Owner Scorecard


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CLBT, Cellebrite DI Ltd.

Software asset-light Cyclical

Revenue is led by Subscription Services (70%) and Term-Licenses (20%), with 2 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share
CLBT · Cellebrite DI Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$476M
+18.6% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $476M 5-yr avg $344M
Gross margin 84% 5-yr avg 83%
Operating margin 14.0% 5-yr avg 8.9%
ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 24%
Owner-earnings margin 34% 5-yr avg 22%
Free cash flow margin 34% 5-yr avg 22%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 83% and operating margin about 5.6% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.9% to 14% — on a steadier 83% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 30% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Subscription Services is 70% of revenue, with Term-Licenses the other meaningful line at 20%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Subscription Services70%$331M
  • Term-Licenses20%$96M
  • Professional Services6%$31M
  • Other non-recurring4%$18M
By geographyAmericas54%EMEA34%Asia Pacific12%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$172M$195M$246M$271M$325M$401M$476M$476MRevenueRevenue
79%81%83%81%84%84%84%84%Gross marginGross mgn
($2M)$9M$14M$1M$33M$57M$66M$66MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−0.9%4.7%5.6%0.4%10.2%14.2%14.0%14.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($2M)$6M$71M$121M($81M)($283M)$78M$78MNet incomeNet inc.
49%13%-0%14%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$16M$67M$36M$21M$102M$132M$174M$174MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$4M$6M$7M$9M$10M$11M$12M$12MDepreciationDeprec.
$14M$55M($42M)($109M)$173M$405M$83M$83MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$6M$6M$5M$7M$5M$9M$13M$13MCapexCapex
3.6%3.2%2.1%2.5%1.6%2.1%2.8%2.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$12M$60M$31M$14M$97M$124M$160M$160MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.0%31.0%12.6%5.1%29.8%30.8%33.7%33.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$10M$60M$31M$14M$97M$124M$160M$160MFree cash flowFCF
5.8%31.0%12.6%5.1%29.8%30.8%33.7%33.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$25M$10M$100M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$808K$85K$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
-1%7%31%16%16%ROICROIC
-3%9%164%-237%-84%16%16%Return on equityROE
−46%−7%164%−237%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$146M$132M$228M$293M$276M$276MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$66M$68M$79M$77M$82M$105M$105MReceivablesReceiv.
$5M$7M$10M$10M$9M$8M$8MInventoryInvent.
$71M$74M$89M$87M$91M$113M$113MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$324M$273M$296M$422M$568M$576M$576MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$159M$187M$208M$254M$296M$370M$370MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×1.5×1.4×1.7×1.9×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9M$27M$27M$27M$29M$120M$120MGoodwillGoodwill
$364M$340M$403M$533M$691M$939M$939MTotal assetsAssets
($146M)($132M)($228M)($293M)($276M)($276M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$59M$64M($73M)$74M$34M$336M$484M$484MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
122M124M162M195M190M209M250M249MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.41$1.58$1.52$1.39$1.71$1.92$1.90$1.91Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.02$0.05$0.44$0.62$-0.43$-1.35$0.31$0.32EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.10$0.49$0.19$0.07$0.51$0.59$0.64$0.64Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.08$0.49$0.19$0.07$0.51$0.59$0.64$0.64Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.21$0.08$0.62$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.05$0.05$0.03$0.04$0.03$0.04$0.05$0.05Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.48$0.52$-0.45$0.38$0.18$1.60$1.94$1.95Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.1%/yr+3.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+36.5%/yr+5.6%/yr
EPS+46.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+0.6%/yr+1.2%/yr
Book value / share+26.0%/yr+30.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
250Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
16%low FY2019
Gross margin
84%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$160Mowner earningsvs.$78Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $78M of profit into $160M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$78M
Owner earnings$160M · 34% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$78M($283M)($81M)$121M$71M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$12M+$11M+$10M+$9M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$83M+$405M+$173M−$109M−$42M
Cash from operations$174M$132M$102M$21M$36M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$13M−$9M−$5M−$7M−$5M
Owner earnings$160M$124M$97M$14M$31M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue34%31%30%5%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $124M + ST investments $152M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $276M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -23%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range 5%–34%; latest $160M = operating cash $174M − maintenance capex $13M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 30% median across 7 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $174M ÷ net income $78M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $160M
    What this means

    Of $160M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.11×
    Maintaining
    Capex $13M ÷ depreciation $12M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $476M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −480%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.38/share (latest year $0.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 3% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 13% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +26%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 26% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · −0.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“As a result, the purchase process can be lengthier than traditional e-commerce transactions, and it is possible that the length of the process may discourage some customers from completing the transaction with us rather than with a competitor who offers more seamless online sales. 13 Table of Content Issues in the use …”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$576M
  • Cash & short-term investments$276M
  • Receivables$105M
  • Inventory$8M
  • Other current assets$187M
Current liabilities$370M
  • Other current liabilities$370M
Current ratio1.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.54×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.75×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$206Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$283Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$121MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4M$4M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$278Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $547M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$51M · 9%
  • Dividends$135M · 25%
  • Buybacks$893K · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$360M · 66%
  • Returned to owners$136M

    27% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $135M as dividends and $893K as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $893K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count104.5%

    The diluted count rose from 122M to 249M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$201M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity25%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 7 years buying other businesses, against $51M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NABLN-able Inc.$511M83%12.7%3%15%
INTAIntapp$504M67%-9.8%-23%6%
PDPagerDuty$493M84%-33.4%-24%3%
CLBTCellebrite DI Ltd.$476M83%5.6%12%30%
SPTSprout Social Inc$458M76%-20.6%-52%2%
XPERXperi Inc. Common Stock$448M-29.1%-19%-7%
ALKTAlkami Technology Inc.$444M54%-28.2%-15%-19%
VIAVia Transportation Inc.$434M40%-24.8%-24%-21%
Group median76%-22.7%-21%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Cellebrite DI Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cellebrite DI Ltd. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Cellebrite DI Ltd. earns about $142M on its 29.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 33.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+59%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+26%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $160M on 249M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2026-02-23; net cash $276M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cellebrite DI Ltd. (CLBT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CLBT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CIGI its page in the Manual CLLS →

Industry order: ← CHKP the Software chapter CLPS →