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WKC, World Kinect

World Kinect is a fuel middleman. It buys petroleum products and resells them to the commercial operators that burn them, and wraps each sale in services such as supply logistics, credit, and payment handling. Almost all of what it books as revenue is fuel passing through; the company keeps only a thin margin on the spread plus fees for those services.

Profit from our segments is generally determined by the volume and the unit margin achieved on fuel resales.

Corporate expenses are allocated to each segment based on usage, where possible, or other factors according to the nature of the activity.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

WKC · World Kinect

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$36.9B

−12.5% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $37.1B 5-yr avg $43.4B

Gross margin 3% 5-yr avg 2%

Operating margin −1.4% 5-yr avg 0.1%

ROIC −20% 5-yr avg 0%

Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 0%

Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: The whole question is whether a reseller standing between refiners and fuel buyers is anything more than a broker of a commodity it does not make. A franchise would show up as customers who stay for the logistics, credit, and global reach rather than chase the lowest price — watch the gross margin and the share of profit from services, not volume, for that evidence; the filing itself warns that cheap fuel lowers the barriers to entry and lets thinner-capitalized rivals compete, which is the commodity case talking. Because revenue is mostly pass-through, the business runs on a sliver of each dollar, leans on a limited set of suppliers in some markets, and carries net debt under covenant terms — so a working-capital squeeze or a bad spread bites hard. Whether the spread and the returns on capital actually clear the cost of that capital is the test; the figures are in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

48% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States52%$19.3B
Americas Excluding United States14%$5.1B
Asia Pacific12%$4.6B
Singapore12%$4.5B
United Kingdom8%$3.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$27.0B	$33.7B	$39.8B	$36.8B	$20.4B	$31.3B	$59.0B	$47.7B	$42.2B	$36.9B	$37.1B	RevenueRevenue
3%	3%	3%	3%	4%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%	3%	Gross marginGross mgn
1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$189M	$46M	$260M	$300M	$138M	$143M	$273M	$198M	$211M	($565M)	($502M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.7%	0.1%	0.7%	0.8%	0.7%	0.5%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	−1.5%	−1.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$127M	($170M)	$128M	$179M	$110M	$74M	$114M	$53M	$67M	($614M)	($567M)	Net incomeNet inc.
11%	—	30%	24%	32%	26%	20%	20%	29%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$51M	($134M)	($183M)	$229M	$604M	$173M	$139M	$271M	$260M	$293M	$132M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$82M	$86M	$82M	$87M	$86M	$81M	$108M	$105M	$106M	$98M	$93M	DepreciationDeprec.
($177M)	($71M)	($400M)	($61M)	$410M	($1M)	($101M)	$90M	$58M	$784M	$580M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$36M	$54M	$72M	$81M	$51M	$39M	$79M	$88M	$68M	$66M	$64M	CapexCapex
0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$15M	($188M)	($255M)	$148M	$553M	$134M	$60M	$184M	$192M	$227M	$68M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.1%	−0.6%	−0.6%	0.4%	2.7%	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%	0.5%	0.6%	0.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$15M	($188M)	($255M)	$148M	$553M	$134M	$60M	$184M	$192M	$227M	$68M	Free cash flowFCF
0.1%	−0.6%	−0.6%	0.4%	2.7%	0.4%	0.1%	0.4%	0.5%	0.6%	0.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$431M	$121M	$21M	$0	$129M	$37M	$644M	$14M	$40M	$154M	$154M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$17M	$16M	$16M	$21M	$26M	$29M	$31M	$34M	$39M	$41M	$42M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$41M	$62M	$20M	$65M	$68M	$51M	$49M	$60M	$100M	$85M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
7%	—	8%	10%	5%	6%	9%	6%	6%	-25%	-20%	ROICROIC
7%	-10%	7%	9%	6%	4%	6%	3%	3%	-47%	-47%	Return on equityROE
6%	−11%	6%	8%	4%	2%	4%	1%	1%	−50%	−51%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$699M	$372M	$212M	$186M	$659M	$652M	$298M	$304M	$383M	$194M	$161M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.3B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$1.2B	$2.4B	$3.3B	$2.7B	$2.4B	$2.2B	$2.8B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$458M	$505M	$523M	$593M	$344M	$478M	$780M	$665M	$514M	$454M	$739M	InventoryInvent.
$1.8B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$1.2B	$2.4B	$3.5B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$3.4B	Accounts payablePayables
$1.0B	$971M	$863M	$883M	$368M	$434M	$545M	$303M	$220M	$76M	$170M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.8B	$3.9B	$4.0B	$4.2B	$2.6B	$4.0B	$5.2B	$4.5B	$4.0B	$3.5B	$4.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.2B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$1.7B	$3.1B	$4.6B	$4.0B	$3.4B	$3.3B	$4.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×	1.4×	1.4×	1.3×	1.6×	1.3×	1.1×	1.1×	1.2×	1.1×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$836M	$846M	$853M	$844M	$859M	$862M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$738M	$740M	GoodwillGoodwill
$5.4B	$5.6B	$5.7B	$6.0B	$4.5B	$5.9B	$8.2B	$7.4B	$6.7B	$5.9B	$6.8B	Total assetsAssets
$1.2B	$910M	$701M	$629M	$525M	$509M	$846M	$888M	$881M	$697M	$888M	Total debtDebt
$488M	$538M	$489M	$443M	($134M)	($144M)	$547M	$584M	$498M	$504M	$727M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.3×	0.7×	3.5×	3.7×	2.8×	3.0×	2.3×	1.5×	1.8×	-5.0×	-4.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.3B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	−0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$72M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$528M	$528M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
69.8M	68.1M	67.7M	66.5M	64.0M	63.3M	62.7M	61.7M	59.5M	55.9M	52.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$387.05	$494.79	$587.15	$553.67	$318.10	$495.06	$941.68	$773.27	$708.71	$660.40	$714.41	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.81	$-2.50	$1.89	$2.69	$1.71	$1.16	$1.82	$0.86	$1.13	$-10.99	$-10.91	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.21	$-2.75	$-3.76	$2.22	$8.64	$2.12	$0.96	$2.98	$3.22	$4.07	$1.31	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.21	$-2.75	$-3.76	$2.22	$8.64	$2.12	$0.96	$2.98	$3.22	$4.07	$1.31	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.24	$0.24	$0.24	$0.32	$0.40	$0.45	$0.49	$0.55	$0.65	$0.74	$0.81	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.52	$0.79	$1.07	$1.22	$0.80	$0.62	$1.25	$1.42	$1.15	$1.17	$1.23	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$27.58	$25.28	$26.82	$28.43	$29.83	$30.22	$31.66	$31.49	$32.75	$23.24	$23.15	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.1%/yr	+15.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+39.1%/yr	−14.0%/yr
Dividends / share	+13.4%/yr	+13.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+9.5%/yr	+7.9%/yr
Book value / share	−1.9%/yr	−4.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue-12.5%
“Our consolidated revenue for the year ended December 31, 2025 was $36.9 billion, a decrease of $5.3 billion, or 12%, compared to the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily driven by decreased revenue of $2.6 billion, $1.5 billion, and $1.2 billion in our land, aviation, and marine segments, respectively, as discussed further below.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

56Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

−25%low FY2025

Gross margin

3%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.2×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$227Mowner earningsvs.($614M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $614M loss into $227M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($614M)	$67M	$53M	$114M	$74M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$98M	+$106M	+$105M	+$108M	+$81M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$26M	+$28M	+$24M	+$18M	+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$784M	+$58M	+$90M	−$101M	−$1M
Cash from operations	$293M	$260M	$271M	$139M	$173M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$66M	−$68M	−$88M	−$79M	−$39M
Owner earnings	$227M	$192M	$184M	$60M	$134M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer $202M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -5.0×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($565M) ÷ interest expense $112M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $686M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $194M + ST investments $8M − debt $888M

What this means
Netting $202M of cash and short-term investments against $888M of debt leaves $686M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 0d

Tight

DSO 22 + DIO 5 − DPO 26 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -25%–10%; -22% latest = NOPAT ($446M) ÷ invested capital $2.0B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $227M = operating cash $293M − maintenance capex $66M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $202M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $293M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($614M) · cash from operations $293M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 56%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $126M ÷ Owner Earnings $227M

What this means
Of $227M Owner Earnings, $126M (56%) went back to shareholders, $41M dividends, $85M buybacks. Net of $26M stock comp, the real buyback was about $60M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.67×

Harvesting

Capex $66M ÷ depreciation $98M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $36.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.06×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $888M vs $190M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −688%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.21/share (latest year $-11.96), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 0% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 0% early, −0% lately, median 0%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2025 · −1.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −2.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Additionally, the use of artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, may enable more automated and effective attacks.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.4B

Cash & short-term investments$161M
Receivables$2.8B
Inventory$739M
Other current assets$647M

Current liabilities$4.2B

Debt due within a year$13M
Accounts payable$3.4B
Other current liabilities$775M

Current ratio1.05×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.87×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$190Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$13M due · $161M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$159Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$435M$161M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$9M

'27$12M

'28$366M

'29$17M

'30$293M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$9Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$21Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$366Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$697Mthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $888M of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$161M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$227M

Together, against $9M due next year41.8×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $388M against the $9M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 42 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$634M · 37%
Dividends$269M · 16%
Buybacks$601M · 35%
Retained (debt / cash)$199M · 12%

Returned to owners$870M
81% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $269M as dividends and $601M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $298M and cash and short-term investments fell $538M.
Average price paid for buybacks$33.83
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 12M shares were bought for $416M, about $33.83 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $24.35 (2022) to $120.20 (2023); its heaviest year, 2020, paid $26.27 ($68M).
Net change in share count−25.5%
The diluted count fell from 70M to 52M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.74/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.0B18% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity57%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $634M of capital spent building

$601M written down across 2 years (2017, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 38% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Michael J. Kasbar	$5.1M	$4.0M	$134M
2022	Michael J. Kasbar	$15.3M	$14.2M	$60M
2023	Michael J. Kasbar	$6.8M	−$1.2M	$184M
2024	Michael J. Kasbar	$6.7M	$11.9M	$192M
2025	Michael J. Kasbar	$6.4M	−$97k	$227M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio85:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$26M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why World Kinect is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $1.5B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CORCencora Inc.	$321.3B	3%	0.8%	38%	1%
CAHCardinal Health Inc.	$222.6B	4%	0.5%	14%	1%
SYYSysco Corporation	$81.4B	19%	3.8%	16%	3%
PFGCPerformance Food	$63.3B	12%	1.3%	6%	1%
USFDUS Foods	$39.4B	17%	2.7%	8%	2%
WKCWorld Kinect	$36.9B	3%	0.5%	6%	0%
CHSCOCHS Inc.	$35.5B	3%	1.2%	4%	2%
DPZDomino's Pizza Inc.	$4.9B	39%	18.0%	91%	12%
Group median	—	8%	1.2%	11%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what World Kinect has delivered.

World Kinect’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, World Kinect earns about $145M on its 0.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($145M) Net of stock comp (−$26M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+7%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $68M on 51M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $727M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh WKC against another business →

The owners of WKC: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "World Kinect (WKC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WKC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WK its page in the Manual WLDN →

Industry order: ← VLO the Refining & Marketing chapter XOM →