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RBLX, Roblox Corporation

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Roblox is an immersive gaming and creation platform that offers people millions of ways to be together, inviting its community to explore, create, and share endless unique experiences.

Our Platform consists of the Roblox Client, the Roblox Studio, and the Roblox Cloud.

Roblox Cloud includes the services and infrastructure that power our Platform.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

RBLX · Roblox Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$4.9B

+35.8% YoY · 40% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.3B 5-yr avg $3.1B

Gross margin 78% 5-yr avg 76%

Operating margin −24.0% 5-yr avg −33.4%

ROIC −399% 5-yr avg −315%

Owner-earnings margin 33% 5-yr avg 20%

Free cash flow margin 29% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −29% through the cycle on a 76% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 23% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −247%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$508M	$924M	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.8B	$3.6B	$4.9B	$5.3B	RevenueRevenue
76%	74%	74%	75%	77%	78%	78%	78%	Gross marginGross mgn
8%	11%	16%	13%	14%	11%	12%	13%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
21%	22%	28%	39%	45%	40%	32%	30%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($76M)	($266M)	($495M)	($924M)	($1.3B)	($1.1B)	($1.2B)	($1.3B)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−15.0%	−28.8%	−25.8%	−41.5%	−45.0%	−29.5%	−25.2%	−24.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($71M)	($253M)	($492M)	($924M)	($1.2B)	($935M)	($1.1B)	($1.1B)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
$99M	$524M	$659M	$369M	$458M	$822M	$1.8B	$2.0B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$28M	$44M	$76M	$130M	$208M	$226M	$226M	$233M	DepreciationDeprec.
$125M	$655M	$733M	$574M	$534M	$515M	$1.5B	$1.7B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$83M	$104M	$93M	$426M	$321M	$180M	$441M	$457M	CapexCapex
16.4%	11.3%	4.9%	19.2%	11.5%	5.0%	9.0%	8.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$72M	$481M	$566M	$239M	$250M	$643M	$1.6B	$1.7B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
14.1%	52.0%	29.5%	10.8%	8.9%	17.8%	32.1%	33.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$16M	$420M	$566M	($57M)	$138M	$643M	$1.4B	$1.5B	Free cash flowFCF
3.1%	45.5%	29.5%	−2.6%	4.9%	17.8%	27.7%	28.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$41M	$46M	$13M	$4M	$3M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	-247%	-163%	-534%	-399%	ROICROIC
—	—	-84%	-302%	-1510%	-422%	-270%	-254%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−84%	−302%	n/m	−422%	−270%	−254%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$301M	$894M	$3.0B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$4.0B	$5.5B	$6.2B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$247M	$307M	$379M	$506M	$615M	$901M	$538M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$12M	$64M	$71M	$60M	$43M	$65M	$24M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$235M	$243M	$308M	$446M	$572M	$836M	$514M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$1.4B	$3.7B	$3.8B	$3.3B	$3.7B	$4.9B	$4.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$1.2B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$3.1B	$3.7B	$5.1B	$5.3B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.2×	1.7×	1.5×	1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$60M	$118M	$134M	$142M	$142M	$143M	$142M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.8B	$4.6B	$5.4B	$6.2B	$7.2B	$9.6B	$9.8B	Total assetsAssets
—	$0	$988M	$989M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$993M	$1.0B	Total debtDebt
—	($894M)	($2.0B)	($2.0B)	($2.2B)	($3.0B)	($4.6B)	($5.2B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	-70.7×	-23.2×	-30.9×	-25.8×	-29.7×	-30.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($113M)	($252M)	$585M	$306M	$76M	$221M	$394M	$432M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
3.5%	8.6%	17.8%	26.5%	31.0%	28.2%	23.1%	21.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
163M	182M	506M	596M	616M	647M	690M	712M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$3.12	$5.07	$3.79	$3.74	$4.54	$5.56	$7.09	$7.44	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.44	$-1.39	$-0.97	$-1.55	$-1.87	$-1.44	$-1.54	$-1.54	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.44	$2.64	$1.12	$0.40	$0.41	$0.99	$2.28	$2.46	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.10	$2.31	$1.12	$-0.10	$0.22	$0.99	$1.97	$2.14	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.51	$0.57	$0.18	$0.72	$0.52	$0.28	$0.64	$0.64	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.69	$-1.39	$1.16	$0.51	$0.12	$0.34	$0.57	$0.61	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.78 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+14.7%/yr	+6.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+31.6%/yr	−2.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+3.8%/yr	+2.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

690Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−534%low FY2025

Gross margin

78%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.6Bowner earningsvs.($1.1B)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $226M it takes just to hold its position. It put $215M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.4B.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($1.1B)	($935M)	($1.2B)	($924M)	($492M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$226M	+$226M	+$208M	+$130M	+$76M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$1.1B	+$1.0B	+$868M	+$589M	+$342M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.5B	+$515M	+$534M	+$574M	+$733M
Cash from operations	$1.8B	$822M	$458M	$369M	$659M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$226M	−$180M	−$208M	−$130M	−$93M
Owner earnings	$1.6B	$643M	$250M	$239M	$566M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$215M	—	−$113M	−$296M	—
Free cash flow	$1.4B	$643M	$138M	($57M)	$566M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	32%	18%	9%	11%	29%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $226M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $215M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.1B), owner earnings is nearer $442M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -29.7×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($1.2B) ÷ interest expense $41M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$2.1B

Net cash

Cash $1.2B + ST investments $1.8B − debt $993M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.1B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $2.5B in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $4.6B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 45d

Tight

DSO 67 + DIO 0 − DPO 22 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -247%

Below average through the cycle

3-yr median, range -534%–-163%; -534% latest = NOPAT ($974M) ÷ invested capital $182M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -534% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 18%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 9%–52%; latest $1.6B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $226M

Industry peers: median 27%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 7 years. It chose to put $215M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.4B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.1B of SBC) leaves $442M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $1.8B

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($1.1B) · cash from operations $1.8B

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 1.95×

Expanding

Capex $441M ÷ depreciation $226M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.96×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $993M vs ($228M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.47/share (latest year $-1.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −23% → −33% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
The recent-years average (−33%) sits below the early years (−23%), but the latest year (−25%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −29% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +26%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 26% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · −45.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, some open source software may include output from generative AI software or other software that incorporates or relies on generative AI or other AI technologies.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.7B

Cash & short-term investments$3.2B
Receivables$538M
Other current assets$1.0B

Current liabilities$5.3B

Accounts payable$24M
Other current liabilities$5.3B

Current ratio0.89×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.89×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.60×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($566M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+39.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$273Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($4.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.8B$780M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.8B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$6.8Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$171M

'27$160M

'28$138M

'29$123M

'30$99M

later$300M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$171Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$990Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$795Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$993M

Lease obligations (present value)$795M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.8B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.8B, of which the leases are 44%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$1.6B · 35%
Retained (debt / cash)$3.1B · 65%

Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $2.9B.
Net change in share count336.5%
The diluted count rose from 163M to 712M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	David Baszucki	$232.8M	$744.6M	$566M
2022	David Baszucki	$1.1M	−$574.3M	$239M
2023	David Baszucki	$2.1M	$123.0M	$250M
2024	David Baszucki	$3.0M	−$164.0M	$643M
2025	David Baszucki	$24.6M	$82.2M	$1.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$1.1B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 23% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Roblox Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?336.5%
Diluted shares grew 336.5% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CDNSCadence Design Systems Inc.	$5.3B	99%	24.1%	28%	28%
TEAMAtlassian	$5.2B	83%	-2.5%	—	27%
TWLOTwilio Inc.	$5.1B	52%	-19.4%	-7%	-1%
GENGen Digital	$5.0B	82%	32.2%	11%	31%
RBLXRoblox Corporation	$4.9B	76%	-28.8%	-247%	18%
CRWDCrowdStrike Holdings Inc.	$4.8B	74%	-9.8%	—	31%
SNOWSnowflake Inc.	$4.7B	64%	-49.7%	-20%	16%
PLTRPalantir Technologies Inc.	$4.5B	78%	-17.6%	7%	16%
Group median	—	77%	-13.7%	0%	23%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Roblox Corporation has delivered.

Roblox Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Roblox Corporation earns about $873M on its 17.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 32.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($873M) Net of stock comp (−$1.1B) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.8B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+29%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+29%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.5B on 716M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net cash $5.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($457M) runs well above depreciation ($233M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh RBLX against another business →

The owners of RBLX: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Roblox Corporation (RBLX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RBLX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RBCAA its page in the Manual RBRK →

Industry order: ← RBBN the Software chapter RBRK →