Owner Scorecard


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VC, Visteon Corporation

Auto Components capital-intensive

Visteon Corporation is a global automotive technology company serving the mobility industry, dedicated to creating more enjoyable, connected, and safe driving experiences.

Visteon products and services align with key industry trends and include digital instrument clusters, information displays, infotainment, cockpit domain controllers, CognitoAI TM , battery management systems, high voltage power electronics, and engineering services.

Visteon is headquartered in Van Buren Township, Michigan, and has an international network of manufacturing operations, technical centers, and joint venture operations dedicated to the design, development, manufacture, and support of its product offerings and its global customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
VC · Visteon Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.8B
−2.5% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.8B 5-yr avg $3.6B
Gross margin 13% 5-yr avg 12%
Operating margin 7.7% 5-yr avg 6.2%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 25%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Instrument cluster (46%) and Infotainment (13%), with 4 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 12% and operating margin about 4.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −0.5% to 9.0% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 28%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Instrument cluster at 46%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Instrument cluster46%$1.7B
  • Infotainment13%$508M
  • Climate controls13%$500M
  • Information displays11%$428M
  • Body and security11%$420M
  • Other4%$165M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.2B$3.1B$3.0B$2.9B$2.5B$2.8B$3.8B$4.0B$3.9B$3.8B$3.8BRevenueRevenue
14%16%14%11%10%9%10%12%14%14%13%Gross marginGross mgn
7%7%6%8%8%6%5%5%5%5%6%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%8%10%10%8%7%5%5%5%6%6%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$123M$245M$221M$107M($12M)$82M$183M$255M$303M$339M$293MOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.9%7.8%7.4%3.6%−0.5%3.0%4.9%6.4%7.8%9.0%7.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$75M$176M$164M$70M($56M)$41M$124M$568M$296M$201M$165MNet incomeNet inc.
29%21%21%26%43%27%-3%38%41%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$116M$215M$204M$183M$168M$58M$167M$267M$427M$410M$346MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$84M$87M$91M$100M$104M$108M$108M$104M$96M$109M$113MDepreciationDeprec.
($51M)($60M)($59M)($4M)$102M($109M)($91M)($439M)($6M)$55M$22MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$75M$99M$127M$142M$142MCapexCapex
2.4%3.1%4.3%4.8%3.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$41M$116M$113M$83M$233MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.3%3.7%3.8%2.8%6.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$41M$116M$77M$41M$204MFree cash flowFCF
1.3%3.7%2.6%1.4%5.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$15M$47M$0$0$0$0$0$55M$50M$50MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$15M$15MDividends paidDiv. paid
$500M$200M$300M$20M$16M$0$0$107M$63M$57MBuybacksBuybacks
98%59%43%20%-4%11%27%30%36%22%10%ROICROIC
13%28%35%15%-14%8%18%55%26%14%11%Return on equityROE
55%26%13%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$878M$706M$463M$466M$496M$452M$520M$515M$623M$771M$680MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$505M$530M$486M$514M$484M$549M$672M$666M$578M$613M$675MReceivablesReceiv.
$151M$189M$184M$169M$177M$262M$348M$298M$283M$269M$316MInventoryInvent.
$463M$470M$436M$511M$500M$522M$657M$551M$505M$540M$613MAccounts payablePayables
$193M$249M$234M$172M$161M$289M$363M$413M$356M$342M$378MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B$1.6B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7B$1.6B$1.6B$1.8B$1.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$911M$801M$721M$798M$824M$852M$1.0B$931M$916M$992M$1.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×2.0×1.8×1.7×1.6×1.7×1.7×1.7×1.7×1.8×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$45M$47M$0$0$29MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B$2.3B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2B$2.5B$2.7B$2.8B$3.1B$3.4BTotal assetsAssets
$382M$393M$405M$385M$349M$353M$349M$336M$319M$301M$807MTotal debtDebt
($496M)($313M)($58M)($81M)($147M)($99M)($171M)($179M)($304M)($470M)$127MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
6.8×11.7×15.8×8.2×-0.8×8.2×13.1×15.0×20.2×26.1×22.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$586M$637M$465M$480M$387M$516M$675M$1.0B$1.1B$1.4B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.4%0.3%0.6%0.7%0.6%0.7%0.9%1.1%1.2%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
35.4M32.2M29.7M28.2M27.9M28.4M28.5M28.5M27.9M27.6M27.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$89.29$97.70$100.47$104.43$91.33$97.64$131.79$138.74$138.57$136.52$138.75Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.12$5.47$5.52$2.48$-2.01$1.44$4.35$19.93$10.61$7.28$6.04EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.16$3.60$3.80$2.94$8.53Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.16$3.60$2.59$1.45$7.47Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.54$0.55Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.12$3.07$4.28$5.04$5.20Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.55$19.78$15.66$17.02$13.87$18.17$23.68$36.42$40.75$51.41$57.00Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.8%/yr+8.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+36.5%/yr (3-yr)+36.5%/yr (3-yr)
EPS+14.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+33.5%/yr (3-yr)+33.5%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+13.4%/yr+30.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-2.5%
    “Sales were $3,768 million, down 3% year over year, reflecting lower customer commodity price recoveries, continued market weakness in China and lower demand for its battery management system.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
28Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
22%low FY2020
Gross margin
14%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-1.0×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$83Mowner earningsvs.$70Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2019 the business earned $83M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $100M it takes just to hold its position. It put $42M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $41M.

Reported net income$70M
Owner earnings$83M · 3% of revenue
FY2019FY2018FY2017FY2016
Reported net income$70M$164M$176M$75M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$100M+$91M+$87M+$84M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$17M+$8M+$12M+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$4M−$59M−$60M−$51M
Cash from operations$183M$204M$215M$116M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$100M−$91M−$99M−$75M
Owner earnings$83M$113M$116M$41M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$42M−$36M
Free cash flow$41M$77M$116M$41M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%4%4%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $100M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $42M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $66M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $339M ÷ interest expense $13M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $97M · 0.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $771M − debt $868M
    What this means

    Netting $771M of cash and short-term investments against $868M of debt leaves $97M owed, about 0.3× a year's operating profit (2.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 59 + DIO 30 − DPO 61 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -4%–98%; 14% latest = NOPAT $209M ÷ invested capital $1.5B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    4-yr median margin, range 1%–4%; latest $301M = operating cash $410M − maintenance capex $109M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves $256M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $410M ÷ net income $201M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $72M ÷ Owner Earnings $301M
    What this means

    Of $301M Owner Earnings, $72M (24%) went back to shareholders, $15M dividends, $57M buybacks. Net of $45M stock comp, the real buyback was about $12M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.30×
    Expanding
    Capex $142M ÷ depreciation $109M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.80×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $868M vs $793M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +157%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $13.30/share (latest year $7.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $53.16/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 8% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 17%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −0.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“A.I will continue to play an increasing role in the Company's products and generating opportunities but also presents the risk that the Company's products may be developed more cheaply with A.I. solutions or that a competitor's A.I. offerings may be preferred over the Company's product offerings.…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$680M
  • Receivables$675M
  • Inventory$316M
  • Other current assets$150M
Current liabilities$1.1B
  • Debt due within a year$18M
  • Accounts payable$613M
  • Other current liabilities$422M
Current ratio1.73×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.43×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.65×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$768Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$18M due · $680M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$436M$139M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$125Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2019

Over the record, the business generated $718M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$443M · 62%
  • Buybacks$1.0B · 142%
  • Returned to owners$1.0B

    289% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$745M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $745M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $382M to $807M, and cash and short-term investments drew down $198M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−22.9%

    The diluted count fell from 35M to 27M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021Mr. Sachin S$9.3M$4.2M$41M
2022Mr. Sachin S$10.5M$18.2M$124M
2023Mr. Sachin S$13.2M$9.3M$568M
2024Mr. Sachin S$14.4M$5.3M$296M
2025Mr. Sachin S$16.8M$16.3M$201M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio590:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$45M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Visteon Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$382M → $807M

    Debt rose from $382M to $807M while owner earnings went from about $90M to $104M — about 4.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 7.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?21% → 26% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $656M to $991M while revenue grew 20%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (21% of revenue then, 26% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Auto Components

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LCIILCI Industries$4.1B23%8.2%12%8%
PATKPatrick Industries Inc.$4.0B19%7.4%12%7%
VCVisteon Corporation$3.8B13%5.7%28%3%
GTXGarrett Motion Inc.$3.6B20%12.2%58%8%
PHINPHINIA Inc.$3.5B22%7.3%8%5%
MODModine Manufacturing Company$3.2B17%5.4%12%3%
ALSNAllison Transmission Holdings Inc.$3.0B48%29.0%21%23%
CPSCooper-Standard Holdings Inc.$2.7B12%3.2%7%1%
Group median20%7.4%12%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Visteon Corporation has delivered.

Visteon Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Visteon Corporation earns about $139M on its 3.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’19−9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $204M on 27M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net debt $127M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($142M) runs well above depreciation ($113M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $237M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Visteon Corporation (VC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VALU its page in the Manual VCEL →

Industry order: ← THRM the Auto Components chapter XPEL →