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CSL, Carlisle Cos.

Building Products consumer brand Serial acquirer

Carlisle Companies Incorporated is a leading supplier of innovative building envelope products and solutions for more energy-efficient buildings.

Through our building products businesses, Carlisle Construction Materials and Carlisle Weatherproofing Technologies, and family of leading brands, Carlisle delivers innovative, labor reducing and environmentally responsible products and solutions to customers through the Carlisle Experience.

CCM is a manufacturer and supplier of premium roofing products and related technologies primarily for the commercial construction market.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CSL · Carlisle Cos.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$5.0B

+0.3% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.0B 5-yr avg $4.8B

Gross margin 36% 5-yr avg 34%

Operating margin 20.1% 5-yr avg 20.3%

ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 18%

Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 17%

Free cash flow margin 19% 5-yr avg 17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is CCM (74%) and CWT (26%).
Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 47% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 29% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 13%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, CCM, is also where the profit is made: 74% of revenue and 91% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Operating profit same segments

CCM74%$3.7B91% of profit
CWT26%$1.3B9% of profit

By geographyUnited States90%Europe5%North America Excluding US5%Other1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.4B	$3.8B	$4.5B	$4.5B	$4.0B	$3.8B	$5.4B	$4.6B	$5.0B	$5.0B	$5.0B	RevenueRevenue
32%	28%	26%	29%	29%	29%	34%	36%	38%	36%	36%	Gross marginGross mgn
14%	14%	14%	14%	15%	13%	11%	14%	14%	15%	15%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$404M	$464M	$509M	$634M	$488M	$573M	$1.2B	$983M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$999M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
11.8%	12.4%	11.4%	14.1%	12.3%	14.9%	22.1%	21.4%	22.8%	20.0%	20.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$250M	$366M	$611M	$473M	$320M	$422M	$924M	$767M	$1.3B	$741M	$725M	Net incomeNet inc.
37%	19%	13%	20%	20%	20%	22%	22%	16%	22%	22%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$531M	$459M	$339M	$703M	$697M	$422M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$138M	$169M	$191M	$205M	$224M	$120M	$159M	$151M	$173M	$197M	$198M	DepreciationDeprec.
$146M	($89M)	($486M)	($1M)	$123M	($139M)	($113M)	$241M	($484M)	$130M	$100M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$109M	$160M	$121M	$89M	$96M	$135M	$184M	$142M	$113M	$131M	$131M	CapexCapex
3.2%	4.3%	2.7%	2.0%	2.4%	3.5%	3.4%	3.1%	2.3%	2.6%	2.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$422M	$299M	$219M	$614M	$601M	$287M	$817M	$1.1B	$917M	$971M	$925M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
12.3%	8.0%	4.9%	13.7%	15.1%	7.5%	15.0%	23.1%	18.3%	19.3%	18.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$422M	$299M	$219M	$614M	$601M	$287M	$817M	$1.1B	$917M	$971M	$925M	Free cash flowFCF
12.3%	8.0%	4.9%	13.7%	15.1%	7.5%	15.0%	23.1%	18.3%	19.3%	18.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$186M	$934M	$20M	$616M	$35M	$1.6B	$25M	$36M	$677M	$110M	$60M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$85M	$92M	$94M	$103M	$112M	$113M	$134M	$160M	$172M	$181M	$182M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$75M	$268M	$460M	$382M	$382M	$316M	$400M	$900M	$1.6B	$1.3B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
9%	10%	13%	13%	11%	9%	18%	17%	27%	22%	21%	ROICROIC
10%	14%	24%	18%	13%	16%	31%	27%	53%	41%	44%	Return on equityROE
7%	11%	20%	14%	8%	12%	26%	21%	46%	31%	33%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$385M	$378M	$804M	$351M	$897M	$324M	$365M	$577M	$754M	$1.1B	$771M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$512M	$626M	$698M	$683M	$554M	$815M	$615M	$615M	$580M	$594M	$692M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$377M	$449M	$458M	$511M	$433M	$605M	$518M	$362M	$473M	$447M	$481M	InventoryInvent.
$244M	$332M	$312M	$327M	$285M	$432M	$274M	$246M	$261M	$233M	$316M	Accounts payablePayables
$645M	$742M	$844M	$866M	$703M	$987M	$860M	$732M	$791M	$808M	$857M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.4B	$1.6B	$2.1B	$1.8B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$3.4B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$514M	$659M	$596M	$899M	$646M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$666M	$736M	$601M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×	2.5×	3.5×	1.9×	3.4×	1.8×	2.1×	2.9×	2.9×	3.1×	3.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.0B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	GoodwillGoodwill
$4.0B	$5.3B	$5.2B	$5.5B	$5.9B	$7.2B	$7.2B	$6.6B	$5.8B	$6.3B	$6.0B	Total assetsAssets
$596M	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$2.1B	$2.9B	$2.6B	$2.3B	$1.9B	$2.9B	$2.9B	Total debtDebt
$211M	$1.2B	$784M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$2.6B	$2.2B	$1.7B	$1.1B	$1.8B	$2.1B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	14.0×	13.0×	15.6×	12.8×	10.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$3.0B	$2.8B	$2.5B	$1.8B	$1.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
−0.1%	0.4%	0.5%	0.6%	0.8%	0.5%	0.6%	0.9%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
64.9M	63.6M	60.8M	57.5M	55.0M	53.2M	52.5M	50.4M	47.1M	43.2M	41.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$52.79	$59.02	$73.68	$77.99	$72.18	$72.12	$103.80	$91.01	$106.23	$116.20	$121.08	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.85	$5.75	$10.05	$8.22	$5.82	$7.93	$17.60	$15.23	$27.85	$17.15	$17.64	EPS (diluted)EPS
$6.51	$4.70	$3.59	$10.68	$10.93	$5.39	$15.57	$21.01	$19.47	$22.47	$22.50	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$6.51	$4.70	$3.59	$10.68	$10.93	$5.39	$15.57	$21.01	$19.47	$22.47	$22.50	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.30	$1.45	$1.54	$1.79	$2.04	$2.11	$2.56	$3.18	$3.66	$4.19	$4.42	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.68	$2.52	$1.99	$1.55	$1.74	$2.53	$3.50	$2.82	$2.41	$3.04	$3.18	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$38.02	$39.78	$42.72	$45.96	$46.14	$49.43	$57.61	$56.13	$52.30	$41.56	$40.22	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.2%/yr	+10.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+14.8%/yr	+15.5%/yr
EPS	+18.0%/yr	+24.1%/yr
Dividends / share	+13.9%/yr	+15.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+6.8%/yr	+11.8%/yr
Book value / share	+1.0%/yr	−2.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

CCM+0.5%
“CCM’s revenue increased in 2025 primarily driven by strong re-roofing activity aided by the MTL acquisition partially offset by lower new construction activity.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
CWT-0.1%
“CWT’s revenue decrease in 2025 was primarily the result of lower sales volumes due to continued softness in new construction activity, mostly offset by the acquisitions of PFB, ThermaFoam, and Bonded Logic.”
✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

43Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

22%low FY2021

Gross margin

36%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.8×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$971Mowner earningsvs.$741Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $741M of profit into $971M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$741M

Owner earnings$971M · 19% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$741M	$1.3B	$767M	$924M	$422M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$197M	+$173M	+$151M	+$159M	+$120M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$35M	+$30M	+$42M	+$31M	+$19M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$130M	−$484M	+$241M	−$113M	−$139M
Cash from operations	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$422M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$131M	−$113M	−$142M	−$184M	−$135M
Owner earnings	$971M	$917M	$1.1B	$817M	$287M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	18%	23%	15%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $35M), owner earnings is nearer $936M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 12.8×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.0B ÷ interest expense $79M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.8B · 1.8× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $1.1B − debt $2.9B

What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $2.9B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, about 1.8× a year's operating profit (2.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 67d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 43 + DIO 51 − DPO 26 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 13%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range 9%–27%; 22% latest = NOPAT $784M ÷ invested capital $3.6B

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 14%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 5%–23%; latest $971M = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $131M

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $35M of SBC) leaves $936M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.49×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $741M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 153%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $1.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $971M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $971M of Owner Earnings, $1.5B (153%) went back to shareholders, $181M dividends, $1.3B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $35M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.3B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.67×

Harvesting

Capex $131M ÷ depreciation $197M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.09×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.9B vs $1.5B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +130%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $23.23/share (latest year $18.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $44.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 12% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 21% lately, median 14% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +11%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · 11.4% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −4.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.0B

Cash & short-term investments$771M
Receivables$692M
Inventory$481M
Other current assets$88M

Current liabilities$601M

Debt due within a year$5M
Accounts payable$316M
Other current liabilities$280M

Current ratio3.38×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.58×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $771M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.9× → 3.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$3.0B$136M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$373Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.3B · 17%
Dividends$1.2B · 17%
Buybacks$6.1B · 81%

Returned to owners$7.3B
118% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.2B as dividends and $6.1B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$1.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $596M to $2.9B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $6.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−36.7%
The diluted count fell from 65M to 41M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$4.19/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.0B47% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity86%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$4.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.3B of capital spent building

$130M written down across 1 year (2016): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	D. Christian Koch	$11.0M	$33.2M	$287M
2022	D. Christian Koch	$11.5M	$10.8M	$817M
2023	D. Christian Koch	$11.0M	$22.4M	$1.1B
2024	D. Christian Koch	$14.2M	$22.3M	$917M
2025	D. Christian Koch	$11.4M	$2.0M	$971M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$35M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Carlisle Cos. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$596M → $2.9B
Debt rose from $596M to $2.9B while owner earnings went from about $313M to $982M — about 1.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$1.6B · 33% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Market Factors CCM serves a large and diverse customer base; however, in 2025 CCM's two largest customers represented 33% of the Company's consolidated revenues.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BERYBerry Global	$12.3B	18%	9.3%	8%	8%
NWLNewell Brands	$7.2B	33%	0.7%	1%	5%
DECKDeckers Outdoor Corporation	$5.5B	52%	18.0%	65%	16%
CSLCarlisle Cos.	$5.0B	30%	14.5%	13%	14%
CROXCrocs Inc.	$4.0B	53%	13.0%	34%	16%
ATRAptarGroup Inc.	$3.8B	—	12.3%	10%	8%
ENTGEntegris Inc.	$3.2B	45%	15.8%	11%	14%
WMSAdvanced Drainage Systems	$3.1B	24%	16.1%	16%	13%
Group median	—	33%	13.7%	12%	14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Carlisle Cos. has delivered.

Carlisle Cos.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Carlisle Cos. earns about $720M on its 14.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($720M) Net of stock comp (−$33M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+14%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+11%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $925M on 40M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $2.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CSL against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Carlisle Cos. (CSL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CSL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CSGP its page in the Manual CSR →

Industry order: ← CARR the Building Products chapter CSTE →