Owner Scorecard


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HSIC, Henry Schein Inc.

Drug & Medical Distributors capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Henry Schein, Inc. is a solutions company for health care professionals powered by a network of people and technology.

Our philosophy is grounded in our commitment to serve as trusted advisors and help customers operate a more efficient and successful business so the practitioner can provide better clinical care.

We stock a comprehensive selection of more than 300,000 branded and Henry Schein corporate brand products through our network.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HSIC · Henry Schein Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$13.2B
+4.0% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $13.4B 5-yr avg $12.6B
Gross margin 31% 5-yr avg 31%
Operating margin 4.9% 5-yr avg 5.5%
ROIC 9% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Global Distribution and Value-Added Services (84%), Global Specialty Products (11%) and Global Technology (5%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 47% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 31% and operating margin about 5.9% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has held in a narrow 4.9%–7.5% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Global Distribution and Value-Added Services is 84% of revenue, with Global Specialty Products the other meaningful segment at 11%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Global Distribution and Value-Added Services84%$11.1B
  • Global Specialty Products11%$1.4B
  • Global Technology5%$675M
By geographyUnited States69%International31%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$11.6B$8.9B$9.4B$10.0B$10.1B$12.4B$12.6B$12.3B$12.7B$13.2B$13.4BRevenueRevenue
28%31%31%31%28%30%30%31%32%31%31%Gross marginGross mgn
21%23%24%24%21%21%22%24%24%23%24%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$772M$670M$601M$718M$535M$852M$747M$615M$621M$653M$660MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.7%7.5%6.4%7.2%5.3%6.9%5.9%5.0%4.9%5.0%4.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$507M$406M$536M$695M$404M$631M$538M$416M$390M$398M$395MNet incomeNet inc.
30%43%17%19%19%24%24%22%25%24%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$643M$546M$685M$654M$599M$710M$602M$500M$848M$712M$578MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$170M$134M$144M$185M$186M$210M$212M$248M$297M$311M$319MDepreciationDeprec.
($92M)($31M)($27M)($271M)$0($209M)($202M)($203M)$122M($36M)($173M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$70M$62M$71M$76M$49M$79M$96M$147M$148M$139M$133MCapexCapex
0.6%0.7%0.8%0.8%0.5%0.6%0.8%1.2%1.2%1.1%1.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$572M$483M$613M$578M$550M$631M$506M$353M$700M$573M$445MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.9%5.4%6.5%5.8%5.4%5.1%4.0%2.9%5.5%4.3%3.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$572M$483M$613M$578M$550M$631M$506M$353M$700M$573M$445MFree cash flowFCF
4.9%5.4%6.5%5.8%5.4%5.1%4.0%2.9%5.5%4.3%3.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$229M$181M$53M$656M$60M$571M$158M$955M$230M$199M$172MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$550M$450M$200M$525M$74M$401M$485M$250M$385M$850MBuybacksBuybacks
15%11%13%17%13%16%13%9%9%9%9%ROICROIC
18%14%18%23%12%18%16%11%11%12%12%Return on equityROE
18%14%18%23%12%18%16%11%11%12%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$62M$175M$80M$106M$421M$118M$117M$171M$122M$156M$138MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B$1.5B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.9B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.7B$1.9B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.9B$2.0B$1.8B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0BInventoryInvent.
$1.0B$1.2B$786M$880M$1.0B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$962M$1.2B$1.0BAccounts payablePayables
$1.9B$2.3B$1.8B$1.8B$1.9B$2.3B$2.4B$2.7B$2.3B$2.5B$2.7BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.3B$4.1B$4.2B$3.2B$3.8B$3.8B$4.0B$4.5B$4.0B$4.5B$4.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.3B$2.8B$3.2B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2B$2.7B$2.8B$3.2B$3.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.4×1.3×1.6×1.7×1.7×1.8×1.7×1.4×1.4×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.0B$1.6B$2.1B$2.5B$2.5B$2.9B$2.9B$3.9B$3.9B$4.2B$4.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$6.8B$7.9B$8.5B$7.2B$7.8B$8.5B$8.6B$10.6B$10.2B$11.2B$11.3BTotal assetsAssets
$781M$924M$1.0B$623M$516M$822M$1.0B$2.1B$1.9B$2.3B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
$719M$750M$933M$517M$95M$704M$929M$1.9B$1.8B$2.2B$2.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
24.2×13.1×7.9×14.1×13.0×31.6×21.3×7.1×4.7×4.4×4.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.8B$2.8B$3.0B$3.0B$3.3B$3.4B$3.4B$3.7B$3.4B$3.2B$3.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.4%0.3%0.4%0.1%0.6%0.4%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$20M$13M$13MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
164M158M154M149M143M142M138M132M128M122M116MShares out (diluted)Shares
$70.68$56.15$61.27$66.90$70.56$87.47$91.81$93.66$99.18$108.32$115.32Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.10$2.57$3.49$4.65$2.82$4.45$3.91$3.16$3.05$3.27$3.40EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.50$3.05$3.99$3.87$3.84$4.45$3.67$2.68$5.48$4.71$3.83Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.50$3.05$3.99$3.87$3.84$4.45$3.67$2.68$5.48$4.71$3.83Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.43$0.39$0.46$0.51$0.34$0.56$0.70$1.12$1.16$1.14$1.15Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.06$17.77$19.27$20.09$23.35$24.16$25.02$27.74$26.55$26.66$28.14Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.9%/yr+8.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.4%/yr+4.2%/yr
EPS+0.6%/yr+3.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.5%/yr+27.3%/yr
Book value / share+5.1%/yr+2.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
122Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
9%low FY2023
Gross margin
31%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.8×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$573Mowner earningsvs.$398Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $398M of profit into $573M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$398M
Owner earnings$573M · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$398M$390M$416M$538M$631M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$311M+$297M+$248M+$212M+$210M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$39M+$39M+$39M+$54M+$78M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$36M+$122M−$203M−$202M−$209M
Cash from operations$712M$848M$500M$602M$710M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$139M−$148M−$147M−$96M−$79M
Owner earnings$573M$700M$353M$506M$631M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%6%3%4%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $39M), owner earnings is nearer $534M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $653M ÷ interest expense $150M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.2B · 3.3× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $156M − debt $2.3B
    What this means

    Netting $156M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $2.2B owed, about 3.3× a year's operating profit (3.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 46 + DIO 80 − DPO 46 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 9%–17%; 9% latest = NOPAT $496M ÷ invested capital $5.4B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–7%; latest $573M = operating cash $712M − maintenance capex $139M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $39M of SBC) leaves $534M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $712M ÷ net income $398M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $850M ÷ Owner Earnings $573M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $573M of Owner Earnings, $850M (148%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $850M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $39M stock comp, the real buyback was about $811M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.45×
    Harvesting
    Capex $139M ÷ depreciation $311M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $13.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.38×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $1.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −17%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.52/share (latest year $3.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 5% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 0%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 4.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our future success depends on our ability to timely develop (or obtain the right to sell) competitive and innovative (particularly for our Global Technology and Global Specialty Products segments) products and services and utilize new technologies, such as artificial intelligence ("AI") (among other emerging technologi…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$138M
  • Receivables$1.7B
  • Inventory$2.0B
  • Other current assets$625M
Current liabilities$3.3B
  • Debt due within a year$17M
  • Accounts payable$1.0B
  • Other current liabilities$2.2B
Current ratio1.36×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.75×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$17M due · $138M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.4B$341M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$93Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$33M
'27$534M
'28$221M
'29$143M
'30$810M
later$602M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$33Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$567Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$810Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$2.3Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 28, 2026$138M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$573M
Together, against $33M due next year21.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $711M against the $33M due in the twelve months after the Dec 27, 2025 schedule: 22 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 27, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$938M · 14%
  • Buybacks$4.2B · 64%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.4B · 21%
  • Returned to owners$4.2B

    75% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $4.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.6B and cash and short-term investments rose $76M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $4.2B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−29.1%

    The diluted count fell from 164M to 116M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−2%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($751M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $14M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$5.2B47% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$3.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $938M of capital spent building

$33M written down across 2 years (2022, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Bergman$10.8M$28.3M$631M
2022Mr. Bergman$8.3M$10.0M$506M
2023Mr. Bergman$10.0M$4.9M$353M
2024Mr. Bergman$11.6M$7.9M$700M
2025Mr. Bergman$12.0M$9.8M$573M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership0.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$39M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Henry Schein Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.2% vs 5.6%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.6% early in the record and 4.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$781M → $2.3B

    Debt rose from $781M to $2.3B while owner earnings went from about $556M to $542M — about 1.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $111M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Drug & Medical Distributors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AVTAvnet Inc.$22.2B12%2.3%7%1%
GWWW.W. Grainger Inc.$17.9B39%11.9%29%8%
TELTE Connectivity plc$17.3B33%16.3%15%13%
RSReliance Inc.$14.3B29%8.3%11%7%
LKQLKQ Corporation$13.7B39%8.5%8%6%
HSICHenry Schein Inc.$13.2B31%6.1%13%5%
CNMCore & Main Inc.$7.6B27%9.4%15%6%
SITESiteOne Landscape$4.7B5.3%12%5%
Group median31%8.4%12%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Henry Schein Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Henry Schein Inc. earns about $694M on its 5.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $445M on 114M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $2.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Henry Schein Inc. (HSIC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HSIC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HRTG its page in the Manual HST →

Industry order: ← COR the Drug & Medical Distributors chapter MCK →