Share count
221Mpeak FY2017
← All companies ← DFS Manual DGICA → ← DDT Department & General Merchandise Stores DLTR →
DG, Dollar General Corporation
Dollar General runs the largest chain of discount stores in the United States, counted by number of locations — small-format shops concentrated across the southern, midwestern and eastern parts of the country. It sells everyday goods cheaply, with consumables — the household and food items people buy and use up — making up most of the sales, and seasonal merchandise, home products and apparel behind. It carries both national brands and its own private labels priced below them, and earns its keep on the spread between what it pays for the goods and what shoppers pay at the register.
We offer a broad selection of merchandise, including consumable items, seasonal items, home products and apparel.
Our merchandise includes national brands from leading manufacturers, as well as our own private brand selections with prices at substantial discounts to national brands.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$42.7B
+5.2% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $43.1B 5-yr avg $38.8B
Revenue $10.8B +3.4% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 5.9% yr-ago 5.5%
Net income $444M yr-ago $392M
Net margin 4.1% yr-ago 3.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Consumables (82%) and Seasonal (10%), with 2 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Discount retail sits close to a commodity: a shopper buys the same brands wherever they are cheapest and nearest, so the test is whether buying scale and a web of small stores in places too thin for bigger rivals add up to a real cost-and-convenience edge, or just a treadmill. Watch the cost position — a discounter lives on landing goods cheaply and running lean stores cheaply — and whether prices stay low enough to hold the traffic without giving up the thin margin the model already runs on; the same scale that helps in buying still leans on a wide base of domestic and foreign suppliers it does not control. The bad case is plain: rivals with deeper pockets, freight and wage costs that move the wrong way, and debt that must be served whether the stores are full or empty. The figures for margins, returns and leverage are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Consumables is 82% of revenue, with Seasonal the other meaningful line at 10%.
Revenue by product line, FY2026
- Consumables82%$35.1B
- Seasonal10%$4.3B
- Home Products5%$2.2B
- Apparel3%$1.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $22.0B | $23.5B | $25.6B | $27.8B | $33.7B | $34.2B | $37.8B | $38.7B | $40.6B | $42.7B | $43.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 31% | 31% | 30% | 31% | 32% | 32% | 31% | 30% | 30% | 31% | 31% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 21% | 22% | 22% | 22% | 21% | 22% | 22% | 24% | 25% | 26% | 26% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $2.4B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 9.4% | 8.6% | 8.3% | 8.3% | 10.5% | 9.4% | 8.8% | 6.3% | 4.2% | 5.2% | 5.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $1.7B | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 36% | 19% | 21% | 22% | 22% | 22% | 22% | 22% | 22% | 23% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $3.9B | $2.9B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $3.0B | $3.6B | $3.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $380M | $404M | $454M | $505M | $574M | $641M | $725M | $849M | $972M | $1.0B | $1.1B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($63M) | ($175M) | $59M | ($28M) | $578M | ($253M) | ($1.2B) | ($170M) | $840M | $984M | $776M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $560M | $646M | $734M | $785M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | CapexCapex |
| 2.5% | 2.8% | 2.9% | 2.8% | 3.0% | 3.1% | 4.1% | 4.4% | 3.2% | 2.9% | 3.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $3.3B | $2.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.2B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.6% | 6.0% | 6.6% | 6.2% | 9.8% | 6.5% | 3.3% | 4.0% | 5.0% | 5.6% | 5.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $2.8B | $1.8B | $424M | $692M | $1.7B | $2.4B | $2.2B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 4.8% | 4.9% | 5.5% | 5.2% | 8.4% | 5.2% | 1.1% | 1.8% | 4.2% | 5.6% | 5.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $281M | $283M | $307M | $328M | $356M | $392M | $494M | $518M | $519M | $520M | $520M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $990M | $580M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.7B | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 16% | 18% | 18% | 19% | 29% | 25% | 21% | 15% | 11% | 14% | 12% | ROICROIC |
| 23% | 25% | 25% | 26% | 40% | 38% | 44% | 25% | 15% | 18% | 18% | Return on equityROE |
| 18% | 21% | 20% | 21% | 35% | 32% | 35% | 17% | 8% | 12% | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $188M | $267M | $235M | $240M | $1.4B | $345M | $382M | $537M | $933M | $1.1B | $1.4B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $3.3B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $6.8B | $7.0B | $6.7B | $6.3B | $6.6B | InventoryInvent. |
| $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.9B | $3.6B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $2.9B | $2.3B | $2.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $3.7B | $4.2B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $6.9B | $6.3B | $7.6B | $8.0B | $8.2B | $7.9B | $8.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $2.6B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $4.5B | $5.7B | $6.0B | $5.9B | $6.7B | $6.9B | $7.0B | $7.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.5× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $11.7B | $12.5B | $13.2B | $22.8B | $25.9B | $26.3B | $29.1B | $30.8B | $31.1B | $31.0B | $31.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.2B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $4.1B | $4.2B | $7.0B | $6.2B | $5.7B | $4.6B | $6.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $3.0B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $6.6B | $5.7B | $4.8B | $3.4B | $5.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 21.1× | 20.7× | 21.2× | 22.9× | 23.6× | 20.4× | 15.8× | 7.5× | — | — | 6.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $5.4B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $6.7B | $6.7B | $6.3B | $5.5B | $6.7B | $7.4B | $8.5B | $8.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 282M | 273M | 266M | 258M | 250M | 236M | 226M | 220M | 220M | 221M | 222M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $77.89 | $85.86 | $96.30 | $107.55 | $134.95 | $145.12 | $167.24 | $175.92 | $184.58 | $193.49 | $194.42 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.43 | $5.63 | $5.97 | $6.64 | $10.62 | $10.17 | $10.68 | $7.55 | $5.11 | $6.85 | $7.06 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.34 | $5.11 | $6.35 | $6.72 | $13.20 | $9.43 | $5.57 | $7.02 | $9.20 | $10.84 | $9.94 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.70 | $4.23 | $5.30 | $5.63 | $11.39 | $7.61 | $1.87 | $3.14 | $7.66 | $10.84 | $9.94 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.00 | $1.04 | $1.15 | $1.27 | $1.42 | $1.66 | $2.18 | $2.36 | $2.36 | $2.35 | $2.35 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.99 | $2.36 | $2.76 | $3.04 | $4.11 | $4.54 | $6.90 | $7.73 | $5.95 | $5.62 | $5.88 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $19.15 | $22.41 | $24.12 | $25.97 | $26.64 | $26.55 | $24.49 | $30.69 | $33.69 | $38.55 | $39.91 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +10.6%/yr | +7.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +10.7%/yr | −3.9%/yr |
| EPS | +5.0%/yr | −8.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +10.0%/yr | +10.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +12.3%/yr | +6.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.1%/yr | +7.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
14%low FY2025
Gross margin
31%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.4×peak FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$2.4Bowner earningsvs.$1.5Bnet incomelow FY2017
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2017FY2026
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $1.5B of profit into $2.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.5B | $1.1B | $1.7B | $2.4B | $2.4B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.0B | +$972M | +$849M | +$725M | +$641M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$91M | +$59M | +$52M | +$73M | +$78M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$984M | +$840M | −$170M | −$1.2B | −$253M |
| Cash from operations | $3.6B | $3.0B | $2.4B | $2.0B | $2.9B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$1.2B | −$972M | −$849M | −$725M | −$641M |
| Owner earnings | $2.4B | $2.0B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $2.2B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$338M | −$851M | −$836M | −$429M |
| Free cash flow | $2.4B | $1.7B | $692M | $424M | $1.8B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 5% | 4% | 3% | 7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $91M), owner earnings is nearer $2.3B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $2.2B ÷ interest expense $327M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.4B · 1.6× operating profitModest net debtCash $1.1B − debt $4.6B
What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $4.6B of debt leaves $3.4B owed, about 1.6× a year's operating profit (2.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 11%–29%; 14% latest = NOPAT $1.7B ÷ invested capital $11.9BIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 3%–10%; latest $2.4B = operating cash $3.6B − maintenance capex $1.2BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $91M of SBC) leaves $2.3B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $3.6B ÷ net income $1.5B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $3.3B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.4B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $2.4B of Owner Earnings, $3.3B (137%) went back to shareholders, $520M dividends, $2.7B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $91M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.7B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.19×MaintainingCapex $1.2B ÷ depreciation $1.0B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $42.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.13×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.6B vs $937M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −2%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.50/share (latest year $6.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $38.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 5% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 4.2% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Furthermore, if our competitors or third parties incorporate artificial intelligence into their businesses more quickly or more successfully than us, it could impair our ability to compete effectively and adversely affect our results of operations, or if our use of artificial intelligence is inaccurate or ineffective, …”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, May 1, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$8.5B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.4B
- Inventory$6.6B
- Other current assets$478M
Current liabilities$7.2B
- Debt due within a year$750M
- Accounts payable$4.3B
- Other current liabilities$2.2B
Current ratio1.17×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.25×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$750M due · $1.4B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 1, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($14.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$18.0B$11.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $15.7B (annual-report basis)
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$2.0Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$13.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$11.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$4.6B
Lease obligations (present value)$11.1B
Total fixed claims on the business$15.7B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $15.7B, of which the leases are 71%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 30, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $25.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$10.6B · 42%
- Dividends$4.0B · 16%
- Buybacks$11.5B · 45%
- Returned to owners$15.5B
83% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.0B as dividends and $11.5B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $11.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−21.5%
The diluted count fell from 282M to 222M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$2.35/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained24%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $549M, so each retained $1 added about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Todd J. Vasos | $16.6M | $30.8M | $2.2B |
| 2023 | Todd J. Vasos | $15.6M | $34.6M | $1.3B |
| 2023 | Todd J. Vasos | $12.0M | $15.3M | $1.3B |
| 2024 | Todd J. Vasos | $9.0M | −$2.1M | $1.5B |
| 2024 | Todd J. Vasos | $6.9M | −$24k | $1.5B |
| 2025 | Todd J. Vasos | $2.2M | −$5.7M | $2.0B |
| 2026 | Todd J. Vasos | $8.2M | $19.5M | $2.4B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio114:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$91M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Dollar General Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.2B → $6.7B
Debt rose from $3.2B to $6.7B while owner earnings went from about $1.4B to $2.0B — about 2.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.4 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $320M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Inventory, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Department & General Merchandise Stores
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COSTCostco Wholesale Corp. | $275.2B | 13% | 3.3% | 32% | 4% |
| TGTTarget Corp. | $104.8B | 29% | 5.6% | 17% | 5% |
| DGDollar General Corporation | $42.7B | 31% | 8.4% | 18% | 6% |
| MMacy's | $21.8B | 38% | 5.0% | 13% | 4% |
| BJBJ's Wholesale | $21.5B | 18% | 3.7% | 24% | 3% |
| DLTRDollar Tree Inc. | $19.4B | 31% | 8.3% | 14% | 5% |
| PSMTPriceSmart Inc. | $5.3B | 15% | 4.3% | 13% | 3% |
| FIVEFive Below | $4.8B | 36% | 11.2% | 25% | 9% |
| Group median | — | 30% | 5.3% | 18% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dollar General Corporation has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Dollar General Corporation earns about $2.5B on its 5.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $2.2B on 221M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-29; net debt $5.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Dollar General Corporation (DG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← DFS its page in the Manual DGICA →
Industry order: ← DDT the Department & General Merchandise Stores chapter DLTR →