Owner Scorecard


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CRWD, CrowdStrike Holdings Inc.

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Our Falcon platform is composed of tightly integrated, proprietary technologies that enable us to deliver superior protection and performance, while reducing complexity for our customers.

We took a fundamentally different approach to solve this problem with the AI-native CrowdStrike Falcon cybersecurity platform, which serves as the operating system for cybersecurity.

CrowdStrike built the first, true, cloud-native platform with AI at the core, capable of harnessing vast amounts of security and enterprise data to drive real-time security decisions and response stopping breaches at scale through a single lightweight sensor.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
CRWD · CrowdStrike Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$4.8B
+21.7% YoY · 41% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.1B 5-yr avg $3.1B
Gross margin 75% 5-yr avg 74%
Operating margin −4.0% 5-yr avg −5.6%
ROIC −20%
Owner-earnings margin 35% 5-yr avg 33%
Free cash flow margin 30% 5-yr avg 30%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −10% through the cycle on a 74% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 21% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

33% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2026
  • United States67%$3.2B
  • EMEA16%$783M
  • Asia Pacific10%$496M
  • Other7%$317M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$119M$250M$481M$874M$1.5B$2.2B$3.1B$4.0B$4.8B$5.1BRevenueRevenue
54%65%71%74%74%73%75%75%75%75%Gross marginGross mgn
27%17%19%14%15%14%13%12%14%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
50%34%27%25%26%27%26%27%29%29%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($131M)($137M)($146M)($93M)($143M)($190M)($19M)($116M)($293M)($205M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−110.7%−54.8%−30.3%−10.6%−9.8%−8.5%−0.6%−2.9%−6.1%−4.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($135M)($140M)($142M)($93M)($235M)($183M)$72M($15M)($163M)($30M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($59M)($23M)$100M$357M$575M$941M$1.2B$1.4B$1.6B$1.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$7M$15M$23M$39M$54M$54MDepreciationDeprec.
$57M$82M$139M$261M$445M$598M$445M$536M$678M$649MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$23M$36M$80M$53M$112M$235M$177M$255M$302M$314MCapexCapex
19.3%14.4%16.7%6.0%7.7%10.5%5.8%6.4%6.3%6.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($66M)($38M)$77M$318M$520M$842M$1.0B$1.2B$1.4B$1.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
−55.5%−15.1%16.0%36.4%35.8%37.6%33.7%30.5%29.1%34.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($82M)($59M)$20M$304M$463M$706M$990M$1.1B$1.3B$1.5BFree cash flowFCF
−68.8%−23.5%4.1%34.7%31.9%31.5%32.4%28.5%27.2%29.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M$0$0$86M$415M$18M$239M$310M$382M$1.3BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$2M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
-19%-11%-23%-13%3%-0%-4%-1%Return on equityROE
−19%−11%−23%−13%3%−0%−4%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$63M$192M$912M$1.9B$2.0B$2.7B$3.5B$4.3B$5.2B$4.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$92M$165M$239M$368M$626M$853M$1.1B$1.4B$934MReceivablesReceiv.
$7M$1M$12M$48M$45M$28M$131M$105M$54MAccounts payablePayables
$86M$164M$227M$321M$581M$825M$998M$1.3B$880MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$331M$1.2B$2.3B$2.6B$3.6B$4.8B$6.1B$7.4B$6.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$281M$493M$864M$1.4B$2.1B$2.7B$3.5B$4.2B$4.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×2.4×2.7×1.8×1.7×1.8×1.8×1.8×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$8M$8M$84M$416M$431M$638M$913M$1.4B$2.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$433M$1.4B$2.7B$3.6B$5.0B$6.6B$8.7B$11.1B$11.3BTotal assetsAssets
$0$738M$740M$741M$742M$744M$745M$746MTotal debtDebt
($912M)($1.2B)($1.3B)($2.0B)($2.7B)($3.6B)($4.5B)($3.8B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-79.8×-319.8×-330.5×-59.4×-5.6×-7.5×-0.7×-4.4×-10.5×-7.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($369M)($488M)$742M$871M$1.0B$1.5B$2.3B$3.3B$4.4B$4.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
10.4%8.2%16.6%17.1%21.4%23.5%21.2%21.8%22.8%22.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
41.9M44.9M148M218M227M233M244M245M251M258MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.84$5.57$3.25$4.02$6.39$9.61$12.54$16.15$19.20$19.75Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.24$-3.12$-0.96$-0.43$-1.03$-0.79$0.30$-0.06$-0.65$-0.12EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.57$-0.84$0.52$1.46$2.29$3.61$4.23$4.93$5.58$6.84Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.95$-1.31$0.13$1.39$2.04$3.03$4.06$4.60$5.23$5.84Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.55$0.80$0.54$0.24$0.49$1.01$0.72$1.04$1.21$1.22Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-8.82$-10.87$5.01$4.00$4.52$6.28$9.46$13.40$17.67$17.97Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.3 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+27.0%/yr+36.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+30.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.4%/yr+37.8%/yr
Book value / share+34.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Professional services+28.7%
    “Professional services cost of revenue increased by $47.4 million, or 30%, in fiscal 2026, as compared to fiscal 2025. The increase in professional services cost of revenue was primarily due to an increase in consulting expenses of $18.7 million, an increase in employee-related expenses of $15.5 million driven by a 12% increase in average headcount, an increase in stock-based compensation expense of $5.7 million, charges related to the Strategic Plan of $3.3 million, and an increase in allocated overhead costs of $2.6 million.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2018–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
251Mpeak FY2026
Gross margin
75%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.4Bowner earningsvs.($163M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2020FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $1.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $213M it takes just to hold its position. It put $89M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.3B.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($163M)($15M)$72M($183M)($235M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$54M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$1.1B+$861M+$649M+$527M+$310M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$678M+$536M+$445M+$598M+$445M
Cash from operations$1.6B$1.4B$1.2B$941M$575M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$213M−$175M−$135M−$99M−$54M
Owner earnings$1.4B$1.2B$1.0B$842M$520M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$89M−$80M−$41M−$136M−$58M
Free cash flow$1.3B$1.1B$990M$706M$463M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue29%31%34%38%36%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $213M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $89M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.1B), owner earnings is nearer $303M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($293M) ÷ interest expense $28M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $5.2B − debt $745M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $4.5B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 103 + DIO 0 − DPO 32 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($56M) = debt $745M + equity $4.4B − cash
    Industry peers: median 0%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -55%–38%; latest $1.6B = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $54M
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 31% median across 9 years. It chose to put $248M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.1B of SBC) leaves $461M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($163M) · cash from operations $1.6B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $1.6B
    What this means

    Of $1.6B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 5.55×
    Expanding
    Capex $302M ÷ depreciation $54M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.77×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $745M vs $3.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.14/share (latest year $-0.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.40/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −65% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −65% early to −3% lately, median −10% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2018 · −110.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our competitors may more successfully incorporate AI into their products, gain or leverage superior access to certain AI technologies, and achieve higher market acceptance of their AI solutions.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$6.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$4.6B
  • Receivables$934M
  • Other current assets$815M
Current liabilities$4.1B
  • Accounts payable$54M
  • Other current liabilities$4.1B
Current ratio1.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.53×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+25.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($293M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$821M$76M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$4.7Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2026

Over the record, the business generated $6.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.3B · 21%
  • Buybacks$2M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$4.8B · 79%
  • Returned to owners$2M

    0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $4.5B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count515.8%

    The diluted count rose from 42M to 258M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022George Kurtz$147.7M$34.9M$520M
2023George Kurtz$36.5M−$111.7M$842M
2024George Kurtz$47.0M$343.7M$1.0B
2025George Kurtz$35.2M$148.5M$1.2B
2026George Kurtz$247.6M$330.3M$1.4B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio1,391:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$1.1B

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 23% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CDNSCadence Design Systems Inc.$5.3B99%24.1%28%28%
TEAMAtlassian$5.2B83%-2.5%27%
TWLOTwilio Inc.$5.1B52%-19.4%-7%-1%
GENGen Digital$5.0B82%32.2%11%31%
RBLXRoblox Corporation$4.9B76%-28.8%-247%18%
CRWDCrowdStrike Holdings Inc.$4.8B74%-9.8%31%
SNOWSnowflake Inc.$4.7B64%-49.7%-20%16%
PLTRPalantir Technologies Inc.$4.5B78%-17.6%7%16%
Group median77%-13.7%23%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CrowdStrike Holdings Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, CrowdStrike Holdings Inc. earns about $1.6B on its 32.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 32.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+18%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2020+101%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.5B on 255M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-28; net cash $3.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($314M) runs well above depreciation ($54M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CrowdStrike Holdings Inc. (CRWD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CRWD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CRVL its page in the Manual CRWV →

Industry order: ← CRNC the Software chapter CRWV →