Owner Scorecard


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DDD, 3D Systems Corporation

Software asset-light Distress / turnaround

We provide comprehensive 3D printing and digital manufacturing solutions, including 3D printers for plastics and metals, materials, software, and services, including maintenance, advanced manufacturing and applications engineering.

3D Systems Corporation ("3D Systems" or the "Company" or "we," "our" or "us") markets our products and services through subsidiaries in North America and South America ("Americas"), Europe and the Middle East ("EMEA") and Asia Pacific and Oceania ("APAC").

Our solutions support advanced applications in two key industry verticals: Healthcare Solutions (which includes dental, medical devices, personalized health services and regenerative medicine) and Industrial Solutions (which includes aerospace, defense, transportation and general manufacturing).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
DDD · 3D Systems Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$387M
−12.1% YoY · −7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $388M 5-yr avg $494M
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 39%
Operating margin −17.0% 5-yr avg −39.6%
ROIC −9% 5-yr avg −45%
Owner-earnings margin −18% 5-yr avg −15%
Free cash flow margin −18% 5-yr avg −15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Products (58%) and Services (42%).
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −21% through the cycle on a 40% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −11%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Products at 58%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Products58%$223M
  • Services42%$163M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$633M$646M$692M$636M$557M$616M$538M$488M$440M$387M$388MRevenueRevenue
49%47%47%44%40%43%40%40%37%34%34%Gross marginGross mgn
41%41%39%40%39%37%45%43%48%42%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
14%15%14%13%13%11%16%18%20%17%14%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($38M)($54M)($43M)($57M)($119M)($33M)($117M)($406M)($277M)($96M)($66M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−6.1%−8.4%−6.2%−9.0%−21.3%−5.4%−21.7%−83.2%−63.0%−24.8%−17.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($38M)($66M)($46M)($70M)($150M)$322M($123M)($363M)($256M)$30M$62MNet incomeNet inc.
-1%33%20%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$57M$26M$5M$32M($20M)$48M($70M)($81M)($45M)($88M)($61M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$61M$62M$59M$50M$45M$35M$36M$33M$33M$22M$21MDepreciationDeprec.
$4M$3M($38M)$27M$67M($364M)($26M)$225M$159M($149M)($152M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$17M$31M$41M$24M$14M$19M$21M$27M$16M$10M$9MCapexCapex
2.6%4.8%5.9%3.8%2.4%3.1%3.9%5.6%3.7%2.6%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$41M($5M)($36M)$8M($34M)$29M($91M)($108M)($61M)($98M)($70M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.5%−0.7%−5.2%1.2%−6.1%4.8%−16.9%−22.1%−13.9%−25.3%−18.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$41M($5M)($36M)$8M($34M)$29M($91M)($108M)($61M)($98M)($70M)Free cash flowFCF
6.5%−0.7%−5.2%1.2%−6.1%4.8%−16.9%−22.1%−13.9%−25.3%−18.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$34M$0$0$0$140M$104M$29M$3M$4M$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$15MBuybacksBuybacks
-7%-9%-7%-10%-25%-7%-11%-77%-101%-27%-9%ROICROIC
-6%-11%-8%-13%-35%38%-16%-85%-145%12%27%Return on equityROE
−6%−11%−8%−13%−35%38%−16%−85%−145%12%27%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$185M$136M$110M$134M$75M$790M$569M$332M$171M$96M$85MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$127M$130M$127M$109M$114M$107M$94M$101M$101M$84M$86MReceivablesReceiv.
$103M$104M$133M$111M$117M$93M$138M$152M$119M$127M$127MInventoryInvent.
$41M$56M$67M$50M$45M$57M$54M$50M$42M$41M$39MAccounts payablePayables
$190M$178M$193M$171M$186M$142M$178M$204M$178M$170M$174MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$433M$438M$397M$373M$358M$1.0B$834M$628M$429M$347M$341MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$130M$207M$164M$163M$176M$178M$152M$147M$139M$121M$123MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×2.1×2.4×2.3×2.0×5.8×5.5×4.3×3.1×2.9×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$181M$231M$221M$223M$162M$346M$385M$116M$15M$16M$15MGoodwillGoodwill
$849M$897M$826M$807M$733M$1.5B$1.4B$991M$609M$522M$513MTotal assetsAssets
$0$25M$48M$21M$447M$450M$319M$212M$90M$447MTotal debtDebt
($136M)($85M)($86M)($54M)($343M)($119M)($12M)$41M($5M)$362MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-30.0×-58.7×-36.4×-12.9×-27.1×-14.1×-28.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$630M$619M$578M$522M$431M$842M$750M$427M$176M$240M$234MShareholders’ equityEquity
4.9%4.2%4.2%3.7%3.2%9.0%7.9%4.8%4.2%2.5%2.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$48M$280M$101M$760K$760KGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
111M112M112M114M118M126M128M130M132M176M143MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.69$5.79$6.16$5.59$4.74$4.87$4.21$3.76$3.34$2.20$2.71Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.35$-0.59$-0.41$-0.61$-1.27$2.55$-0.96$-2.79$-1.94$0.17$0.44EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.37$-0.04$-0.32$0.07$-0.29$0.23$-0.71$-0.83$-0.46$-0.56$-0.49Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.37$-0.04$-0.32$0.07$-0.29$0.23$-0.71$-0.83$-0.46$-0.56$-0.49Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.15$0.28$0.36$0.21$0.12$0.15$0.16$0.21$0.12$0.06$0.06Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.66$5.55$5.15$4.59$3.66$6.67$5.87$3.28$1.34$1.37$1.64Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−10.0%/yr−14.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−10.2%/yr−13.4%/yr
Book value / share−14.6%/yr−17.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
176Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−27%low FY2024
Gross margin
34%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($98M)owner earningsvs.$30Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2021

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $30M of profit but ($98M) of owner earnings: $128M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$30M($256M)($363M)($123M)$322M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$22M+$33M+$33M+$36M+$35M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$10M+$18M+$24M+$42M+$55M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$149M+$159M+$225M−$26M−$364M
Cash from operations($88M)($45M)($81M)($70M)$48M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$10M−$16M−$27M−$21M−$19M
Owner earnings($98M)($61M)($108M)($91M)$29M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-25%-14%-22%-17%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer ($107M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($96M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $96M − debt $447M
    What this means

    Netting $96M of cash and short-term investments against $447M of debt leaves $351M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 79 + DIO 182 − DPO 59 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -101%–-7%; -11% latest = NOPAT ($64M) ÷ invested capital $592M
    Industry peers: median -21%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -25%–6%; latest ($98M) = operating cash ($88M) − maintenance capex $10M
    Industry peers: median -4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -25% of revenue this year, a -6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves ($107M).

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ($88M) ÷ net income $30M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.46×
    Harvesting
    Capex $10M ÷ depreciation $22M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $387M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.87×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $447M vs $226M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.33/share (latest year $0.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −7% → −57% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −7% early to −57% lately, median −21% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2023 · −83.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +5.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.

“We have built unique expertise in polymer printing based on our investment in 3D Sprint where customers' 3D content is optimized for additive manufacturing. 3D Sprint uses artificial intelligence and machine learning, user-friendly interfaces, and automated setup processes.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$341M
  • Cash & short-term investments$85M
  • Receivables$86M
  • Inventory$127M
  • Other current assets$42M
Current liabilities$123M
  • Debt due within a year$4M
  • Accounts payable$39M
  • Other current liabilities$80M
Current ratio2.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.73×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.69×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$217Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$4M due · $85M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway1.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.5× → 2.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$203Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$62MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$144M$53M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$23Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$32M6% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity6%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$314Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $219M of capital spent building

$430M written down across 4 years (2020, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$8.6M$15.6M$29M
2022$5.7M−$7.1M($91M)
2023$6.5M$2.6M($108M)
2024$2.1M$3.4M($61M)
2025$1.5M−$120k($98M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$10M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why 3D Systems Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−20.4% vs 0.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 0.2% early in the record and −20.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $951M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
XPERXperi Inc. Common Stock$448M-29.1%-19%-7%
VIAVia Transportation Inc.$434M40%-24.8%-24%-21%
AVPTAvePoint Inc.$419M72%-10.2%12%
PRCHPorch Group Inc.$419M66%-58.4%-26%-10%
CERTCertara Inc.$419M61%4.7%-0%21%
GDYNGrid Dynamics Holdings Inc.$412M38%-0.5%-1%7%
DDD3D Systems Corporation$387M42%-15.2%-11%-6%
AMPLAmplitude Inc.$343M70%-32.2%-77%-4%
Group median61%-20.0%-19%-5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

3D Systems Corporation is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered−8%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−18%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "3D Systems Corporation (DDD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DDD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DD its page in the Manual DDOG →

Industry order: ← DCBO the Software chapter DDOG →