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CPRI, Capri Holdings

Footwear & Accessories consumer brand Cyclical

Capri Holdings Limited is a global fashion luxury group consisting of iconic brands Michael Kors and Jimmy Choo.

Our commitment to glamorous style and craftsmanship is at the heart of each of our luxury brands.

Our strength lies in the unique DNA and heritage of each of our brands, the diversity and passion of our people and our dedication to the clients and communities we serve.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

CPRI · Capri Holdings

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$3.5B

−4.1% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $4.5B

Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 66%

Operating margin 0.7% 5-yr avg 5.9%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 10%

Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Michael Kors (83%) and Jimmy Choo (17%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 61% and operating margin about 1.4% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.5% to 16% — on a steadier 61% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Michael Kors is 83% of revenue, with Jimmy Choo the other meaningful segment at 17%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026

Michael Kors83%$2.9B
Jimmy Choo17%$600M

By geographyAmericas58%EMEA29%Asia13%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$4.5B	$4.7B	$5.2B	$5.6B	$4.1B	$5.7B	$5.6B	$4.1B	$3.6B	$3.5B	$3.5B	RevenueRevenue
59%	61%	61%	59%	64%	66%	66%	—	—	—	45%	Gross marginGross mgn
34%	37%	40%	44%	50%	45%	48%	51%	55%	57%	57%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$690M	$749M	$735M	($192M)	$19M	$903M	$679M	$59M	($26M)	$23M	$23M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
15.4%	15.9%	14.0%	−3.5%	0.5%	16.0%	12.1%	1.4%	−0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$553M	$592M	$543M	($223M)	($62M)	$822M	$616M	($229M)	($1.2B)	$137M	$137M	Net incomeNet inc.
20%	20%	13%	—	—	10%	4%	—	—	16%	16%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.0B	$1.1B	$694M	$859M	$624M	$704M	$771M	$309M	$281M	$77M	$77M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$198M	$182M	$188M	$200M	$165M	$193M	$179M	$132M	$132M	$121M	$121M	DepreciationDeprec.
$250M	$238M	($97M)	$812M	$450M	($396M)	($102M)	$351M	$1.3B	($215M)	($215M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$165M	$120M	$181M	$223M	$111M	$131M	$226M	$135M	$74M	$63M	$63M	CapexCapex
3.7%	2.5%	3.5%	4.0%	2.7%	2.3%	4.0%	3.3%	2.0%	1.8%	1.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$870M	$942M	$513M	$636M	$513M	$573M	$545M	$174M	$207M	$14M	$14M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
19.4%	20.0%	9.8%	11.5%	12.6%	10.1%	9.7%	4.2%	5.7%	0.4%	0.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$870M	$942M	$513M	$636M	$513M	$573M	$545M	$174M	$207M	$14M	$14M	Free cash flowFCF
19.4%	20.0%	9.8%	11.5%	12.6%	10.1%	9.7%	4.2%	5.7%	0.4%	0.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$481M	$1.4B	$1.9B	$13M	$13M	$0	$0	$0	$9M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1.0B	$361M	$207M	$102M	$1M	$661M	$1.4B	$107M	$4M	$81M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
37%	22%	13%	-4%	0%	23%	19%	1%	-1%	6%	6%	ROICROIC
35%	29%	22%	-10%	-3%	32%	33%	-14%	-321%	171%	171%	Return on equityROE
35%	29%	22%	−10%	−3%	32%	33%	−14%	−321%	171%	171%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$228M	$163M	$172M	$592M	$232M	$169M	$249M	$199M	$107M	$135M	$135M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$266M	$290M	$383M	$308M	$373M	$434M	$369M	$332M	$215M	$211M	$211M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$549M	$661M	$953M	$827M	$736M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$862M	$701M	$581M	$581M	InventoryInvent.
$176M	$294M	$371M	$428M	$512M	$555M	$475M	$352M	$379M	$311M	$311M	Accounts payablePayables
$639M	$657M	$965M	$707M	$597M	$975M	$951M	$842M	$537M	$481M	$481M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$566M	$960M	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.3B	$954M	$954M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×	1.3×	1.1×	1.4×	1.0×	1.2×	1.3×	0.9×	1.1×	1.2×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$120M	$848M	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$253M	$199M	$202M	$202M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B	$4.1B	$6.7B	$7.9B	$7.5B	$7.5B	$7.3B	$6.7B	$5.2B	$3.2B	$3.2B	Total assetsAssets
$133M	$875M	$2.6B	$2.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$357M	$357M	Total debtDebt
($95M)	$712M	$2.4B	$1.6B	$1.1B	$991M	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$222M	$222M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.6B	$2.0B	$2.4B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$368M	$80M	$80M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%	1.1%	1.1%	1.3%	1.7%	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%	1.4%	1.0%	1.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	$171M	$94M	—	$82M	$192M	$66M	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
168M	155M	152M	151M	150M	152M	134M	118M	118M	120M	120M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$26.73	$30.42	$34.55	$36.83	$26.99	$37.08	$41.93	$35.07	$30.62	$28.99	$28.99	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.29	$3.82	$3.58	$-1.48	$-0.41	$5.39	$4.60	$-1.94	$-10.00	$1.14	$1.14	EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.17	$6.07	$3.38	$4.22	$3.41	$3.76	$4.07	$1.47	$1.75	$0.12	$0.12	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.17	$6.07	$3.38	$4.22	$3.41	$3.76	$4.07	$1.47	$1.75	$0.12	$0.12	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.98	$0.77	$1.19	$1.48	$0.74	$0.86	$1.69	$1.14	$0.63	$0.53	$0.53	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.47	$13.01	$16.02	$14.38	$14.34	$16.78	$13.79	$13.54	$3.11	$0.67	$0.67	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+0.9%/yr	+1.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−34.4%/yr	−49.1%/yr
EPS	−11.1%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−6.7%/yr	−6.6%/yr
Book value / share	−25.5%/yr	−45.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

120Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

6%low FY2020

Gross margin

66%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

15.9×peak FY2026

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$14Mowner earningsvs.$137Mnet incomelow FY2026

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported $137M of profit but $14M of owner earnings: $123M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$137M

Owner earnings$14M · 0% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$137M	($1.2B)	($229M)	$616M	$822M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$121M	+$132M	+$132M	+$179M	+$193M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$34M	+$50M	+$55M	+$78M	+$85M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$215M	+$1.3B	+$351M	−$102M	−$396M
Cash from operations	$77M	$281M	$309M	$771M	$704M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$63M	−$74M	−$135M	−$226M	−$131M
Owner earnings	$14M	$207M	$174M	$545M	$573M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	0%	6%	4%	10%	10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $34M), owner earnings is nearer ($20M).

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 58.5×

Comfortable

Operating income $23M ÷ interest expense $393K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $222M · 9.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $135M − debt $357M

What this means
Netting $135M of cash and short-term investments against $357M of debt leaves $222M owed, about 9.7× a year's operating profit (15.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 74d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 22 + DIO 112 − DPO 60 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -4%–37%; 6% latest = NOPAT $19M ÷ invested capital $302M

Industry peers: median 20%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 0%–20%; latest $14M = operating cash $77M − maintenance capex $63M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $34M of SBC) leaves ($20M).
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.56×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops $77M ÷ net income $137M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 579%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $81M ÷ Owner Earnings $14M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $14M of Owner Earnings, $81M (579%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $81M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $34M stock comp, the real buyback was about $47M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.52×

Harvesting

Capex $63M ÷ depreciation $121M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.21×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $357M vs $199M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −175%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.69/share (latest year $1.19), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.69/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 15% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 15% early to 0% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −21%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 21% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −3.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −3.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If we are unable to effectively adopt and integrate AI technologies into our operations, supply chain, and consumer-facing platforms at the pace of our competitors, our competitive position, operating efficiency, and ability to meet evolving consumer expectations could be adversely affected.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B

Cash & short-term investments$135M
Receivables$211M
Inventory$581M
Other current assets$226M

Current liabilities$954M

Debt due within a year$14M
Accounts payable$311M
Other current liabilities$629M

Current ratio1.21×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.60×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$199Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$14M due · $135M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($684M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($2.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.4B$1.1B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.4B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'27$287M

'28$236M

'29$191M

'30$138M

'31$97M

later$318M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$287Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.3Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$357M

Lease obligations (present value)$1.1B

Total fixed claims on the business$1.4B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.4B, of which the leases are 75%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Mar 28, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $6.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.4B · 22%
Buybacks$3.9B · 61%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 17%

Returned to owners$3.9B
78% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3.9B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−28.7%
The diluted count fell from 168M to 120M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$764M24% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$3.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.4B of capital spent building

$605M written down across 5 years (2020, 2021, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 16% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Mr. Idol	$14.7M	$15.5M	$573M
2023	Mr. Idol	$14.3M	$11.0M	$545M
2024	Mr. Idol	$10.5M	$9.8M	$174M
2025	Mr. Idol	$9.1M	−$3.1M	$207M
2026	Mr. Idol	$11.9M	$10.4M	$14M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$34M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 148% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Capri Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.4% vs 16.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 16.4% early in the record and 3.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$133M → $357M
Debt rose from $133M to $357M while owner earnings went from about $775M to $132M — about 0.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $2.6B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Footwear & Accessories

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SKXSkechers U.S.A.	$9.0B	48%	9.5%	20%	5%
TPRTapestry Inc.	$7.0B	69%	15.7%	20%	12%
CPRICapri Holdings	$3.5B	61%	6.8%	10%	10%
CALCaleres	$2.8B	43%	6.2%	10%	5%
SHOOSteven Madden Ltd.	$2.5B	39%	10.7%	23%	9%
WWWWolverine World Wide	$1.9B	40%	6.1%	10%	8%
Group median	—	46%	8.1%	15%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Capri Holdings has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Capri Holdings earns about $346M on its 10.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($346M) Net of stock comp (−$34M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−33%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−21%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $14M on 115M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-22; net debt $222M. The if-converted diluted count is 120M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CPRI against another business →

The owners of CPRI: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Capri Holdings (CPRI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CPRI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CPNG its page in the Manual CPRT →

Industry order: ← CAL the Footwear & Accessories chapter CROX →