Owner Scorecard


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CMCO, Columbus McKinnon Corporation

Farm & Heavy Equipment capital-intensive CyclicalSerial acquirer

Columbus McKinnon is a leading global designer, manufacturer and marketer of intelligent motion solutions for efficiently and ergonomically moving, lifting, positioning and securing materials.

Key products include hoists, crane components, precision conveyor systems, rigging tools, light rail workstations and digital power and motion control systems.

Our products are used for mission critical applications where we have established, trusted brands that are well known in the industry.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
CMCO · Columbus McKinnon Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.2B
+23.9% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.0B
Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 34%
Operating margin −10.0% 5-yr avg 5.0%
ROIC −3% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin −14% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin −14% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 63% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 7.9% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −10% and 11% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

42% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2026
  • United States58%$694M
  • Germany19%$231M
  • Europe, Middle East, and Africa (Excluding Germany)13%$158M
  • Asia Pacific4%$54M
  • Latin America3%$32M
  • Canada2%$25M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$637M$839M$876M$809M$650M$907M$936M$1.0B$963M$1.2B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
30%34%35%35%34%35%37%37%34%30%30%Gross marginGross mgn
11%10%10%10%12%11%10%11%11%15%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%2%2%1%2%2%2%3%2%2%2%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$24M$68M$69M$90M$42M$74M$98M$107M$55M($119M)($119M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
3.7%8.1%7.9%11.1%6.5%8.1%10.5%10.6%5.7%−10.0%−10.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$9M$22M$43M$60M$9M$30M$48M$47M($5M)($230M)($230M)Net incomeNet inc.
31%56%20%23%10%23%35%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$60M$70M$79M$107M$99M$49M$84M$67M$46M($146M)($146M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$25M$36M$33M$29M$28M$42M$42M$46M$48M$77M$77MDepreciationDeprec.
$20M$6M($2M)$13M$54M($34M)($17M)($37M)($4M)($3M)($3M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$14M$15M$12M$9M$12M$13M$13M$25M$21M$18M$18MCapexCapex
2.3%1.7%1.4%1.2%1.9%1.4%1.3%2.4%2.2%1.5%1.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$46M$55M$67M$97M$87M$36M$71M$42M$24M($164M)($164M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
7.2%6.6%7.7%12.0%13.3%3.9%7.6%4.2%2.5%−13.7%−13.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$46M$55M$67M$97M$87M$36M$71M$42M$24M($164M)($164M)Free cash flowFCF
7.2%6.6%7.7%12.0%13.3%3.9%7.6%4.2%2.5%−13.7%−13.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$219M$0$0$540M$2M$108M$0$2.6B$2.6BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$3M$4M$5M$6M$6M$7M$8M$8M$8M$8M$8MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$0$0$1M$0$10M$0BuybacksBuybacks
2%5%8%12%5%5%6%-3%-3%ROICROIC
3%5%10%13%2%4%6%5%-1%-16%-16%Return on equityROE
2%5%9%12%1%3%5%4%−1%−16%−16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$85M$71M$78M$122M$210M$126M$144M$126M$64M$107M$107MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$112M$128M$129M$124M$105M$148M$151M$171M$165M$380M$380MReceivablesReceiv.
$131M$153M$146M$127M$111M$172M$179M$186M$199M$609M$609MInventoryInvent.
$41M$47M$47M$57M$69M$91M$77M$83M$93M$169M$169MAccounts payablePayables
$201M$234M$228M$194M$148M$229M$254M$274M$271M$820M$820MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$341M$360M$363M$383M$442M$467M$496M$514M$466M$1.2B$1.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$191M$207M$211M$155M$184M$250M$242M$262M$258M$584M$584MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.7×1.7×2.5×2.4×1.9×2.1×2.0×1.8×2.0×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$319M$347M$323M$320M$331M$649M$645M$710M$711M$1.4B$1.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.7B$1.7B$1.8B$1.7B$4.8B$4.8BTotal assetsAssets
$437M$376M$300M$251M$249M$498M$458M$517M$459M$2.4B$2.4BTotal debtDebt
$352M$305M$222M$130M$39M$372M$315M$392M$395M$2.3B$2.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.2×3.5×4.1×6.3×3.5×3.7×3.5×2.8×1.7×-2.0×-2.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$341M$408M$431M$464M$530M$773M$834M$882M$882M$1.4B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%0.7%0.7%0.6%1.2%1.2%1.1%1.2%0.6%0.8%0.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
20.9M23.3M23.7M23.9M24.2M28.4M28.8M29.0M28.7M28.7M28.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$30.50$35.97$37.04$33.92$26.87$31.92$32.49$34.92$33.51$41.56$41.56Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.43$0.95$1.80$2.50$0.38$1.04$1.68$1.61$-0.18$-7.99$-7.99EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.21$2.36$2.84$4.08$3.58$1.26$2.46$1.46$0.84$-5.71$-5.71Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.21$2.36$2.84$4.08$3.58$1.26$2.46$1.46$0.84$-5.71$-5.71Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.16$0.20$0.24$0.24$0.23$0.28$0.28$0.28$0.28$0.28Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.69$0.62$0.52$0.40$0.51$0.46$0.44$0.85$0.75$0.62$0.62Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.34$17.49$18.22$19.43$21.93$27.21$28.93$30.39$30.69$50.45$50.45Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.5%/yr+9.1%/yr
Dividends / share+6.5%/yr+3.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.1%/yr+4.1%/yr
Book value / share+13.3%/yr+18.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
29Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
−3%low FY2026
Gross margin
30%low FY2026
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
16.3×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($164M)owner earningsvs.($230M)net incomelow FY2026

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $230M loss into ($164M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($230M)($5M)$47M$48M$30M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$77M+$48M+$46M+$42M+$42M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$10M+$6M+$12M+$10M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$3M−$4M−$37M−$17M−$34M
Cash from operations($146M)$46M$67M$84M$49M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$18M−$21M−$25M−$13M−$13M
Owner earnings($164M)$24M$42M$71M$36M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-14%3%4%8%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer ($174M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($119M) ÷ interest expense $61M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $97M − debt $2.4B
    What this means

    Netting $97M of cash and short-term investments against $2.4B of debt leaves $2.3B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $10M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $2.3B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 116 + DIO 267 − DPO 74 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -3%–12%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($94M) ÷ invested capital $3.7B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -14%–13%; latest ($164M) = operating cash ($146M) − maintenance capex $18M
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -14% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves ($174M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($230M) · cash from operations ($146M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.23×
    Harvesting
    Capex $18M ÷ depreciation $77M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.02×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.4B vs $597M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −355%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.17/share (latest year $-7.96), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $50.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 2% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2026 · −10.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2026, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Use of artificial intelligence in our operations and product offerings could result in reputational or competitive harm, legal or regulatory liability and adverse impacts on our results of operations.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$97M
  • Receivables$380M
  • Inventory$609M
  • Other current assets$95M
Current liabilities$584M
  • Debt due within a year$166M
  • Accounts payable$169M
  • Other current liabilities$250M
Current ratio2.02×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.98×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$597Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$166M due · $97M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.6 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 2.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.5B$96M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $514M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$153M · 30%
  • Dividends$62M · 12%
  • Buybacks$11M · 2%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$289M · 56%
  • Returned to owners$73M

    20% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $62M as dividends and $11M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.9B and cash and short-term investments rose $19M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$33.95

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $11M, about $33.95 each.

  • Net change in share count37.5%

    The diluted count rose from 21M to 29M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.28/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.0B63% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity97%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $153M of capital spent building

$200M written down across 1 year (2026): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Mr. Wilson$4.1M$2.6M$36M
2023Mr. Wilson$5.0M$3.5M$71M
2024Mr. Wilson$5.8M$7.0M$42M
2025Mr. Wilson$5.3M−$1.6M$24M
2026Mr. Wilson$6.0M$4.4M($164M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio98:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$10M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Columbus McKinnon Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−2.4% vs 7.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.2% early in the record and −2.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.5%

    Diluted shares grew 37.5% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $11M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$437M → $2.4B

    Debt rose from $437M to $2.4B while owner earnings went from about $56M to ($32M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?38% → 83% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $242M to $989M while revenue grew 87%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (38% of revenue then, 83% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Farm & Heavy Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MTWManitowoc Company Inc. (The)$2.2B18%2.4%3%-2%
AEBIAebi Schmidt Holding AG Common Stock$1.5B20%5.8%2%
ASTEAstec Industries Inc.$1.4B23%2.9%5%1%
CMCOColumbus McKinnon Corporation$1.2B34%8.0%5%7%
WHDCactus$1.1B37%24.7%41%
INVXInnovex International Inc.$978M29%4.1%3%6%
FETForum Energy Technologies Inc.$791M25%-14.0%-7%0%
PLOWDouglas Dynamics Inc.$656M27%12.6%12%9%
Group median26%4.9%5%2%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Columbus McKinnon Corporation has delivered.

Columbus McKinnon Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Columbus McKinnon Corporation earns about $82M on its 6.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −13.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($164M) on 29M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-06-04; net debt $2.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Columbus McKinnon Corporation (CMCO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CMCO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CMC its page in the Manual CMCSA →

Industry order: ← CAT the Farm & Heavy Equipment chapter CNH →