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CMG, Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc.

Restaurants consumer brand Cyclical

Chipotle runs a chain of fast-casual restaurants serving Mexican-style food — burritos, bowls, tacos — assembled to order along a service line. It owns and operates its restaurants rather than selling franchises, so it keeps the full economics of each one. The money comes from the spread between what diners pay for a meal and what it costs to make and serve, store by store, across the whole chain.

We are passionate about providing a great guest experience and making our food more accessible to everyone while continuing to be a brand with a demonstrated purpose.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CMG · Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$11.9B

+5.4% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $12.1B 5-yr avg $9.9B

Operating margin 15.3% 5-yr avg 14.6%

ROIC 65% 5-yr avg 49%

Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 14%

Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Because the company owns its restaurants instead of franchising them, the business is the sum of its individual store economics, and it turns on two linked levers. The first is throughput and unit economics: how many meals one restaurant can serve, at what cost for food and labor and occupancy, and therefore what each store earns on the capital it took to build. The second is how many new restaurants it can open while still earning those returns — the runway. A strong brand and a line people will queue for give it some pricing power, the mark of a franchise rather than a commodity feeder. The bad case is a crowded trade with low switching costs: tastes move, food and wages press on the margin, a safety lapse can wound the name overnight, and a saturated map ends the opening runway. Whether the unit economics and the runway hold shows in the store margins and the returns in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 36%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.9B	$4.5B	$4.9B	$5.6B	$6.0B	$7.5B	$8.6B	$9.9B	$11.3B	$11.9B	$12.1B	RevenueRevenue
7%	7%	8%	8%	8%	8%	7%	6%	6%	5%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$35M	$271M	$258M	$444M	$290M	$805M	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.9%	6.0%	5.3%	7.9%	4.8%	10.7%	13.4%	15.8%	16.9%	16.2%	15.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M	$176M	$177M	$350M	$356M	$653M	$899M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Net incomeNet inc.
41%	36%	—	24%	—	20%	24%	24%	24%	24%	24%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$355M	$468M	$622M	$722M	$664M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.2B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$146M	$163M	$202M	$213M	$239M	$255M	$287M	$319M	$335M	$361M	$371M	DepreciationDeprec.
$122M	$63M	$174M	$67M	($13M)	$198M	$39M	$111M	$104M	$97M	$275M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$259M	$217M	$287M	$334M	$373M	$442M	$479M	$561M	$594M	$666M	$702M	CapexCapex
6.6%	4.8%	5.9%	6.0%	6.2%	5.9%	5.5%	5.7%	5.2%	5.6%	5.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$209M	$305M	$420M	$509M	$425M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.3%	6.8%	8.6%	9.1%	7.1%	13.6%	12.0%	14.8%	15.6%	14.7%	15.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$96M	$251M	$334M	$388M	$290M	$840M	$844M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.5B	Free cash flowFCF
2.5%	5.6%	6.9%	6.9%	4.9%	11.1%	9.8%	12.4%	13.4%	12.1%	12.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$837M	$285M	$161M	$191M	$54M	$466M	$830M	$592M	$1.0B	$2.4B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
2%	15%	22%	28%	21%	44%	45%	47%	50%	60%	65%	ROICROIC
2%	13%	12%	21%	18%	28%	38%	40%	42%	54%	60%	Return on equityROE
2%	13%	12%	21%	18%	28%	38%	40%	42%	54%	60%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$543M	$509M	$677M	$881M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$899M	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.0B	$1.1B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$40M	$40M	$62M	$81M	$105M	$100M	$107M	$116M	$144M	$156M	$95M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$15M	$20M	$22M	$26M	$26M	$33M	$36M	$39M	$49M	$50M	$45M	InventoryInvent.
$78M	$82M	$113M	$116M	$122M	$163M	$185M	$198M	$211M	$213M	$247M	Accounts payablePayables
($23M)	($22M)	($29M)	($9M)	$9M	($31M)	($42M)	($43M)	($18M)	($7M)	($108M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$522M	$630M	$815M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$282M	$324M	$450M	$667M	$822M	$874M	$922M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×	1.9×	1.8×	1.6×	1.7×	1.6×	1.3×	1.6×	1.5×	1.2×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$5.1B	$6.0B	$6.7B	$6.9B	$8.0B	$9.2B	$9.0B	$8.8B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	Total debtDebt
($543M)	($509M)	($677M)	($881M)	($1.1B)	($1.1B)	($899M)	($1.3B)	($1.4B)	($1.0B)	($1.1B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$3.1B	$3.7B	$2.8B	$2.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.6%	1.5%	1.4%	1.6%	1.4%	2.3%	1.1%	1.3%	1.2%	1.0%	0.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
1.49B	1.43B	1.40B	1.41B	1.42B	1.43B	1.40B	1.39B	1.38B	1.34B	1.30B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.62	$3.13	$3.48	$3.95	$4.21	$5.29	$6.15	$7.12	$8.22	$8.88	$9.32	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.02	$0.12	$0.13	$0.25	$0.25	$0.46	$0.64	$0.89	$1.11	$1.14	$1.12	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.14	$0.21	$0.30	$0.36	$0.30	$0.72	$0.74	$1.06	$1.29	$1.31	$1.41	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.06	$0.18	$0.24	$0.27	$0.20	$0.59	$0.60	$0.88	$1.10	$1.08	$1.16	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.17	$0.15	$0.21	$0.24	$0.26	$0.31	$0.34	$0.40	$0.43	$0.50	$0.54	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.94	$0.96	$1.03	$1.19	$1.42	$1.61	$1.69	$2.21	$2.66	$2.11	$1.85	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×50 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+14.5%/yr	+16.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+28.1%/yr	+34.2%/yr
EPS	+61.4%/yr	+35.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+12.4%/yr	+13.6%/yr
Book value / share	+9.4%/yr	+8.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

1.3Bpeak FY2016

ROIC

60%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.8Bowner earningsvs.$1.5Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.8B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $361M it takes just to hold its position. It put $305M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.4B.

Reported net income$1.5B

Owner earnings$1.8B · 15% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$899M	$653M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$361M	+$335M	+$319M	+$287M	+$255M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$120M	+$132M	+$124M	+$98M	+$176M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$97M	+$104M	+$111M	+$39M	+$198M
Cash from operations	$2.1B	$2.1B	$1.8B	$1.3B	$1.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$361M	−$335M	−$319M	−$287M	−$255M
Owner earnings	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.0B	$1.0B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$305M	−$259M	−$241M	−$192M	−$188M
Free cash flow	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$844M	$840M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	15%	16%	15%	12%	14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $361M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $305M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $120M), owner earnings is nearer $1.6B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$1.0B

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $351M + ST investments $699M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $102M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $1.2B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 28%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

10-yr median, range 2%–60%; 60% latest = NOPAT $1.5B ÷ invested capital $2.5B

Industry peers: median 24%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 60% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 9%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 5%–16%; latest $1.8B = operating cash $2.1B − maintenance capex $361M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put $305M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.4B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $120M of SBC) leaves $1.6B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.38×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $2.1B ÷ net income $1.5B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 138%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $2.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.8B

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $1.8B of Owner Earnings, $2.4B (138%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2.4B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $120M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.3B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.84×

Expanding

Capex $666M ÷ depreciation $361M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $11.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.23×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $279M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +1044%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.12/share (latest year $1.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.21/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → 16% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 16% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Owner earnings growth +24%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 24% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 0.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B

Cash & short-term investments$871M
Receivables$95M
Inventory$45M
Other current assets$126M

Current liabilities$1.2B

Accounts payable$247M
Other current liabilities$990M

Current ratio0.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.88×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($100M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$2.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($5.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$5.2B$5.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.1B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$207Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$521M

'27$569M

'28$553M

'29$537M

'30$513M

later$4.8B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$521Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$7.5Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$5.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$0

Lease obligations (present value)$5.1B

Total fixed claims on the business$5.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.1B, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $11.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$4.2B · 37%
Buybacks$6.8B · 60%
Retained (debt / cash)$382M · 3%

Returned to owners$6.8B
77% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $6.8B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$9.24
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 91M shares were bought for $837M, about $9.24 each.
Net change in share count−12.5%
The diluted count fell from 1489M to 1302M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$17.9M	$66.2M	$1.0B
2022	$17.2M	−$16.8M	$1.0B
2023	$22.5M	$95.3M	$1.5B
2024	$22.1M	−$55.0M	$1.8B
2024	$19.1M	$33.4M	$1.8B
2025	$15.5M	−$16.0M	$1.8B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership0.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$120M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $110M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ARMKAramark	$18.5B	11%	4.2%	7%	2%
DRIDarden Restaurants Inc.	$12.1B	59%	9.6%	27%	9%
CMGChipotle Mexican Grill Inc.	$11.9B	—	9.3%	36%	11%
YUMCYum China Holdings Inc.	$11.8B	51%	10.3%	18%	8%
QSRRestaurant Brands International Inc.	$9.4B	66%	31.0%	11%	21%
YUMYum! Brands Inc.	$8.2B	73%	32.2%	75%	20%
TXRHTexas Roadhouse	$5.9B	—	8.0%	26%	9%
EATBrinker Intl	$5.4B	74%	6.6%	24%	5%
Group median	—	—	9.5%	25%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. has delivered.

Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. earns about $1.3B on its 10.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($1.3B) Net of stock comp (−$110M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.8B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+14%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+27%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.5B on 1283M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $1.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($702M) runs well above depreciation ($371M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CMG against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. (CMG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CMG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CME its page in the Manual CMI →

Industry order: ← CHA the Restaurants chapter DIN →