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COR, Cencora Inc.

Cencora is a wholesale distributor of prescription drugs. It buys pharmaceuticals and related healthcare products from manufacturers and delivers them to the pharmacies, hospitals, and other providers that dispense them, taking a small cut on each dollar of product that moves through. Most customers buy on credit, so the business is part logistics network and part lender, financing the inventory that sits between maker and dispenser.

We deliver innovative programs and services designed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the pharmaceutical supply chain in both human and animal health.

The number of individuals aged 65 and over in the U.S. is expected to be approximately 71 million by 2029 and is the most rapidly growing segment of the population.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

COR · Cencora Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$321.3B

+9.3% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $328.7B 5-yr avg $266.0B

Gross margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%

Operating margin 0.8% 5-yr avg 0.9%

ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 63%

Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: This is a penny-margin, high-turn business: the spread on each dollar of drugs is thin, so the whole case rests on scale and the cost position that lets a distributor earn an acceptable return on capital it barely ties up — watch whether the returns below come from real efficiency or from leaning on the balance sheet. The franchise test is whether handling drug volume at this cost is something few rivals can match, or whether it is a commodity service that manufacturers, large drugstore chains, and specialty distributors can route around. Keep the bad case in view: a pair of large customer accounts anchors the receivables, an opioid-settlement liability sits on the books, and the model runs on extending credit to customers whose own health must be judged correctly. The record below holds the margins, the returns, and the debt.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 38%, above 15% in 9 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$146.8B	$153.1B	$167.9B	$179.6B	$189.9B	$214.0B	$238.6B	$262.2B	$294.0B	$321.3B	$328.7B	RevenueRevenue
3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	4%	4%	Gross marginGross mgn
1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.5B	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.1B	($5.1B)	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$2.8B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.0%	0.7%	0.9%	0.6%	−2.7%	1.1%	1.0%	0.9%	0.7%	0.8%	0.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.4B	$364M	$1.7B	$855M	($3.4B)	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.5B	Net incomeNet inc.
-3%	—	—	12%	—	31%	23%	20%	24%	31%	27%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$3.2B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$3.9B	$3.5B	$3.9B	$2.3B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$365M	$398M	$465M	$462M	$391M	$505M	$694M	$964M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	DepreciationDeprec.
$1.3B	$680M	($774M)	$967M	$5.2B	$522M	$217M	$1.1B	$736M	$1.1B	($1.4B)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$465M	$466M	$336M	$310M	$370M	$438M	$496M	$458M	$487M	$668M	$718M	CapexCapex
0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.8B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$3.5B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$1.6B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.9%	0.7%	0.6%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	0.9%	1.3%	1.0%	1.0%	0.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.7B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$3.5B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$1.6B	Free cash flowFCF
1.8%	0.7%	0.6%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	0.9%	1.3%	1.0%	1.0%	0.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.7B	$62M	$785M	$64M	$0	$5.6B	$134M	$1.4B	$70M	$4.1B	$5.1B	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$288M	$320M	$333M	$339M	$344M	$367M	$392M	$399M	$416M	$437M	$459M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$2.3B	$330M	$639M	$674M	$420M	$82M	$484M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$435M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
43%	17%	30%	27%	—	38%	86%	69%	87%	38%	15%	ROICROIC
67%	18%	57%	30%	—	689%	—	334%	234%	103%	75%	Return on equityROE
54%	2%	45%	18%	—	525%	—	258%	169%	74%	62%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2.7B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$3.4B	$4.6B	$2.5B	$3.4B	$2.6B	$3.1B	$4.4B	$2.2B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$9.2B	$10.3B	$11.3B	$12.4B	$13.8B	$18.2B	$18.5B	$20.9B	$23.9B	$25.2B	$24.9B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$10.7B	$11.5B	$11.9B	$11.1B	$12.6B	$15.4B	$15.6B	$17.5B	$19.0B	$20.5B	$20.0B	InventoryInvent.
$23.9B	$25.4B	$26.8B	$28.4B	$31.7B	$38.0B	$40.2B	$45.8B	$50.9B	$54.7B	$51.9B	Accounts payablePayables
($4.0B)	($3.6B)	($3.6B)	($4.9B)	($5.3B)	($4.5B)	($6.2B)	($7.5B)	($8.1B)	($9.0B)	($7.0B)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$22.9B	$24.3B	$25.9B	$28.1B	$33.1B	$38.8B	$39.6B	$42.8B	$47.7B	$52.2B	$53.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$25.3B	$26.8B	$27.9B	$29.6B	$33.9B	$41.4B	$43.5B	$48.8B	$54.3B	$57.8B	$56.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	1.0×	1.0×	0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6.0B	$6.0B	$6.7B	$6.7B	$6.7B	$9.0B	$8.5B	$9.6B	$9.3B	$13.7B	$16.5B	GoodwillGoodwill
$33.6B	$35.3B	$37.7B	$39.2B	$44.3B	$57.3B	$56.6B	$62.6B	$67.1B	$76.6B	$81.7B	Total assetsAssets
$4.2B	$3.4B	$4.3B	$4.2B	$4.1B	$6.7B	$5.7B	$4.8B	$4.4B	$7.7B	$12.4B	Total debtDebt
$1.4B	$1.0B	$1.8B	$799M	($478M)	$4.1B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$1.3B	$3.3B	$10.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.9B	$2.9B	($1.0B)	$223M	($212M)	$522M	$646M	$1.5B	$3.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	$60M	—	—	$6M	$76M	—	$418M	$724M	$724M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
226M	222M	220M	212M	205M	208M	211M	205M	200M	195M	195M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$649.90	$691.08	$762.20	$847.76	$927.29	$1026.50	$1129.62	$1281.45	$1467.71	$1646.05	$1682.50	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.32	$1.64	$7.53	$4.04	$-16.65	$7.39	$8.04	$8.53	$7.53	$7.96	$13.05	EPS (diluted)EPS
$12.45	$4.68	$4.88	$9.60	$8.97	$10.69	$10.45	$16.88	$14.97	$16.43	$7.98	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$12.01	$4.68	$4.88	$9.60	$8.97	$10.69	$10.45	$16.88	$14.97	$16.43	$7.98	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.28	$1.45	$1.51	$1.60	$1.68	$1.76	$1.85	$1.95	$2.08	$2.24	$2.35	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.06	$2.10	$1.53	$1.46	$1.81	$2.10	$2.35	$2.24	$2.43	$3.42	$3.68	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.42	$9.32	$13.31	$13.59	$-4.98	$1.07	$-1.00	$2.55	$3.23	$7.72	$17.39	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+10.9%/yr	+12.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+3.1%/yr	+12.9%/yr
EPS	+2.6%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+6.4%/yr	+5.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.8%/yr	+13.6%/yr
Book value / share	−2.2%/yr	—

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+9.3%
“Revenue increased by $27.4 billion, or 9.3%, from the prior fiscal year due to growth in both reportable segments.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

195Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

38%low FY2017

Gross margin

4%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.0×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.2Bowner earningsvs.$1.6Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.6B of profit into $3.2B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.6B

Owner earnings$3.2B · 1% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.1B	+$1.1B	+$964M	+$694M	+$505M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$148M	+$148M	+$125M	+$93M	+$100M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.1B	+$736M	+$1.1B	+$217M	+$522M
Cash from operations	$3.9B	$3.5B	$3.9B	$2.7B	$2.7B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$668M	−$487M	−$458M	−$496M	−$438M
Owner earnings	$3.2B	$3.0B	$3.5B	$2.2B	$2.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $148M), owner earnings is nearer $3.1B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.3B · 1.3× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $4.4B − debt $7.7B

What this means
Netting $4.4B of cash and short-term investments against $7.7B of debt leaves $3.3B owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (2.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -12d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 29 + DIO 24 − DPO 64 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 38%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

9-yr median, range 17%–87%; 38% latest = NOPAT $1.8B ÷ invested capital $4.8B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 38% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 1%–2%; latest $3.2B = operating cash $3.9B − maintenance capex $668M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $148M of SBC) leaves $3.1B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.49×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $3.9B ÷ net income $1.6B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 27%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $873M ÷ Owner Earnings $3.2B

What this means
Of $3.2B Owner Earnings, $873M (27%) went back to shareholders, $437M dividends, $435M buybacks. Net of $148M stock comp, the real buyback was about $288M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.64×

Harvesting

Capex $668M ÷ depreciation $1.1B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $321.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.90×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $7.7B vs ($5.6B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +39%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.24/share (latest year $7.99), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.75/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 1% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 1% early, 1% lately, median 1%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +5%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −2.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$53.1B

Cash & short-term investments$2.2B
Receivables$24.9B
Inventory$20.0B
Other current assets$6.1B

Current liabilities$56.1B

Debt due within a year$203M
Accounts payable$51.9B
Other current liabilities$4.0B

Current ratio0.95×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.59×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($3.0B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$203M due · $2.2B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($19.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$14.1B$1.7B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $9.3B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$320M

'27$295M

'28$270M

'29$238M

'30$191M

later$669M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$320Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$2.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.7Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$7.7B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.7B

Total fixed claims on the business$9.3B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $9.3B, of which the leases are 18%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Sep 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $27.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$4.5B · 16%
Dividends$3.6B · 13%
Buybacks$8.0B · 29%
Retained (debt / cash)$11.2B · 41%

Returned to owners$11.6B
51% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.6B as dividends and $8.0B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $8.2B and cash and short-term investments fell $565M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $8.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−13.5%
The diluted count fell from 226M to 195M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$2.24/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$17.5B23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$14.9Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $4.5B of capital spent building

$1.3B written down across 5 years (2018, 2021, 2022, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	—	$14.9M	$39.8M	$2.2B
2022	—	$16.7M	$26.1M	$2.2B
2023	—	$17.5M	$33.8M	$3.5B
2024	Steven H. Collis	$18.5M	$61.4M	$3.0B
2025	Robert P. Mauch	$18.3M	$33.9M	$3.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$148M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cencora Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$4.2B → $12.4B
Debt rose from $4.2B to $12.4B while owner earnings went from about $1.6B to $3.2B — about 2.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $3.6B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$216.9B · 66% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our top 10 customers, including governmental agencies and group purchasing organizations ("GPO"), represented approximately 66% of revenue in fiscal 2025.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Drug & Medical Distributors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MCKMcKesson Corporation	$403.4B	5%	1.2%	—	2%
CORCencora Inc.	$321.3B	3%	0.8%	38%	1%
CAHCardinal Health Inc.	$222.6B	4%	0.5%	14%	1%
SYYSysco Corporation	$81.4B	19%	3.8%	16%	3%
PFGCPerformance Food	$63.3B	12%	1.3%	6%	1%
USFDUS Foods	$39.4B	17%	2.7%	8%	2%
WKCWorld Kinect	$36.9B	3%	0.5%	6%	0%
CHSCOCHS Inc.	$35.5B	3%	1.2%	4%	2%
Group median	—	5%	1.2%	8%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cencora Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Cencora Inc. earns about $3.2B on its 1.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($3.2B) Net of stock comp (−$143M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+9%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.6B on 195M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $10.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh COR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cencora Inc. (COR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/COR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← COP its page in the Manual CORT →

Industry order: ← CAH the Drug & Medical Distributors chapter HSIC →