Owner Scorecard


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DRI, Darden Restaurants Inc.

Restaurants consumer brand

Restaurants will be franchise-owned and will operate as members of our Olive Garden International family.

During the fourth quarter of fiscal 2025, we entered into an agreement with Recipe Unlimited, Canada's largest full-service restaurant company, pursuant to which Recipe Unlimited will acquire Olive Garden's eight Canadian restaurants.

On our June 2025 earnings call, we announced the decision to explore strategic alternatives for the Bahama Breeze brand, which includes 28 locations owned and operated by Darden and one franchise location.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
DRI · Darden Restaurants Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$12.1B
+6.0% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $12.8B 5-yr avg $10.2B
Operating margin 11.4% 5-yr avg 11.1%
ROIC 32% 5-yr avg 33%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 9.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.6% to 12% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 27%, above 15% in 9 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMFeb 2026
Income statement
$6.9B$7.2B$8.1B$8.5B$7.8B$7.2B$9.6B$10.5B$11.4B$12.1B$12.8BRevenueRevenue
6%5%5%5%5%6%4%4%4%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$622M$678M$767M$833M$48M$649M$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.0%9.4%9.5%9.8%0.6%9.0%12.1%11.5%11.5%11.3%11.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$375M$479M$596M$713M($52M)$629M$953M$982M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1BNet incomeNet inc.
19%24%0%8%-10%13%12%12%11%12%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$820M$916M$1.0B$1.3B$717M$1.2B$1.3B$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$290M$273M$313M$337M$356M$351M$368M$388M$460M$516M$550MDepreciationDeprec.
$118M$124M$68M$158M$361M$141M($117M)$116M$66M$62M$2MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$228M$293M$396M$452M$460M$255M$377M$565M$601M$645M$713MCapexCapex
3.3%4.1%4.9%5.3%5.9%3.5%3.9%5.4%5.3%5.3%5.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$592M$623M$707M$931M$362M$939M$888M$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2BOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.5%8.7%8.7%10.9%4.6%13.0%9.2%11.1%10.2%8.8%9.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$592M$623M$624M$816M$258M$939M$888M$988M$1.0B$1.1B$1.0BFree cash flowFCF
8.5%8.7%7.7%9.6%3.3%13.0%9.2%9.4%9.0%8.8%8.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$764M$40M$0$56M$0$0$0$701M$614M$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$268M$279M$314M$371M$322M$203M$563M$590M$628M$659M$685MDividends paidDiv. paid
$185M$230M$235M$208M$330M$45M$1.1B$459M$454M$418MBuybacksBuybacks
24%18%26%27%26%38%39%34%29%32%ROICROIC
19%23%27%30%-2%22%43%45%46%45%53%Return on equityROE
5%10%13%14%−16%15%18%18%18%17%20%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$275M$233M$147M$457M$763M$1.2B$421M$368M$195M$240M$263MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$64M$76M$84M$88M$50M$68M$72M$80M$79M$94M$108MReceivablesReceiv.
$175M$179M$205M$207M$207M$191M$271M$288M$291M$312M$345MInventoryInvent.
$242M$250M$277M$333M$249M$305M$367M$426M$400M$440M$451MAccounts payablePayables
($3M)$5M$12M($37M)$7M($46M)($24M)($58M)($30M)($34M)$2MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$820M$588M$554M$893M$1.1B$1.9B$1.2B$998M$823M$938M$1.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8B$1.9B$2.2B$2.2B$2.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.5×0.4×0.6×0.6×1.0×0.6×0.5×0.4×0.4×0.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$872M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$1.4B$1.7B$1.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$4.6B$5.3B$5.5B$5.9B$9.9B$10.7B$10.1B$10.2B$11.3B$12.6B$12.9BTotal assetsAssets
$440M$937M$927M$928M$929M$930M$901M$885M$1.4B$2.1B$2.1BTotal debtDebt
$165M$704M$780M$470M$166M($285M)$480M$517M$1.2B$1.9B$1.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.8×19.7×5.0×18.8×1.0×13.7×28.4×23.9×14.1×11.8×12.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.4B$2.3B$2.8B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3B$2.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.6%0.5%0.7%0.7%1.0%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
129M126M126M125M123M132M129M123M121M118M117MShares out (diluted)Shares
$53.62$56.91$64.13$67.87$63.63$54.60$74.65$85.34$94.29$102.00$109.37Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.90$3.80$4.73$5.69$-0.43$4.77$7.39$7.99$8.51$8.86$9.47EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.58$4.95$5.61$7.42$2.95$7.12$6.88$9.48$9.62$8.97$10.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.58$4.95$4.95$6.50$2.10$7.12$6.88$8.04$8.45$8.97$8.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.07$2.22$2.49$2.96$2.63$1.54$4.36$4.80$5.20$5.56$5.87Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.77$2.33$3.14$3.60$3.75$1.93$2.92$4.60$4.98$5.44$6.11Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.10$16.68$17.42$19.08$19.00$21.34$17.04$17.91$18.56$19.52$18.03Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.4%/yr+9.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.8%/yr+24.9%/yr
EPS+13.2%/yr
Dividends / share+11.6%/yr+16.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.3%/yr+7.8%/yr
Book value / share+2.9%/yr+0.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
118Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
29%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.1Bowner earningsvs.$1.0Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.0B of profit into $1.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.0B
Owner earnings$1.1B · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.0B$1.0B$982M$953M$629M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$516M+$460M+$388M+$368M+$351M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$79M+$69M+$68M+$61M+$72M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$62M+$66M+$116M−$117M+$141M
Cash from operations$1.7B$1.6B$1.6B$1.3B$1.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$645M−$460M−$388M−$377M−$255M
Owner earnings$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$888M$939M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$141M−$177M
Free cash flow$1.1B$1.0B$988M$888M$939M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%10%11%9%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $79M), owner earnings is nearer $983M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.4B ÷ interest expense $116M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.9B · 1.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $240M − debt $2.1B
    What this means

    Netting $240M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $1.9B owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (1.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $22M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $1.9B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 3 + DIO 23 − DPO 32 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 18%–39%; 29% latest = NOPAT $1.2B ÷ invested capital $4.2B
    Industry peers: median 24%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 29% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–13%; latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.7B − maintenance capex $645M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $79M of SBC) leaves $983M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.7B ÷ net income $1.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $1.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $1.1B of Owner Earnings, $1.1B (101%) went back to shareholders, $659M dividends, $418M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $79M stock comp, the real buyback was about $339M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.25×
    Expanding
    Capex $645M ÷ depreciation $516M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.42×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs ($1.3B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +111%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.90/share (latest year $9.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 11% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 0.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Feb 22, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$240M
  • Receivables$108M
  • Inventory$345M
  • Other current assets$316M
Current liabilities$2.6B
  • Accounts payable$451M
  • Other current liabilities$2.2B
Current ratio0.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.25×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.6B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 0.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$432Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($9.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.1B$4.0B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $7.8B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$469Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$500M
'28$400M
'29$0
'30$350M
later$939M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$500Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$500Min 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$2.2Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s May 25, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$541M
'27$551M
'28$545M
'29$531M
'30$517M
later$5.8B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$541Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$8.5Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$5.6Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.1B
Lease obligations (present value)$5.6B
Total fixed claims on the business$7.8B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $7.8B, of which the leases are 73%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s May 25, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $12.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$4.3B · 35%
  • Dividends$4.2B · 35%
  • Buybacks$3.6B · 30%
  • Returned to owners$7.8B

    93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.2B as dividends and $3.6B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$83.05

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $1.2B, about $83.05 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $61.60 (2016) to $113.90 (2020), and 2020, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($330M).

  • Net change in share count−9.7%

    The diluted count fell from 129M to 117M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$5.56/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.7B13% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity72%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $4.3B of capital spent building

$169M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Eugene I. Lee, Jr.$10.1M$34.9M$939M
2022Eugene I. Lee, Jr.$11.9M$8.9M$888M
2023Ricardo Cardenas$8.5M$15.2M$1.2B
2024Ricardo Cardenas$12.0M$6.6M$1.2B
2025Ricardo Cardenas$14.0M$31.6M$1.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$79M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Darden Restaurants Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$440M → $2.1B

    Debt rose from $440M to $2.1B while owner earnings went from about $641M to $1.1B — about 0.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $256M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ARMKAramark$18.5B11%4.2%7%2%
DRIDarden Restaurants Inc.$12.1B59%9.6%27%9%
CMGChipotle Mexican Grill Inc.$11.9B9.3%36%11%
YUMCYum China Holdings Inc.$11.8B51%10.3%18%8%
QSRRestaurant Brands International Inc.$9.4B66%31.0%11%21%
YUMYum! Brands Inc.$8.2B73%32.2%75%20%
TXRHTexas Roadhouse$5.9B8.0%26%9%
EATBrinker Intl$5.4B74%6.6%24%5%
Group median62%9.5%25%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Darden Restaurants Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Darden Restaurants Inc. earns about $1.1B on its 9.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.0B on 115M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-16; net debt $1.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Darden Restaurants Inc. (DRI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DRI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DRH its page in the Manual DRIO →

Industry order: ← DPZ the Restaurants chapter EAT →