Owner Scorecard


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VEEV, Veeva Systems Inc.

Software asset-light

Veeva is the leading provider of industry cloud solutions for the global life sciences industry.

Our offerings span cloud software, data, and business consulting and are designed to meet the unique needs of our customers and their most strategic business functions—from research and development ("R&D") through commercialization.

Our solutions help life sciences companies develop and bring products to market faster and more efficiently, market and sell more effectively, and maintain compliance with government regulations.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
VEEV · Veeva Systems Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$3.2B
+16.3% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $2.5B
Gross margin 75% 5-yr avg 73%
Operating margin 28.8% 5-yr avg 24.1%
ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 72% and operating margin about 25% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Stock-based pay runs about 13% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 20%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 34% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

North America is 60% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.

Revenue by geography, FY2026
  • North America60%$1.9B
  • Europe29%$940M
  • Asia Pacific9%$280M
  • Other international2%$72M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$551M$691M$862M$1.1B$1.5B$1.9B$2.2B$2.4B$2.7B$3.2B$3.3BRevenueRevenue
68%69%72%73%72%73%72%71%75%76%75%Gross marginGross mgn
9%9%10%10%10%9%10%10%10%9%9%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
18%19%18%19%20%21%24%27%25%24%24%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$121M$158M$223M$286M$378M$505M$459M$429M$691M$916M$956MOperating incomeOp. inc.
21.9%22.9%25.8%25.9%25.8%27.3%21.3%18.2%25.2%28.7%28.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$78M$151M$230M$301M$380M$427M$488M$526M$714M$909M$942MNet incomeNet inc.
37%9%4%4%4%17%4%11%22%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$144M$233M$311M$437M$551M$764M$780M$911M$1.1B$1.4B$1.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$14M$14M$14M$20M$9M$7M$6M$6M$6MDepreciationDeprec.
$53M$68M($10M)$492K($23M)$95M($65M)($14M)($61M)$34M$238MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$7M$10M$8M$3M$2MCapexCapex
1.3%1.4%1.0%0.3%0.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$137M$224M$302M$434M$1.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
24.9%32.4%35.1%39.3%50.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$137M$224M$302M$434M$1.7BFree cash flowFCF
24.9%32.4%35.1%39.3%50.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$448M$0$8M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$170MBuybacksBuybacks
17%25%31%23%24%24%16%10%11%12%13%ROICROIC
11%17%19%18%17%15%13%11%12%13%13%Return on equityROE
11%17%19%18%17%15%13%11%12%13%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$519M$762M$551M$477M$731M$1.1B$886M$703M$1.1B$1.4B$2.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$183M$225M$303M$390M$564M$631M$703M$852M$1.0B$1.3B$568MReceivablesReceiv.
$6M$7M$9M$19M$23M$20M$42M$32M$30M$38M$41MAccounts payablePayables
$177M$218M$294M$370M$541M$611M$661M$821M$986M$1.2B$527MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$712M$1.0B$1.4B$1.5B$2.3B$3.1B$4.0B$5.0B$6.3B$8.0B$8.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$247M$306M$401M$551M$716M$841M$1.0B$1.2B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×3.3×3.6×2.8×3.2×3.7×3.9×4.2×4.5×4.9×4.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$96M$96M$96M$439M$436M$440M$440M$440M$440M$440M$488MGoodwillGoodwill
$917M$1.2B$1.7B$2.3B$3.0B$3.8B$4.8B$5.9B$7.3B$9.0B$9.1BTotal assetsAssets
($519M)($762M)($551M)($477M)($731M)($1.1B)($886M)($703M)($1.1B)($1.4B)($2.5B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$678M$906M$1.2B$1.7B$2.3B$2.9B$3.7B$4.6B$5.8B$7.2B$7.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
8.9%10.5%12.6%12.7%16.3%16.7%15.9%14.8%14.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
148M154M156M158M161M162M162M163M165M167M166MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.73$4.49$5.52$6.97$9.11$11.41$13.27$14.46$16.62$19.13$20.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.53$0.98$1.47$1.90$2.36$2.63$3.00$3.22$4.32$5.44$5.67EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.93$1.46$1.94$2.74$10.02Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.93$1.46$1.94$2.74$10.02Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.06$0.05$0.02$0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.60$5.90$7.93$10.52$14.10$17.94$22.88$28.41$35.30$43.20$44.01Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+19.9%/yr+16.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+43.5%/yr (3-yr)+43.5%/yr (3-yr)
EPS+29.7%/yr+18.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−25.2%/yr (3-yr)−25.2%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+28.3%/yr+25.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
167Mpeak FY2026
ROIC
12%low FY2024
Gross margin
76%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$434Mowner earningsvs.$301Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2020 the business turned $301M of profit into $434M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$301M
Owner earnings$434M · 39% of revenue
FY2020FY2019FY2018FY2017
Reported net income$301M$230M$151M$78M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$20M+$14M+$14M+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$116M+$76M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$492K−$10M+$68M+$53M
Cash from operations$437M$311M$233M$144M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$3M−$8M−$10M−$7M
Owner earnings$434M$302M$224M$137M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue39%35%32%25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $116M), owner earnings is nearer $318M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $1.4B + ST investments $442M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.9B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 144 + DIO 0 − DPO 18 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -1%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    4-yr median margin, range 25%–39%; latest $1.4B = operating cash $1.4B − maintenance capex $3M
    Industry peers: median 19%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 44% of revenue this year, a 32% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $473M of SBC) leaves $939M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.4B ÷ net income $909M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $170M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.4B
    What this means

    Of $1.4B Owner Earnings, $170M (12%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $170M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($473M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.52×
    Harvesting
    Capex $3M ÷ depreciation $6M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.89×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +369%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.41/share (latest year $5.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $44.41/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 24% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 24% early, 24% lately, median 25%.

  • Owner earnings growth +27%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 27% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 18.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If our actual or potential competitors' products, services, or technologies become more accepted than our solutions, if they are successful in bringing their products or services to market earlier than we are, if their products or services are more technologically capable than ours (including as a result of new or bett…”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.5B
  • Receivables$568M
  • Other current assets$5.0B
Current liabilities$1.7B
  • Accounts payable$41M
  • Other current liabilities$1.7B
Current ratio4.74×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.74×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.46×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$6.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.0× → 4.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$6.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$6.2BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$103M$103M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1.5Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2020

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$28M · 2%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 98%
  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $2.0B.

  • Net change in share count12.5%

    The diluted count rose from 148M to 166M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained13%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($760M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $99M, so each retained $1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2022Mr. Gassner$350k−$57.9M$427M
2023Mr. Gassner$392k−$93.7M$488M
2024Mr. Gassner$421k$31.8M$526M
2025Mr. Gassner$172.4M$284.2M$714M
2026Mr. Gassner$471k−$88.1M$909M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership10.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$473M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 15% of revenue, equal to 52% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Veeva Systems Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?12.5%

    Diluted shares grew 12.5% over 2017–2020. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DDOGDatadog Inc.$3.4B78%-2.3%-1%23%
DOCUDocuSign$3.2B78%-6.7%-10%16%
VEEVVeeva Systems Inc.$3.2B72%25.5%20%34%
HUBSHubSpot Inc.$3.1B81%-6.5%-6%13%
OKTAOkta Inc.$2.9B72%-30.8%-8%7%
PTCPTC Inc.$2.7B79%21.1%10%19%
ANSSAnsys Inc.$2.5B87%31.7%13%30%
DBXDropbox$2.5B79%1.5%-1%29%
Group median79%-0.4%-1%21%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Veeva Systems Inc. has delivered.

Veeva Systems Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Veeva Systems Inc. earns about $1.1B on its 35.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 44.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’20+27%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.7B on 162M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-01; net cash $2.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Veeva Systems Inc. (VEEV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VEEV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VECO its page in the Manual VEL →

Industry order: ← U the Software chapter VERX →