | $10K | $14M | $11M | $23M | $30M | $10K | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | ($6M) | ($13M) | ($29M) | ($4M) | ($12M) | ($8M) | $1M | ($29M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | $5M | $18M | $21M | $27M | — | $67M | $65M | $63M | $56M | $56M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 11.3M | 11.3M | 11.6M | 13.8M | 14.7M | 17.6M | 21.1M | 23.2M | 25.2M | 27.5M | 28.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.57 | $2.78 | $4.21 | $4.69 | $6.09 | $7.18 | $7.22 | $6.49 | $5.66 | $5.97 | $5.88 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.16 | $0.20 | $0.23 | $-0.25 | $0.21 | $0.40 | $0.22 | $0.01 | $-0.07 | $-0.23 | $-0.23 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.39 | $0.05 | $-0.43 | $-0.01 | $0.39 | $-0.19 | $0.11 | $0.40 | $0.30 | $-0.14 | $-0.14 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.37 | $0.05 | $-0.43 | $-0.01 | $0.39 | $-0.21 | $-0.83 | $0.40 | $0.27 | $-0.14 | $-0.14 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.47 | $0.07 | $0.05 | — | — | $0.00 | — | $0.05 | $0.10 | $0.13 | $0.13 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.01 | $0.06 | $0.99 | $0.02 | $0.08 | $0.05 | $0.04 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | $0.43 | $1.56 | $1.50 | $1.86 | — | $3.16 | $2.79 | $2.48 | $2.02 | $1.98 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.8%/yr | −0.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −13.1%/yr | +187.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +5.2%/yr | +32.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +21.4%/yr (8-yr) | +1.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $6M loss into ($4M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($6M) | ($2M) | $166K | $5M | $7M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2M | +$1M | +$1M | +$912K | +$677K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$2M | +$10M | +$8M | −$2M | −$10M |
| Cash from operations | ($3M) | $9M | $10M | $3M | ($3M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$1M | −$1M | −$519K | −$912K | −$677K |
| Owner earnings | ($4M) | $8M | $9M | $2M | ($3M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$865K | — | −$20M | −$395K |
| Free cash flow | ($4M) | $7M | $9M | ($18M) | ($4M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -2% | 5% | 6% | 2% | -3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $28M + ST investments $897K − debt $10K
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $29M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 100 + DIO 0 − DPO 7 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -15%–21%; -16% latest = NOPAT ($4M) ÷ invested capital $27MIndustry peers: median -34%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -10%–15%; latest ($4M) = operating cash ($3M) − maintenance capex $1MIndustry peers: median -10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($6M) · cash from operations ($3M)
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.00×MaintainingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $1M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $164M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.58×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $10K vs $31M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 7 of 9 tagged yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design. One year of this record is untagged in the data, with the dividend paid on both sides; a lone missing tag is treated as unknown, not a suspension, so the streak is judged on the tagged years.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −221%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.09/share (latest year $-0.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to −2% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −14%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −3%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2019 · −4.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 7 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$29M
- Receivables$45M
- Other current assets$12M
- Debt due within a year$10K
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$52M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $23M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$27M · 116%
- Dividends$14M · 60%
- Returned to owners$14M
79% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $14M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$18M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $18M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Net change in share count147.9%
The diluted count rose from 11M to 28M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.13/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 19% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why CLPS Incorporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?147.9%
Diluted shares grew 147.9% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AIC3.ai Inc. | $250M | 67% | -80.5% | -36% | -37% |
| WEAVWeave Communications Inc. | $239M | 63% | -35.0% | -111% | -10% |
| XZOExzeo Group Inc. | $217M | 40% | 28.4% | — | 35% |
| IIIVi3 Verticals Inc. | $213M | 32% | 1.9% | 1% | 10% |
| SOUNSoundHound AI Inc | $169M | 69% | -308.2% | -6% | -150% |
| CLPSCLPS Incorporation | $164M | 33% | 2.8% | 0% | 2% |
| BLZEBackblaze Inc. | $146M | 52% | -32.1% | -88% | 1% |
| BBAIBigBear.ai Inc. | $128M | 25% | -62.6% | -31% | -19% |
| Group median | — | 46% | -33.5% | -31% | -5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. CLPS Incorporation reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CLPS Incorporation has delivered.
CLPS Incorporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, CLPS Incorporation earns about $3M on its 1.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($4M) on 30M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-10-06; net cash $29M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CLLS its page in the Manual CM →
Industry order: ← CLBT the Software chapter CMCM →