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CPS, Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc.

Auto Components capital-intensive Unprofitable

Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc. is a leading manufacturer of sealing systems and fluid handling systems.

Our products are primarily designed for passenger vehicles and light trucks that are manufactured by global automotive original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") and replacement markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CPS · Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.7B

+0.4% YoY

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $1.1B

Gross margin 12% 5-yr avg 12%

Operating margin 3.2% 5-yr avg 2.9%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg −1%

Owner-earnings margin −2% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin −2% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Sealing systems (52%), Fluid transfer systems (46%) and Corporate (3%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Volume, mix and the cost of the platform. What decides it: units sold, how rich the mix is, and whether the fixed cost of plants and engineering is covered when demand softens. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Sealing systems at 52%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Sealing systems52%$1.4B
Fluid transfer systems46%$1.3B
Corporate3%$74M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$2.7B	$2.7B	$2.8B	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11%	12%	12%	Gross marginGross mgn
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8%	8%	8%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3%	3%	3%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$247M	$266M	$110M	$156M	($269M)	($209M)	($105M)	$46M	$70M	$87M	$88M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.6%	3.2%	3.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$139M	$138M	$104M	$68M	($268M)	($323M)	($215M)	($202M)	($79M)	($4M)	($39M)	Net incomeNet inc.
28%	34%	—	35%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$365M	$313M	$149M	$98M	($16M)	($116M)	($36M)	$117M	$76M	$64M	$10M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$123M	$138M	$147M	$152M	$154M	$139M	$122M	$110M	$104M	$98M	$99M	DepreciationDeprec.
$80M	$12M	($109M)	($134M)	$87M	$63M	$53M	$202M	$42M	($45M)	($65M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$164M	$187M	$218M	$164M	$92M	$96M	$71M	$81M	$50M	$48M	$55M	CapexCapex
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.8%	1.8%	2.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$201M	$126M	($69M)	($67M)	($108M)	($212M)	($107M)	$37M	$26M	$16M	($45M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.9%	0.6%	−1.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$201M	$126M	($69M)	($67M)	($108M)	($212M)	($107M)	$37M	$26M	$16M	($45M)	Free cash flowFCF
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.9%	0.6%	−1.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$37M	$478K	$172M	$452K	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$24M	$55M	$60M	$37M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
18%	16%	8%	8%	-18%	-15%	-9%	4%	7%	8%	8%	ROICROIC
20%	17%	13%	8%	-44%	-99%	-200%	—	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
20%	17%	13%	8%	−44%	−99%	−200%	—	—	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$480M	$516M	$265M	$360M	$438M	$248M	$187M	$155M	$170M	$192M	$118M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$461M	$494M	$419M	$423M	$380M	$317M	$359M	$381M	$311M	$334M	$378M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$146M	$170M	$176M	$143M	$144M	$158M	$158M	$147M	$142M	$154M	$185M	InventoryInvent.
$475M	$523M	$452M	$426M	$385M	$348M	$338M	$335M	$295M	$337M	$365M	Accounts payablePayables
$132M	$141M	$142M	$141M	$138M	$127M	$178M	$193M	$158M	$151M	$198M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$995M	$946M	$901M	$805M	$881M	$903M	Current assetsCur. assets
$759M	$827M	$820M	$720M	$671M	$598M	$632M	$653M	$577M	$678M	$645M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.7×	1.5×	1.7×	1.9×	1.7×	1.5×	1.4×	1.4×	1.3×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$167M	$172M	$144M	$142M	$142M	$142M	$142M	$141M	$140M	$141M	$141M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.9B	Total assetsAssets
$777M	$770M	$841M	$816M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Total debtDebt
$297M	$254M	$576M	$457M	$602M	$802M	$866M	$1.0B	$944M	$922M	$1.0B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$697M	$827M	$825M	$856M	$607M	$325M	$108M	($81M)	($126M)	($83M)	($115M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.3%	0.6%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	$45M	—	—	$390K	—	—	—	—	$390K	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
18.7M	18.8M	18.3M	17.2M	16.9M	17.0M	17.2M	17.4M	17.6M	17.9M	18.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$155.48	$153.45	$153.60	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.42	$7.35	$5.66	$3.92	$-15.82	$-18.94	$-12.53	$-11.64	$-4.48	$-0.23	$-2.17	EPS (diluted)EPS
$10.74	$6.73	$-3.76	$-3.88	$-6.37	$-12.41	$-6.24	$2.11	$1.47	$0.91	$-2.48	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$10.74	$6.73	$-3.76	$-3.88	$-6.37	$-12.41	$-6.24	$2.11	$1.47	$0.91	$-2.48	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$8.78	$9.95	$11.92	$9.56	$5.43	$5.64	$4.14	$4.65	$2.88	$2.70	$3.04	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$37.23	$44.02	$45.10	$49.75	$35.89	$19.06	$6.27	$-4.68	$-7.16	$-4.67	$-6.42	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Owner earnings / share	−24.0%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−12.3%/yr	−13.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

18Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

8%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

56.7×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$16Mowner earningsvs.($4M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $4M loss into $16M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($4M)	($79M)	($202M)	($215M)	($323M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$98M	+$104M	+$110M	+$122M	+$139M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$15M	+$9M	+$8M	+$3M	+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$45M	+$42M	+$202M	+$53M	+$63M
Cash from operations	$64M	$76M	$117M	($36M)	($116M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$48M	−$50M	−$81M	−$71M	−$96M
Owner earnings	$16M	$26M	$37M	($107M)	($212M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	1%	—	—	—

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer $1M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $922M · 10.6× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $192M − debt $1.1B

What this means
Netting $192M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $922M owed, about 10.6× a year's operating profit (12.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 17d

Tight

DSO 45 + DIO 23 − DPO 51 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -18%–18%; 8% latest = NOPAT $68M ÷ invested capital $839M

Industry peers: median 21%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin

Owner earnings $16M = operating cash $64M − maintenance capex $48M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves $1M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $64M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($4M) · cash from operations $64M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $16M

What this means
Of $16M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.49×

Harvesting

Capex $48M ÷ depreciation $98M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $203M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −175%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-5.35/share (latest year $-0.23), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-4.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −20%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 20% a year over the record.
Worst year 2024 · 2.6% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We may be unable to develop new products successfully or to keep pace with technological developments by our competitors and the industry in general, which in recent years includes the rapid development and rising use of digital, A.I. and machine learning technologies.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$903M

Cash & short-term investments$118M
Receivables$378M
Inventory$185M
Other current assets$222M

Current liabilities$645M

Debt due within a year$44M
Accounts payable$365M
Other current liabilities$236M

Current ratio1.40×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.11×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$258Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$44M due · $118M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($284M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$627M$99M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.2B · 115%
Buybacks$175M · 17%

Returned to owners$175M
$0 as dividends and $175M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$331M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $331M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $777M to $1.1B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $362M.
Average price paid for buybacks$107.28
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $55M, about $107.28 each.
Net change in share count−4.1%
The diluted count fell from 19M to 18M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$170M9% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$210Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$46M written down across 2 years (2018, 2021): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 22% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Edwards	$5.1M	$1.2M	($212M)
2022	Mr. Edwards	$4.7M	$1.9M	($107M)
2023	Mr. Edwards	$7.6M	$11.4M	$37M
2024	Mr. Edwards	$8.7M	$3.5M	$26M
2025	Mr. Edwards	$5.2M	$17.5M	$16M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio284:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$15M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 18% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$777M → $1.1B
Debt rose from $777M to $1.1B while owner earnings went from about $86M to $26M — about 9.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 44 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $353M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Components

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
VCVisteon Corporation	$3.8B	13%	5.7%	28%	3%
GTXGarrett Motion Inc.	$3.6B	20%	12.2%	58%	8%
PHINPHINIA Inc.	$3.5B	22%	7.3%	8%	5%
MODModine Manufacturing Company	$3.2B	17%	5.4%	12%	3%
ALSNAllison Transmission Holdings Inc.	$3.0B	48%	29.0%	21%	23%
CPSCooper-Standard Holdings Inc.	$2.7B	12%	3.2%	7%	1%
GNTXGentex	$2.5B	36%	23.7%	22%	21%
DORMDorman Products Inc.	$2.1B	37%	13.4%	14%	7%
Group median	—	21%	9.7%	17%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($26M) Net of stock comp (−$16M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($38M))

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−20%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($45M) on 18M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.0B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($55M) runs well above depreciation ($99M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($38M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CPS against another business →

The owners of CPS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc. (CPS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CPS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CPRX its page in the Manual CPT →

Industry order: ← CAAS the Auto Components chapter DAN →