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COIN, Coinbase Global Inc.

Capital Markets & Asset Management diversified Cyclical

We are working to update the century-old financial system by providing a trusted platform that makes it easy for our customers to engage with crypto assets.

We offer products primarily to three customer groups: Consumers : Retail customers seeking to hold, invest or trade crypto assets, as well as a growing set of trading offerings such as equities, prediction markets, and derivatives.

Consumers use Coinbase as a primary account for crypto-enabled financial services, and to engage onchain.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

COIN · Coinbase Global Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$7.2B

+9.4% YoY · 41% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $6.6B 5-yr avg $5.6B

Operating margin 10.8% 5-yr avg 0.9%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 23%

Owner-earnings margin 27% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin 27% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 20% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −85% to 39% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Stock-based pay runs about 12% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

16% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States84%$6.0B
International16%$1.2B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$534M	$1.3B	$7.8B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$6.6B	$7.2B	$6.6B	RevenueRevenue
43%	22%	12%	50%	35%	20%	23%	24%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
35%	21%	16%	73%	43%	22%	23%	28%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($46M)	$409M	$3.1B	($2.7B)	($162M)	$2.3B	$1.4B	$708M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−8.6%	32.0%	39.2%	−84.8%	−5.2%	35.1%	20.0%	10.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($30M)	$322M	$3.6B	($2.6B)	$95M	$2.6B	$1.3B	$801M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	21%	—	—	—	12%	17%	18%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
($81M)	$294M	$4.0B	($1.6B)	$673M	$3.1B	$2.4B	$1.8B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$17M	$31M	$64M	$154M	$140M	$128M	$188M	$223M	DepreciationDeprec.
($98M)	($130M)	($470M)	($680M)	($342M)	($515M)	$138M	($164M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$34M	$10M	$3M	$3M	—	—	—	$281K	CapexCapex
6.3%	0.8%	0.0%	0.1%	—	—	—	0.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($97M)	$284M	$4.0B	($1.6B)	—	—	—	$1.8B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−18.3%	22.2%	51.5%	−49.7%	—	—	—	26.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($114M)	$284M	$4.0B	($1.6B)	—	—	—	$1.8B	Free cash flowFCF
−21.4%	22.2%	51.5%	−49.7%	—	—	—	26.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M	$0	$71M	$186M	$31M	$0	$742M	$747M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$790M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	116%	-48%	-3%	39%	11%	6%	ROICROIC
-6%	33%	57%	-48%	2%	25%	9%	6%	Return on equityROE
−6%	33%	57%	−48%	2%	25%	9%	6%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$549M	$1.1B	$7.1B	$4.4B	$5.5B	$9.3B	$11.6B	$10.4B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	—	—	$220M	$168M	$265M	$307M	$296M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$12M	$40M	$56M	$39M	$63M	$118M	$112M	Accounts payablePayables
—	—	—	$164M	$129M	$202M	$190M	$184M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$5.1B	$18.4B	$86.4B	$11.4B	$18.1B	$20.4B	$19.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$4.2B	$11.4B	$80.8B	$5.5B	$7.9B	$8.7B	$9.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.2×	1.6×	1.1×	2.1×	2.3×	2.3×	2.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$55M	$77M	$626M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$4.2B	$4.2B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$5.9B	$21.3B	$89.7B	$14.8B	$22.5B	$29.7B	$28.8B	Total assetsAssets
—	$0	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.0B	$4.2B	$7.2B	$7.2B	Total debtDebt
—	($1.1B)	($3.7B)	($1.0B)	($2.5B)	($5.1B)	($4.4B)	($3.2B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	105.5×	-30.5×	-2.0×	28.6×	16.8×	8.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$497M	$964M	$6.4B	$5.5B	$6.3B	$10.3B	$14.8B	$13.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
5.8%	5.5%	10.5%	49.0%	25.1%	13.9%	11.7%	13.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
61.3M	91.2M	220M	222M	254M	273M	287M	265M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$8.70	$14.01	$35.64	$14.37	$12.22	$24.01	$25.00	$24.78	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.50	$3.53	$16.48	$-11.81	$0.37	$9.43	$4.39	$3.02	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.59	$3.11	$18.35	$-7.14	—	—	—	$6.63	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.86	$3.11	$18.35	$-7.14	—	—	—	$6.63	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.55	$0.11	$0.01	$0.01	—	—	—	$0.00	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.11	$10.56	$29.01	$24.53	$24.69	$37.59	$51.51	$50.91	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.49 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.41 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+19.2%/yr	+12.3%/yr
EPS	—	+4.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	−71.1%/yr (3-yr)	−71.1%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	+36.1%/yr	+37.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

287Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

11%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($1.6B)owner earningsvs.($2.6B)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2020FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2019–FY2022cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2022 the business turned a $2.6B loss into ($1.6B) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020	FY2019
Reported net income	($2.6B)	$3.6B	$322M	($30M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$154M	+$64M	+$31M	+$17M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$1.6B	+$821M	+$71M	+$31M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$680M	−$470M	−$130M	−$98M
Cash from operations	($1.6B)	$4.0B	$294M	($81M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$3M	−$3M	−$10M	−$17M
Owner earnings	($1.6B)	$4.0B	$284M	($97M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$17M
Free cash flow	($1.6B)	$4.0B	$284M	($114M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-50%	51%	22%	-18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.6B), owner earnings is nearer ($3.2B).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 16.8×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.4B ÷ interest expense $85M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$4.4B

Net cash

Cash $11.3B + ST investments $310M − debt $7.2B

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $4.4B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 11%

Solid through the cycle

5-yr median, range -48%–116%; 11% latest = NOPAT $1.2B ÷ invested capital $10.7B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 34%

Positive this year, negative across the cycle

latest $2.4B = operating cash $2.4B − maintenance capex $3M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median -18%)

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a -18% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $839M of SBC) leaves $1.6B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.93×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $2.4B ÷ net income $1.3B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 33%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $790M ÷ Owner Earnings $2.4B

What this means
Of $2.4B Owner Earnings, $790M (33%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $790M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($839M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.02×

Harvesting

Capex $3M ÷ depreciation $188M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.34×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $7.2B vs $11.7B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +0%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.98/share (latest year $4.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $56.16/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 21% → 17% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
The recent-years average (17%) sits below the early years (21%), but the latest year (20%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 20% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +136%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 136% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −84.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“For example, decentralized networks and other disruptive technologies such as generative AI may fundamentally alter the use of our products or services in unpredictable ways.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$19.7B

Cash & short-term investments$10.4B
Receivables$296M
Other current assets$8.9B

Current liabilities$9.2B

Debt due within a year$1.3B
Accounts payable$112M
Other current liabilities$7.8B

Current ratio2.14×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.14×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$10.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$1.3B due · $10.4B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−30.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 2.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$7.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$4.3BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$7.4B$197M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2022

Over the record, the business generated $2.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$49M · 2%
Retained (debt / cash)$2.6B · 98%

Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $9.9B.
Net change in share count331.8%
The diluted count rose from 61M to 265M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−38%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $497M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.38 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Net income
2021	Mr. Armstrong	$3.3M	—	$3.6B
2022	Mr. Armstrong	$7.5M	—	($2.6B)
2023	Mr. Armstrong	$4.7M	$680.9M	$95M
2024	Mr. Armstrong	$7.2M	$523.6M	$2.6B
2025	Mr. Armstrong	$9.7M	$37.2M	$1.3B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio45:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$839M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 12% of revenue, equal to 58% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Coinbase Global Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.9% vs 2.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.0% early in the record and 0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?331.8%
Diluted shares grew 331.8% over 2019–2022. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 7 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 7 years, $380M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
COINCoinbase Global Inc.	$7.2B	—	20.0%	11%	2%
UWMCUWM Holdings Corporation	$3.2B	—	13.9%	4%	-86%
CACCCredit Acceptance Corporation	$2.3B	—	45.7%	10%	54%
PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd.	$1.3B	41%	-1.3%	4%	3%
PRAAPRA Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	570.9%	6%	124%
PWPPerella Weinberg Partners	$751M	—	-7.6%	—	15%
DAVEDave Inc.	$554M	—	-4.2%	-12%	13%
WDWalker & Dunlop	$320M	—	143.4%	14%	149%
Group median	—	—	16.9%	6%	14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Coinbase Global Inc. has delivered.

Coinbase Global Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Coinbase Global Inc. earns about $1.6B on its 22.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 33.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($1.6B) Net of stock comp (−$897M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’22+143%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.8B on 263M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net cash $3.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh COIN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Coinbase Global Inc. (COIN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/COIN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← COHU its page in the Manual COKE →

Industry order: ← CNS the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter CORZ →