Owner Scorecard


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ONTO, Onto Innovation

Semiconductor Equipment capital-intensive Cyclical

Our products are primarily used by silicon wafer manufacturers, semiconductor integrated circuit fabricators, and advanced packaging manufacturers operating in the semiconductor market.

Our automated and integrated metrology systems measure critical dimensions, device structures, topography, shape, and various thin film compositions, including three-dimensional features and film thickness, as well as optical and material properties.

Our primary areas of focus include products that provide critical yield-enhancing and actionable information, which is used by microelectronic device manufacturers to improve yield and time to market of their next-generation devices.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
ONTO · Onto Innovation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.0B
+1.8% YoY · 27% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.0B 5-yr avg $874M
Gross margin 49% 5-yr avg 51%
Operating margin 10.0% 5-yr avg 13.0%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 23% 5-yr avg 21%
Free cash flow margin 23% 5-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Systems and Software (84%), Parts Revenue (8%) and Service Revenue (7%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 52% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.8% and 24% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 32% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Systems and Software is 84% of revenue, with Parts Revenue the other meaningful line at 8%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Systems and Software84%$848M
  • Parts Revenue8%$84M
  • Service Revenue7%$73M
By geographyTaiwan32%South Korea28%United States12%Japan9%China7%Southeast Asia6%Europe6%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202022’222023’232024’242026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$221M$255M$274M$306M$556M$1.0B$816M$987M$1.0B$1.0BRevenueRevenue
52%52%49%44%50%54%52%52%50%49%Gross marginGross mgn
11%11%12%17%12%7%10%8%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
14%15%15%16%15%11%13%12%13%13%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$29M$59M$51M($5M)($27M)$237M$116M$187M$133M$103MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.2%23.2%18.7%−1.6%−4.8%23.5%14.2%19.0%13.2%10.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$44M$33M$45M$223M$31M$223M$121M$202M$137M$106MNet incomeNet inc.
45%15%-9%8%9%9%16%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$46M$64M$35M$18M$106M$137M$172M$246M$328M$263MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$8M$7M$7M$6M$14M$9M$12M$13M$21M$22MDepreciationDeprec.
($14M)$19M($23M)($222M)$43M($120M)$13M$3M$143M$106MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4M$10M$8M$7M$4M$18M$23M$32M$29M$24MCapexCapex
1.8%4.0%2.8%2.2%0.7%1.8%2.8%3.2%2.8%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$42M$57M$28M$11M$102M$127M$160M$233M$307M$239MOwner earningsOwner earn.
18.9%22.4%10.1%3.7%18.4%12.7%19.6%23.6%30.6%23.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$42M$54M$28M$11M$102M$118M$149M$214M$300M$239MFree cash flowFCF
18.9%21.2%10.1%3.7%18.4%11.8%18.3%21.7%29.8%23.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$37M$0$5M$0$27M$436M$436MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$27M$21M$744K$52M$65M$3M$25M$75MBuybacksBuybacks
12%11%17%-0%-2%15%7%10%6%5%ROICROIC
15%10%12%18%2%14%7%10%7%5%Return on equityROE
15%10%12%18%2%14%7%10%7%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$130M$117M$112M$131M$137M$176M$234M$213M$346M$315MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$39M$62M$64M$124M$149M$241M$227M$308M$269M$307MReceivablesReceiv.
$39M$53M$97M$176M$191M$324M$328M$287M$298M$316MInventoryInvent.
$11M$14M$17M$28M$40M$55M$50M$56M$108M$106MAccounts payablePayables
$67M$101M$144M$272M$300M$511M$504M$539M$460M$517MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$216M$240M$351M$642M$732M$1.1B$1.3B$1.5B$1.3B$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$42M$44M$45M$86M$120M$161M$148M$170M$219M$214MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.1×5.4×7.8×7.5×6.1×7.1×8.7×8.7×5.8×6.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9M$22M$22M$316M$307M$316M$316M$330M$644M$643MGoodwillGoodwill
$288M$310M$418M$1.4B$1.5B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.4B$2.4BTotal assetsAssets
($130M)($117M)($112M)($131M)($137M)($176M)($234M)($213M)($346M)($315M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
102.1×644.4×154.3×312.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$294M$333M$362M$1.3B$1.3B$1.6B$1.7B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
3.5%2.2%2.2%3.5%3.2%2.4%3.1%2.9%2.7%2.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
25.2M25.9M25.9M49.8M49.5M49.8M49.3M49.7M49.3M50.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.79$9.86$10.57$6.15$11.25$20.20$16.54$19.88$20.40$20.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.75$1.27$1.74$4.49$0.63$4.49$2.46$4.06$2.78$2.13EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.66$2.21$1.06$0.23$2.06$2.56$3.24$4.69$6.24$4.78Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.66$2.09$1.06$0.23$2.06$2.38$3.03$4.30$6.08$4.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.39$0.29$0.14$0.08$0.37$0.46$0.64$0.58$0.48Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.68$12.88$13.98$25.40$25.56$32.08$35.21$38.78$42.63$42.64Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.92 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.8%/yr+0.3%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share+14.2%/yr+24.9%/yr (4-yr)
EPS+4.7%/yr−11.3%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+13.8%/yr+11.8%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share+13.8%/yr+7.4%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
49Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
6%low FY2020
Gross margin
50%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$307Mowner earningsvs.$137Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $307M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $21M it takes just to hold its position. It put $7M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $300M.

Reported net income$137M
Owner earnings$307M · 31% of revenue
FY2026FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2020
Reported net income$137M$202M$121M$223M$31M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$21M+$13M+$12M+$9M+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$28M+$29M+$26M+$24M+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$143M+$3M+$13M−$120M+$43M
Cash from operations$328M$246M$172M$137M$106M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$21M−$13M−$12M−$9M−$4M
Owner earnings$307M$233M$160M$127M$102M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$7M−$19M−$10M−$9M
Free cash flow$300M$214M$149M$118M$102M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue31%24%20%13%18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $21M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $7M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $28M), owner earnings is nearer $280M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $133M ÷ interest expense $331K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $346M + ST investments $82M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $428M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 98 + DIO 215 − DPO 78 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -2%–17%; 6% latest = NOPAT $112M ÷ invested capital $1.8B
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 4%–31%; latest $307M = operating cash $328M − maintenance capex $21M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 31% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves $280M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $328M ÷ net income $137M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $75M ÷ Owner Earnings $307M
    What this means

    Of $307M Owner Earnings, $75M (24%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $75M buybacks. Net of $28M stock comp, the real buyback was about $47M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.36×
    Expanding
    Capex $29M ÷ depreciation $21M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.79×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $1.0B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +277%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.08/share (latest year $2.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $42.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 18% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to 15% lately, median 14% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Owner earnings growth +18%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −4.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$315M
  • Receivables$307M
  • Inventory$316M
  • Other current assets$382M
Current liabilities$214M
  • Accounts payable$106M
  • Other current liabilities$109M
Current ratio6.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.68×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters9.3× → 6.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.1BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$17M$17M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$40Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$134M · 12%
  • Buybacks$269M · 23%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$749M · 65%
  • Returned to owners$269M

    25% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $269M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$46.59

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 6M shares were bought for $266M, about $46.59 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $19.86 (2018) to $159.68 (2024); its heaviest year, 2026, paid $152.47 ($75M).

  • Net change in share count98.8%

    The diluted count rose from 25M to 50M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained24%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($790M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $191M, so each retained $1 added about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$942M40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity31%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$505Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $134M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$5.1M$14.0M
2022$5.3M$2.1M$127M
2023$5.6M$21.2M$160M
2024$7.0M$10.1M$233M
2025$7.8M$6.5M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio63:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$28M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Onto Innovation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?98.8%

    Diluted shares grew 98.8% over 2016–2026, even as the company spent $269M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?35% → 60% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $78M to $623M while revenue grew 366%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (35% of revenue then, 60% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductor Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ITRIItron Inc.$2.4B32%5.2%6%4%
KODKEastman Kodak Company Common New$1.1B15%-5.6%-2%-6%
ONTOOnto Innovation$1.0B52%14.2%10%19%
MIRMirion Technologies Inc.$925M43%2.9%-1%5%
BMIBadger Meter$917M39%15.4%17%15%
WRBYWarby Parker Inc.$872M57%-10.7%-67%3%
ALNTAllient Inc.$554M30%7.4%8%5%
COHUCohu Inc$453M39%0.8%1%7%
Group median39%4.0%4%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Onto Innovation has delivered.

Onto Innovation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Onto Innovation earns about $190M on its 18.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 30.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’26+15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’26+18%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $239M on 50M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $315M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($24M) runs well above depreciation ($22M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $242M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Onto Innovation (ONTO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ONTO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ONT its page in the Manual OOMA →

Industry order: ← LRCX the Semiconductor Equipment chapter VECO →