Owner Scorecard


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CROX, Crocs Inc.

Footwear & Accessories consumer brand Cyclical

Crocs, Inc. and our consolidated subsidiaries are engaged in the design, development, worldwide marketing, distribution, and sale of casual lifestyle footwear and accessories for all.

We have brands with broad democratic appeal and accessible price points, which are aligned with global megatrends such as casualization, comfort, and personalization.

The HEYDUDE Brand provides opportunity to play in a broader casual footwear market.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CROX · Crocs Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.0B
−1.5% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.0B 5-yr avg $3.6B
Gross margin 58% 5-yr avg 57%
Operating margin 3.2% 5-yr avg 21.6%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 42%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 20%
Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 19%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Crocs Brand (82%) and HEYDUDE Brand (18%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 52% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.6% to 30% — on a steadier 52% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 34%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Crocs Brand is 82% of revenue, with HEYDUDE Brand the other meaningful segment at 18%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Crocs Brand82%$3.3B
  • HEYDUDE Brand18%$715M
By geographyUnited States56%International44%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$2.3B$3.6B$4.0B$4.1B$4.0B$4.0BRevenueRevenue
48%51%51%50%54%61%52%56%59%58%58%Gross marginGross mgn
49%48%45%40%37%32%28%29%33%36%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($6M)$17M$63M$129M$214M$683M$851M$1.0B$1.0B$150M$127MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−0.6%1.7%5.8%10.5%15.4%29.5%23.9%26.2%24.9%3.7%3.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($16M)$10M$50M$119M$313M$726M$540M$793M$950M($81M)($104M)Net incomeNet inc.
44%23%-0%-9%25%10%-4%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$40M$98M$114M$90M$267M$567M$603M$930M$992M$710M$697MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$34M$33M$29M$24M$28M$32M$39M$54M$70M$79M$81MDepreciationDeprec.
$11M$45M$21M($68M)($90M)($229M)($8M)$55M($60M)$676M$681MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$22M$13M$12M$37M$42M$56M$104M$116M$69M$51M$54MCapexCapex
2.1%1.3%1.1%3.0%3.0%2.4%2.9%2.9%1.7%1.3%1.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$18M$85M$102M$66M$239M$535M$564M$876M$923M$659M$643MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.7%8.3%9.4%5.3%17.3%23.1%15.9%22.1%22.5%16.3%16.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$18M$85M$102M$53M$225M$511M$499M$815M$923M$659M$643MFree cash flowFCF
1.7%8.3%9.4%4.3%16.2%22.1%14.0%20.6%22.5%16.3%16.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$2.0B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$50M$63M$147M$171M$1.0B$0$175M$552M$582MBuybacksBuybacks
-6%68%33%56%64%119%22%32%34%3%2%ROICROIC
-7%6%34%91%108%5153%66%55%52%-6%-7%Return on equityROE
−7%6%34%91%108%n/m66%55%52%−6%−7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$148M$172M$123M$108M$136M$213M$192M$149M$180M$130M$131MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$78M$84M$98M$108M$150M$183M$296M$306M$258M$278M$442MReceivablesReceiv.
$147M$130M$124M$172M$175M$214M$472M$385M$356M$369M$398MInventoryInvent.
$62M$66M$77M$96M$113M$162M$231M$261M$265M$266M$242MAccounts payablePayables
$163M$147M$145M$184M$212M$234M$536M$430M$349M$381M$597MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$425M$425M$380M$425M$493M$667M$1.0B$911M$872M$886M$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$149M$157M$184M$257M$292M$388M$641M$698M$740M$700M$640MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×2.7×2.1×1.7×1.7×1.7×1.6×1.3×1.2×1.3×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1M$2M$2M$2M$2M$2M$715M$712M$711M$405M$405MGoodwillGoodwill
$566M$544M$469M$739M$1.1B$1.5B$4.5B$4.6B$4.8B$4.2B$4.3BTotal assetsAssets
$2M$706K$120M$205M$180M$771M$2.3B$1.7B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3BTotal debtDebt
($145M)($171M)($3M)$97M$44M$558M$2.1B$1.5B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-7.4×19.9×65.9×14.9×31.8×31.6×6.2×6.4×9.4×1.7×1.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$220M$186M$150M$132M$291M$14M$818M$1.5B$1.8B$1.3B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%1.0%1.2%1.2%1.2%1.6%0.9%0.7%0.8%0.9%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$431K$307M$307MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
73.4M72.3M68.4M71.8M68.5M63.7M62.0M62.0M59.8M54.2M50.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.12$14.17$15.90$17.15$20.22$36.31$57.33$63.96$68.56$74.54$79.37Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.22$0.14$0.74$1.66$4.56$11.39$8.71$12.79$15.88$-1.50$-2.05EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.24$1.18$1.49$0.92$3.49$8.40$9.09$14.14$15.43$12.16$12.68Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.24$1.18$1.49$0.74$3.28$8.02$8.05$13.15$15.43$12.16$12.68Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.30$0.18$0.18$0.51$0.61$0.88$1.68$1.87$1.16$0.95$1.06Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.00$2.57$2.20$1.84$4.24$0.22$13.19$23.47$30.68$23.86$28.15Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+20.3%/yr+29.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+54.7%/yr+28.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.5%/yr+9.0%/yr
Book value / share+25.9%/yr+41.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
54Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
3%low FY2016
Gross margin
58%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.7×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$659Mowner earningsvs.($81M)net incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $81M loss into $659M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($81M)$950M$793M$540M$726M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$79M+$70M+$54M+$39M+$32M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$37M+$33M+$29M+$31M+$38M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$676M−$60M+$55M−$8M−$229M
Cash from operations$710M$992M$930M$603M$567M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$51M−$69M−$54M−$39M−$32M
Owner earnings$659M$923M$876M$564M$535M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$61M−$65M−$24M
Free cash flow$659M$923M$815M$499M$511M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%23%22%16%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $37M), owner earnings is nearer $622M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $150M ÷ interest expense $88M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.1B · 7.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $130M − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Netting $130M of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $1.1B owed, about 7.4× a year's operating profit (8.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 25 + DIO 80 − DPO 58 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -6%–119%; 3% latest = NOPAT $75M ÷ invested capital $2.4B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–23%; latest $659M = operating cash $710M − maintenance capex $51M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $37M of SBC) leaves $622M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($81M) · cash from operations $710M

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $582M ÷ Owner Earnings $659M
    What this means

    Of $659M Owner Earnings, $582M (88%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $582M buybacks. Net of $37M stock comp, the real buyback was about $546M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.65×
    Harvesting
    Capex $51M ÷ depreciation $79M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $186M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +3661%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $11.15/share (latest year $-1.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $26.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 18% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 24%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +36%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 36% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −0.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −3.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$131M
  • Receivables$442M
  • Inventory$398M
  • Other current assets$94M
Current liabilities$640M
  • Debt due within a year$6M
  • Accounts payable$242M
  • Other current liabilities$391M
Current ratio1.67×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.04×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$426Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $131M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($298M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.7B$390M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.6B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$98M
'27$92M
'28$73M
'29$58M
'30$43M
later$96M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$98Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$461Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$383Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.2B
Lease obligations (present value)$383M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.6B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.6B, of which the leases are 24%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$522M · 12%
  • Buybacks$2.7B · 62%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 26%
  • Returned to owners$2.7B

    67% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.7B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.3B and cash and short-term investments fell $17M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$12.16

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 9M shares were bought for $113M, about $12.16 each.

  • Net change in share count−30.9%

    The diluted count fell from 73M to 51M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained113%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($663M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $751M, so each retained $1 added about 1.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.7B41% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity31%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $522M of capital spent building

$307M written down across 2 years (2016, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 15% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Andrew Rees$15.8M$57.4M$535M
2022Andrew Rees$9.9M−$4.4M$564M
2023Andrew Rees$10.7M$8.7M$876M
2024Andrew Rees$12.4M$14.3M$923M
2025Andrew Rees$11.0M$7.4M$659M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio290:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$37M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 25% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Crocs Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2M → $1.3B

    Debt rose from $2M to $1.3B while owner earnings went from about $68M to $819M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $1.1B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Footwear & Accessories

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NWLNewell Brands$7.2B33%0.7%1%5%
DECKDeckers Outdoor Corporation$5.5B52%18.0%65%16%
CSLCarlisle Cos.$5.0B30%14.5%13%14%
CROXCrocs Inc.$4.0B53%13.0%34%16%
ATRAptarGroup Inc.$3.8B12.3%10%8%
ENTGEntegris Inc.$3.2B45%15.8%11%14%
WMSAdvanced Drainage Systems$3.1B24%16.1%16%13%
AWIArmstrong World Industries Inc$1.6B37%25.7%23%11%
Group median37%15.1%14%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Crocs Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Crocs Inc. earns about $650M on its 16.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+36%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $643M on 50M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $1.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Crocs Inc. (CROX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CROX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CRON its page in the Manual CRS →

Industry order: ← CPRI the Footwear & Accessories chapter DECK →