Owner Scorecard


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COHU, Cohu Inc

Electronic Components & Instruments capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Cohu's differentiated and broad product portfolio enables optimized yield and productivity, accelerating customers' manufacturing time-to-market.

Cohu's recurring revenue consists of interface products, services, spares, upgrades, configuration tooling, and software analytics, supporting a resilient and scalable business model which complements the systems revenue driven by the capital expenditure of our customers.

Our active equipment installed base exceeds 25,000 systems, serving over 280 high-volume manufacturing facilities across 108 customers in 31 countries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
COHU · Cohu Inc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$453M
+12.7% YoY · −7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $481M 5-yr avg $638M
Operating margin −11.1% 5-yr avg 2.3%
ROIC −5% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 39% and operating margin about 0.5% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −18% and 23% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 22% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 2 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

90% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • Rest of the World28%$128M
  • Philippines15%$69M
  • Taiwan14%$65M
  • China13%$61M
  • Malaysia13%$57M
  • United States10%$47M
  • Singapore6%$26M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$282M$353M$452M$583M$636M$887M$813M$636M$402M$453M$481MRevenueRevenue
35%41%35%39%43%24%Gross marginGross mgn
20%17%21%25%20%14%16%21%32%27%27%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
12%12%12%15%14%10%11%14%21%20%20%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$3M$38M($30M)($52M)$3M$202M$126M$43M($72M)($70M)($54M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.1%10.7%−6.6%−9.0%0.5%22.7%15.4%6.8%−17.8%−15.4%−11.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$3M$33M($32M)($70M)($14M)$167M$97M$28M($70M)($74M)($56M)Net incomeNet inc.
47%6%13%24%39%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$25M$40M$34M$17M$50M$98M$113M$101M$3M$32M$52MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$9M$26M$59M$53M$49M$46M$50M$52M$51M$48MDepreciationDeprec.
$4M($9M)$22M$28M($3M)($132M)($45M)$6M($631K)$32M$37MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$3M$6M$5M$18M$19M$12M$15M$16M$11M$21M$12MCapexCapex
1.2%1.7%1.1%3.1%2.9%1.4%1.8%2.5%2.6%4.6%2.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$21M$34M$29M($731K)$31M$86M$98M$85M($8M)$11M$40MOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.5%9.5%6.5%−0.1%4.9%9.7%12.1%13.4%−2.0%2.4%8.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$21M$34M$29M($731K)$31M$86M$98M$85M($8M)$11M$40MFree cash flowFCF
7.5%9.5%6.5%−0.1%4.9%9.7%12.1%13.4%−2.0%2.4%8.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$12M$339M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$6M$7M$7M$10M$5M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$7M$51M$24M$27M$9MBuybacksBuybacks
1%22%-3%-6%25%13%4%-9%-6%-5%ROICROIC
1%11%-6%-14%-3%19%10%3%-8%-9%-7%Return on equityROE
−1%9%−7%−16%−4%19%10%−7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$128M$156M$165M$156M$170M$380M$386M$336M$262M$484M$489MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$46M$62M$139M$131M$143M$161M$170M$156M$142M$129M$131MInventoryInvent.
$31M$38M$48M$49M$68M$85M$52M$34M$31M$41M$49MAccounts payablePayables
$14M$25M$91M$82M$75M$76M$118M$122M$111M$88M$82MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$245M$297M$485M$440M$485M$751M$765M$639M$534M$750M$754MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$69M$85M$161M$149M$174M$192M$161M$103M$85M$109M$117MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×3.5×3.0×3.0×2.8×3.9×4.8×6.2×6.3×6.9×6.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$59M$66M$242M$239M$252M$220M$214M$242M$235M$283M$280MGoodwillGoodwill
$346M$420M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$999M$1.2B$1.2BTotal assetsAssets
$9M$350M$353M$320M$118M$79M$41M$9M$296M$296MTotal debtDebt
($147M)$185M$197M$150M($262M)($307M)($295M)($253M)($188M)($193M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
698.6×-6.0×-2.5×0.2×31.4×30.1×12.8×-116.0×-34.0×-15.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$235M$289M$546M$483M$512M$883M$929M$950M$857M$786M$769MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.5%2.0%4.0%2.2%1.6%1.8%2.7%5.2%5.1%4.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
27.5M28.9M31.8M41.2M41.9M48.5M48.8M48.0M46.9M46.7M47.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$10.27$12.20$14.22$14.17$15.20$18.31$16.66$13.25$8.57$9.69$10.24Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.11$1.14$-1.01$-1.69$-0.33$3.45$1.98$0.59$-1.49$-1.59$-1.18EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.77$1.16$0.93$-0.02$0.75$1.77$2.01$1.78$-0.17$0.23$0.85Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.77$1.16$0.93$-0.02$0.75$1.77$2.01$1.78$-0.17$0.23$0.85Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.23$0.23$0.22$0.24$0.12$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.13$0.21$0.16$0.44$0.45$0.25$0.30$0.33$0.23$0.45$0.26Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.57$10.00$17.19$11.74$12.24$18.21$19.03$19.78$18.27$16.81$16.36Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.6%/yr−8.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−12.5%/yr−21.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.2%/yr+0.1%/yr
Book value / share+7.8%/yr+6.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
47Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
−6%low FY2024
Gross margin
43%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$11Mowner earningsvs.($74M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $74M loss into $11M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($74M)($70M)$28M$97M$167M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$51M+$52M+$50M+$46M+$49M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$23M+$21M+$17M+$15M+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$32M−$631K+$6M−$45M−$132M
Cash from operations$32M$3M$101M$113M$98M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$21M−$11M−$16M−$15M−$12M
Owner earnings$11M($8M)$85M$98M$86M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%-2%13%12%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer ($12M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($70M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $227M + ST investments $257M − debt $296M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $188M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -9%–25%; -6% latest = NOPAT ($55M) ÷ invested capital $855M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -2%–13%; latest $11M = operating cash $32M − maintenance capex $21M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves ($12M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($74M) · cash from operations $32M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $9M ÷ Owner Earnings $11M
    What this means

    Of $11M Owner Earnings, $9M (80%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $9M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($23M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.41×
    Harvesting
    Capex $21M ÷ depreciation $51M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $453M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.88×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $296M vs $641M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −3233%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.82/share (latest year $-1.57), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → −9% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 2% early to −9% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −14%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −28%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 28% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −17.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +6.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Additionally, failures in the performance of our AI models could damage our reputation, erode customer trust, and result in loss of business and negative publicity.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$754M
  • Cash & short-term investments$489M
  • Inventory$131M
  • Other current assets$135M
Current liabilities$117M
  • Debt due within a year$11M
  • Accounts payable$49M
  • Other current liabilities$58M
Current ratio6.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio5.31×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio4.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$637Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$11M due · $489M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+29.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters7.0× → 6.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$417Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$330M$34M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$13Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $513M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$126M · 25%
  • Dividends$35M · 7%
  • Buybacks$117M · 23%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$235M · 46%
  • Returned to owners$152M

    39% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $35M as dividends and $117M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $361M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$29.16

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $117M, about $29.16 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $19.86 (2025) to $35.45 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $28.70 ($51M).

  • Net change in share count71.0%

    The diluted count rose from 27M to 47M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$362M29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity36%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$351Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $126M of capital spent building

$715K written down across 1 year (2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Dr. Müller$4.6M$960k$86M
2022Dr. Müller$5.3M$5.4M$98M
2023Dr. Müller$6.5M$3.6M$85M
2024Dr. Müller$4.8M−$1.5M($8M)
2025Dr. Müller$4.5M$4.5M$11M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio169:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$23M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cohu Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.6% vs 7.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.8% early in the record and 4.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?71.0%

    Diluted shares grew 71.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $117M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 27% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $46M to $131M while revenue grew 71%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 27% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Does management own its misses?
    1 plain admission in this year's filing
    “Upon issuance, we evaluated the conversion feature for potential separation as an embedded derivative under ASC 815, Derivatives and Hedging ("ASC 815") and determined that the conversion feature did not meet the criteria for derivative accounting.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ONTOOnto Innovation$1.0B52%14.2%10%19%
MIRMirion Technologies Inc.$925M43%2.9%-1%5%
BMIBadger Meter$917M39%15.4%17%15%
CDRECadre Holdings Inc.$610M41%11.7%11%9%
UFPTUFP Technologies Inc.$603M25%11.4%12%8%
ALNTAllient Inc.$554M30%7.4%8%5%
COHUCohu Inc$453M39%0.8%1%7%
AORTArtivion Inc.$441M66%3.9%4%2%
Group median40%9.4%9%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cohu Inc has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Cohu Inc earns about $32M on its 7.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−65%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−28%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $40M on 47M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-21; net cash $193M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cohu Inc (COHU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/COHU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← COHR its page in the Manual COIN →

Industry order: ← COHR the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter CTS →