Share count
1.3Bpeak FY2022
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CNH, CNH Industrial N.V.
CNH is a leading global equipment company that develops, manufactures and sells agricultural and construction equipment.
CNH's global network includes industrial, commercial and financial services subsidiaries located in 32 countries and a commercial presence in approximately 166 countries.
Product and Technology Leadership: By advancing the integration of core industrial capabilities with emerging technologies, we enhance innovation, deliver differentiated solutions, and remain well-positioned to be at the forefront of industry transformation.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$15.3B
−10.0% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $15.3B 5-yr avg $18.8B
Revenue $3.8B −0.1% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $10M yr-ago $132M
Net margin 0.3% yr-ago 3.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Agriculture (81%) and Construction (19%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 21% and operating margin about 9.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 1.9% and 19% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Agriculture is 81% of revenue, with Construction the other meaningful segment at 19%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Agriculture81%$12.4B
- Construction19%$3.0B
- Financial Services0%$0
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $13.1B | $17.8B | $21.5B | $22.1B | $17.1B | $15.3B | $15.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 15% | 21% | 22% | 24% | 22% | 19% | 19% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 10% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 10% | 12% | 13% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 4% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 7% | 7% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $252M | $2.5B | $3.5B | $4.2B | $1.6B | $694M | $2.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.9% | 14.0% | 16.3% | 19.1% | 9.3% | 4.5% | 13.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($493M) | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $1.2B | $510M | $386M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 12% | 27% | 21% | 21% | 27% | 27% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $5.5B | $4.1B | $557M | $907M | $2.0B | $2.5B | $2.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $227M | $210M | $198M | $213M | $235M | $267M | $267M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $5.8B | $2.1B | ($1.8B) | ($1.7B) | $416M | $1.7B | $1.7B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $8M | $188M | $423M | $538M | $607M | $333M | $333M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | 10% | 10% | 11% | 4% | 2% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| -10% | 25% | 29% | 28% | 16% | 7% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| −10% | 23% | 23% | 21% | 8% | 2% | 1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $9.0B | $5.0B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $3.2B | $2.6B | $1.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $192M | $172M | $133M | $125M | $226M | $226M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $4.2B | $4.8B | $5.5B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $5.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $4.4B | $5.0B | $5.7B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $5.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.8B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.6B | $3.6B | $3.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $49.4B | $39.4B | $46.3B | $42.9B | $42.7B | $42.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $20.9B | $23.0B | $27.3B | $26.9B | $26.8B | $25.9B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $15.9B | $18.6B | $23.0B | $23.7B | $24.2B | $24.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.4× | 4.6× | 4.8× | 3.1× | — | — | 1.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $5.0B | $6.8B | $6.9B | $8.1B | $7.7B | $7.8B | $7.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 1.35B | 1.36B | 1.36B | 1.35B | 1.26B | 1.25B | 1.24B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.68 | $13.08 | $15.82 | $16.36 | $13.54 | $12.27 | $12.33 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.36 | $1.27 | $1.49 | $1.69 | $0.99 | $0.41 | $0.31 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.01 | $0.14 | $0.31 | $0.40 | $0.48 | $0.27 | $0.27 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $3.69 | $5.00 | $5.09 | $6.00 | $6.12 | $6.21 | $6.28 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.8%/yr | +4.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +114.1%/yr | +114.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +11.0%/yr | +11.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
2%low FY2025
Gross margin
19%low FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2020FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $2.0B ÷ interest expense $1.3B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $24.2B · 11.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $2.6B − debt $26.8B
What this means
Netting $2.6B of cash and short-term investments against $26.8B of debt leaves $24.2B owed, about 11.9× a year's operating profit (13.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median, range 2%–11%; 5% latest = NOPAT $1.5B ÷ invested capital $32.0BIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $2.5B ÷ net income $510M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $15.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (6-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (6)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +24%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.08/share (latest year $0.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 11% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 11% early, 11% lately, median 9%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · 1.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If we fail to advance these technologies at a pace consistent with industry standards or customer expectations—or if competitors deploy more effective or trusted AI enabled solutions—our competitive position could be negatively affected.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$4.7B11% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity47%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 6 years buying other businesses
$585M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Scott W. Wine | $44.8M | $108.4M | $1.7B |
| 2022 | Scott W. Wine | $22.9M | $24.7M | $2.0B |
| 2023 | Scott W. Wine | $18.1M | −$8.9M | $2.3B |
| 2024 | Gerrit Marx | $19.5M | $22.1M | $1.2B |
| 2024 | Scott W. Wine | $3.6M | −$16.1M | $1.2B |
| 2025 | Gerrit Marx | $11.7M | $4.0M | $510M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$45M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why CNH Industrial N.V. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Farm & Heavy Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CATCaterpillar Inc. | $67.6B | 31% | 14.3% | 19% | 12% |
| BKRBaker Hughes Company | $27.7B | 66% | 5.1% | 3% | 4% |
| LRCXLam Research Corporation | $18.4B | 46% | 28.8% | 52% | 24% |
| ITWIllinois Tool Works Inc. | $16.0B | 42% | 24.2% | 29% | 17% |
| CNHCNH Industrial N.V. | $15.3B | 21% | 11.7% | 10% | — |
| FTITechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share | $9.9B | 16% | 7.0% | 4% | 6% |
| NOVNOV Inc. | $8.7B | 16% | 0.0% | -1% | 7% |
| DOVDover Corporation | $8.1B | 37% | 14.8% | 13% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 34% | 13.0% | 11% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFCNH Industrial N.V. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered2%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CNH Industrial N.V. (CNH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CNH, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CNC its page in the Manual CNK →
Industry order: ← CMCO the Farm & Heavy Equipment chapter DE →