Share count
363Mpeak FY2025
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DDOG, Datadog Inc.
Datadog is the AI-powered observability and security platform for cloud applications.
Our SaaS platform integrates and automates infrastructure monitoring, application performance monitoring, log management, user experience monitoring, cloud security, service management, and many other capabilities to provide unified, real-time observability and security for our customers' entire technology stack.
Software applications are transforming how organizations engage with customers and operate their businesses.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$3.4B
+27.7% YoY · 42% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.7B 5-yr avg $2.2B
Revenue $1.0B +32.2% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 0.7% yr-ago −1.6%
Net income $53M yr-ago $25M
Net margin 5.2% yr-ago 3.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −2.3% through the cycle on a 78% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 16% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →North America is 71% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- North America71%$2.4B
- International29%$994M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $101M | $198M | $363M | $603M | $1.0B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $3.4B | $3.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 77% | 77% | 75% | 78% | 77% | 79% | 81% | 81% | 80% | 80% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 11% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 9% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 8% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 25% | 28% | 31% | 35% | 41% | 45% | 45% | 43% | 45% | 45% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($3M) | ($11M) | ($20M) | ($14M) | ($19M) | ($59M) | ($33M) | $54M | ($44M) | ($25M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −2.9% | −5.6% | −5.6% | −2.3% | −1.9% | −3.5% | −1.6% | 2.0% | −1.3% | −0.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($3M) | ($11M) | ($17M) | ($25M) | ($21M) | ($50M) | $49M | $184M | $108M | $136M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 19% | 10% | 15% | 12% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $14M | $11M | $24M | $109M | $287M | $418M | $660M | $871M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $6M | $12M | $15M | $19M | $27M | $36M | $49M | $49M | $55M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $11M | $11M | $10M | $45M | $125M | $78M | $93M | $68M | $143M | $139M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $10M | $13M | $5M | $10M | $35M | $28M | $35M | $50M | $52M | CapexCapex |
| 2.3% | 4.9% | 3.7% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 2.1% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $11M | $5M | $11M | $104M | $277M | $391M | $632M | $836M | $1.0B | $1.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.4% | 2.7% | 3.0% | 17.2% | 26.9% | 23.4% | 29.7% | 31.1% | 29.2% | 28.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $11M | $1M | $11M | $104M | $277M | $383M | $632M | $836M | $1.0B | $1.1B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.4% | 0.6% | 3.0% | 17.2% | 26.9% | 22.9% | 29.7% | 31.1% | 29.2% | 28.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $5M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $227M | $46M | $12M | $7M | $118M | $127M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | -9% | -1% | -1% | -3% | -1% | 2% | -1% | -0% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -2% | -3% | -2% | -4% | 2% | 7% | 3% | 3% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −2% | −3% | −2% | −4% | 2% | 7% | 3% | 3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $60M | $54M | $597M | $225M | $271M | $339M | $330M | $1.2B | $401M | $426M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $56M | $102M | $163M | $269M | $400M | $509M | $599M | $741M | $680M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $13M | $15M | $21M | $25M | $23M | $88M | $108M | $149M | $175M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $43M | $87M | $142M | $244M | $376M | $422M | $491M | $592M | $506M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $122M | $904M | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $3.2B | $4.9B | $5.4B | $5.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $112M | $200M | $298M | $529M | $760M | $1.0B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.1× | 4.5× | 5.8× | 3.5× | 3.1× | 3.2× | 2.6× | 3.4× | 3.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $6M | $8M | $9M | $18M | $292M | $348M | $353M | $360M | $531M | $541M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $180M | $1.0B | $1.9B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.9B | $5.8B | $6.6B | $7.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $576M | $735M | $739M | $742M | $979M | $983M | $984M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | $351M | $465M | $400M | $412M | ($268M) | $582M | $558M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | -629.4× | -0.5× | -0.9× | -3.5× | -5.3× | 7.7× | -4.0× | -2.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($76M) | ($76M) | $782M | $957M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $3.7B | $4.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 3.0% | 2.6% | 5.2% | 12.3% | 15.9% | 21.7% | 22.7% | 21.2% | 21.9% | 21.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 61.3M | 71.0M | 140M | 300M | 309M | 315M | 350M | 359M | 363M | 365M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.64 | $2.79 | $2.59 | $2.01 | $3.33 | $5.31 | $6.08 | $7.48 | $9.43 | $10.07 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.04 | $-0.15 | $-0.12 | $-0.08 | $-0.07 | $-0.16 | $0.14 | $0.51 | $0.30 | $0.37 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.19 | $0.08 | $0.08 | $0.35 | $0.89 | $1.24 | $1.81 | $2.33 | $2.75 | $2.91 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.19 | $0.02 | $0.08 | $0.35 | $0.89 | $1.21 | $1.81 | $2.33 | $2.75 | $2.91 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.14 | $0.10 | $0.02 | $0.03 | $0.11 | $0.08 | $0.10 | $0.14 | $0.14 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-1.23 | $-1.07 | $5.59 | $3.19 | $3.37 | $4.47 | $5.78 | $7.57 | $10.27 | $10.93 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.97 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.15 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +24.4%/yr | +36.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +39.9%/yr | +51.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +17.2%/yr | +49.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +26.4%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+27.7%
“Sales and Marketing Year Ended December 31, 2025 2024 Change % Change (dollars in thousands) Sales and marketing $ 956,423 $ 756,605 $ 199,818 26 % Percentage of revenue 28 % 28 % Sales and marketing expense increased by $199.8 million, or 26%, for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. This increase was primarily due to an increase of $58.2 million in personnel costs and other related costs as a result of increased headcount, and an increase of $10.4 million in legal and other professional services expenses.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−1%low FY2019
Gross margin
80%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.6×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$1.0Bowner earningsvs.$108Mnet incomelow FY2018
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2017FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $108M of profit into $1.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $108M | $184M | $49M | ($50M) | ($21M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$49M | +$49M | +$36M | +$27M | +$19M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$751M | +$570M | +$482M | +$363M | +$164M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$143M | +$68M | +$93M | +$78M | +$125M |
| Cash from operations | $1.1B | $871M | $660M | $418M | $287M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$50M | −$35M | −$28M | −$27M | −$10M |
| Owner earnings | $1.0B | $836M | $632M | $391M | $277M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$8M | — |
| Free cash flow | $1.0B | $836M | $632M | $383M | $277M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 29% | 31% | 30% | 23% | 27% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $751M), owner earnings is nearer $250M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -4.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($44M) ÷ interest expense $11M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $401M − debt $983M
What this means
Netting $401M of cash and short-term investments against $983M of debt leaves $582M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 79 + DIO 0 − DPO 79 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -9%–2%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($38M) ÷ invested capital $4.3BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle9-yr median margin, range 3%–31%; latest $1.0B = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $50MIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a 23% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $751M of SBC) leaves $250M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $108M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.01×MaintainingCapex $50M ÷ depreciation $49M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $3.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.38×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $983M vs $3.8B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.32/share (latest year $0.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −5% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −5% early to −0% lately, median −2% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 0%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +80%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 80% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · −5.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$5.6B
- Cash & short-term investments$426M
- Receivables$680M
- Other current assets$4.5B
Current liabilities$1.7B
- Accounts payable$175M
- Other current liabilities$1.5B
Current ratio3.40×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.40×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+32.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 3.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$2.7BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$301M$301M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1.3Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $3.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$188M · 5%
- Retained (debt / cash)$3.3B · 95%
- Net change in share count494.8%
The diluted count rose from 61M to 365M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained379%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($215M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $814M, so each retained $1 added about 3.79 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Pomel | $8.6M | $107.0M | $277M |
| 2022 | Mr. Pomel | $11.2M | −$85.7M | $391M |
| 2023 | Mr. Pomel | $11.6M | $33.1M | $632M |
| 2024 | Mr. Pomel | $19.8M | $29.5M | $836M |
| 2025 | Mr. Pomel | $27.1M | $50.1M | $1.0B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$751M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 22% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Datadog Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?494.8%
Diluted shares grew 494.8% over 2017–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PLTRPalantir Technologies Inc. | $4.5B | 78% | -17.6% | 7% | 16% |
| DDOGDatadog Inc. | $3.4B | 78% | -2.3% | -1% | 23% |
| DOCUDocuSign | $3.2B | 78% | -6.7% | -10% | 16% |
| VEEVVeeva Systems Inc. | $3.2B | 72% | 25.5% | 20% | 34% |
| HUBSHubSpot Inc. | $3.1B | 81% | -6.5% | -6% | 13% |
| OKTAOkta Inc. | $2.9B | 72% | -30.8% | -8% | 7% |
| PTCPTC Inc. | $2.7B | 79% | 21.1% | 10% | 19% |
| ANSSAnsys Inc. | $2.5B | 87% | 31.7% | 13% | 30% |
| Group median | — | 78% | -4.4% | 3% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Datadog Inc. has delivered.
Datadog Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Datadog Inc. earns about $801M on its 23.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
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The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+86%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+80%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.1B on 353M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $558M. The if-converted diluted count is 365M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Datadog Inc. (DDOG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DDOG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← DDD its page in the Manual DDS →
Industry order: ← DDD the Software chapter DJT →