Share count
337Mpeak FY2026
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SNOW, Snowflake Inc.
Our platform is the innovative technology that powers the AI Data Cloud, enabling customers to consolidate data into a single source of truth to drive meaningful insights, apply AI to solve business problems, build data applications, and share data and data products.
To realize this vision, we deliver the AI Data Cloud, a network where Snowflake customers, partners, developers, data providers, and data consumers can break down data silos and derive value from a growing number of data sets in secure, governed, and compliant ways.
We provide our platform through a customer-centric, consumption-based business model.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$4.7B
+29.2% YoY · 51% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.0B 5-yr avg $2.9B
Revenue $1.4B +33.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −23.4% yr-ago −42.9%
Net income ($296M) yr-ago ($430M)
Net margin −21.2% yr-ago −41.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −59% through the cycle on a 62% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 41% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −20%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →25% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2026
- United States75%$3.5B
- EMEA16%$764M
- Asia-Pacific and Japan6%$271M
- Other Americas3%$125M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $97M | $265M | $592M | $1.2B | $2.1B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $4.7B | $5.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 46% | 56% | 59% | 62% | 65% | 68% | 67% | 67% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 37% | 41% | 30% | 22% | 14% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 9% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 71% | 40% | 40% | 38% | 38% | 46% | 49% | 42% | 40% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($185M) | ($358M) | ($544M) | ($715M) | ($842M) | ($1.1B) | ($1.5B) | ($1.4B) | ($1.3B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −191.9% | −135.3% | −91.9% | −58.6% | −40.8% | −39.0% | −40.2% | −30.6% | −26.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($178M) | ($349M) | ($539M) | ($680M) | ($797M) | ($836M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.3B) | ($1.2B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| ($144M) | ($177M) | ($45M) | $110M | $546M | $848M | $960M | $1.2B | $1.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1M | $4M | $10M | $21M | $64M | $120M | $183M | $220M | $239M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $10M | $90M | $182M | $164M | $417M | $396M | $584M | $734M | $572M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $19M | $35M | $16M | $25M | $35M | $46M | $102M | $67M | CapexCapex |
| 2.1% | 7.0% | 5.9% | 1.3% | 1.2% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 2.2% | 1.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($145M) | ($180M) | ($55M) | $94M | $521M | $813M | $913M | $1.1B | $1.2B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −150.4% | −68.0% | −9.3% | 7.7% | 25.2% | 29.0% | 25.2% | 23.9% | 23.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($146M) | ($195M) | ($80M) | $94M | $521M | $813M | $913M | $1.1B | $1.2B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −151.1% | −73.7% | −13.6% | 7.7% | 25.2% | 29.0% | 25.2% | 23.9% | 23.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $6M | $6M | $0 | $363M | $276M | $30M | $179M | $431M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $30M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $592M | $1.9B | $874M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | -10% | -14% | -15% | -25% | -44% | -82% | -49% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -11% | -13% | -15% | -16% | -43% | -69% | -62% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −11% | −13% | −15% | −16% | −43% | −69% | −62% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $117M | $127M | $820M | $1.1B | $940M | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $179M | $294M | $546M | $716M | $927M | $923M | $1.3B | $580M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $8M | $6M | $13M | $24M | $52M | $170M | $146M | $55M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $171M | $288M | $532M | $692M | $875M | $753M | $1.2B | $525M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $665M | $4.3B | $4.6B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $5.9B | $5.7B | $4.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $416M | $789M | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $3.3B | $4.4B | $3.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.6× | 5.4× | 3.3× | 2.5× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.3× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $0 | $7M | $8M | $8M | $657M | $976M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $1.0B | $5.9B | $6.6B | $7.7B | $8.2B | $9.0B | $9.1B | $8.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | — | ($1.8B) | ($357M) | ($548M) | $197M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | -527.7× | -173.0× | -158.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($312M) | ($545M) | $4.9B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $3.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 23.2% | 29.6% | 50.9% | 49.6% | 41.7% | 41.6% | 40.8% | 34.1% | 32.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 38.2M | 44.8M | 142M | 300M | 319M | 328M | 333M | 337M | 345M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.53 | $5.90 | $4.18 | $4.06 | $6.48 | $8.56 | $10.90 | $13.88 | $14.57 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.67 | $-7.77 | $-3.81 | $-2.26 | $-2.50 | $-2.55 | $-3.86 | $-3.95 | $-3.47 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-3.81 | $-4.02 | $-0.39 | $0.31 | $1.63 | $2.48 | $2.75 | $3.32 | $3.39 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-3.83 | $-4.35 | $-0.57 | $0.31 | $1.63 | $2.48 | $2.75 | $3.32 | $3.39 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.05 | $0.41 | $0.25 | $0.05 | $0.08 | $0.11 | $0.14 | $0.30 | $0.19 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-8.19 | $-12.15 | $34.86 | $16.81 | $17.12 | $15.79 | $9.02 | $5.70 | $5.62 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×3.16 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.12 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +27.5%/yr | +27.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +27.9%/yr | +4.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | −30.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−82%low FY2026
Gross margin
67%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.5×peak FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$1.1Bowner earningsvs.($1.3B)net incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2022FY2026
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $1.3B loss into $1.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($1.3B) | ($1.3B) | ($836M) | ($797M) | ($680M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$220M | +$183M | +$120M | +$64M | +$21M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$1.6B | +$1.5B | +$1.2B | +$862M | +$605M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$734M | +$584M | +$396M | +$417M | +$164M |
| Cash from operations | $1.2B | $960M | $848M | $546M | $110M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$102M | −$46M | −$35M | −$25M | −$16M |
| Owner earnings | $1.1B | $913M | $813M | $521M | $94M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 24% | 25% | 29% | 25% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.6B), owner earnings is nearer ($479M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -173.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($1.4B) ÷ interest expense $8M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $2.8B − debt $2.3B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $548M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 102 + DIO 0 − DPO 35 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -82%–-10%; -82% latest = NOPAT ($1.1B) ÷ invested capital $1.4BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -82% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -150%–29%; latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $102MIndustry peers: median 27%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.6B of SBC) leaves ($479M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($1.3B) · cash from operations $1.2B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $874M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B
What this means
Of $1.1B Owner Earnings, $874M (78%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $874M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($1.6B SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.46×HarvestingCapex $102M ÷ depreciation $220M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $1.3B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.32/share (latest year $-3.84), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −140% → −37% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −140% early to −37% lately, median −59% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2019 · −191.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“In addition, enterprise adoption of AI may significantly transform our competitive landscape.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$4.0B
- Cash & short-term investments$2.1B
- Receivables$580M
- Other current assets$1.3B
Current liabilities$3.8B
- Accounts payable$55M
- Other current liabilities$3.7B
Current ratio1.05×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.05×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.55×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$200Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+33.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($49M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$490M$490M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.7B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$2.9Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$73Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$591Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$461Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$2.3B
Lease obligations (present value)$461M
Total fixed claims on the business$2.7B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.7B, of which the leases are 17%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2019–2026
Over the record, the business generated $3.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$280M · 8%
- Buybacks$3.4B · 103%
- Returned to owners$3.4B
111% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3.4B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$388M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $388M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$1183.46
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $592M, about $1183.46 each.
- Net change in share count805.1%
The diluted count rose from 38M to 345M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Frank Slootman | $775k | −$17.8M | $94M |
| 2023 | Frank Slootman | $23.7M | −$494.7M | $521M |
| 2024 | Frank Slootman | $21.2M | $22.4M | $813M |
| 2025 | Frank Slootman | $44k | −$7.4M | $913M |
| 2025 | Sridhar Ramaswamy | $101.3M | $94.3M | $913M |
| 2026 | Sridhar Ramaswamy | $22.3M | $28.1M | $1.1B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio67:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$1.6B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 34% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Snowflake Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2026.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?805.1%
Diluted shares grew 805.1% over 2019–2026, even as the company spent $3.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CDNSCadence Design Systems Inc. | $5.3B | 99% | 24.1% | 28% | 28% |
| TEAMAtlassian | $5.2B | 83% | -2.5% | — | 27% |
| TWLOTwilio Inc. | $5.1B | 52% | -19.4% | -7% | -1% |
| GENGen Digital | $5.0B | 82% | 32.2% | 11% | 31% |
| RBLXRoblox Corporation | $4.9B | 76% | -28.8% | -247% | 18% |
| CRWDCrowdStrike Holdings Inc. | $4.8B | 74% | -9.8% | — | 31% |
| SNOWSnowflake Inc. | $4.7B | 64% | -49.7% | -20% | 16% |
| PLTRPalantir Technologies Inc. | $4.5B | 78% | -17.6% | 7% | 16% |
| Group median | — | 77% | -13.7% | 0% | 23% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Snowflake Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Snowflake Inc. earns about $1.1B on its 23.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+35%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+86%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+86%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.2B on 347M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-15; net debt $197M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Snowflake Inc. (SNOW), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SNOW, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SNEX its page in the Manual SNPS →
Industry order: ← SNAP the Software chapter SNPS →