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DDT, Dillard's Capital Trust I
A retailer, earning thin margins on high volume, where inventory turns, unit economics and scale decide the outcome.
As of January 31, 2026, we operated 271 Dillard's stores, including 28 clearance centers, and an Internet store at dillards.com offering a wide selection of merchandise including fashion apparel for women, men and children, accessories, cosmetics, home furnishings and other consumer goods.
Customers also have the option to buy online and pickup in store or have their orders shipped directly to their desired location.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 35% and operating margin about 5.0% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −2.4% to 17% — on a steadier 35% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −55 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 29%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $6.4B | $6.4B | $6.5B | $6.3B | $4.4B | $6.5B | $6.9B | $6.8B | $6.5B | $6.5B | $6.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 35% | 35% | 34% | 33% | 31% | 42% | 42% | 40% | 40% | 39% | 40% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 26% | 26% | 26% | 27% | 27% | 24% | 24% | 25% | 27% | 27% | 27% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $321M | $276M | $261M | $180M | ($104M) | $1.1B | $1.1B | $912M | $770M | $736M | $850M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.0% | 4.3% | 4.0% | 2.8% | −2.4% | 17.4% | 16.6% | 13.5% | 11.9% | 11.4% | 13.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $169M | $221M | $170M | $111M | ($72M) | $862M | $892M | $739M | $593M | $570M | $657M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 34% | -4% | 18% | 17% | — | 21% | 20% | 19% | 19% | 18% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $512M | $274M | $367M | $365M | $253M | $1.3B | $948M | $884M | $714M | $717M | $848M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $244M | $232M | $224M | $222M | $213M | $199M | $188M | $180M | $178M | $179M | $178M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $99M | ($179M) | ($27M) | $32M | $111M | $218M | ($132M) | ($35M) | ($57M) | ($33M) | $13M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $105M | $130M | $137M | $103M | $60M | $104M | $120M | $133M | $105M | $93M | $94M | CapexCapex |
| 1.6% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 1.6% | 1.4% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 2.0% | 1.6% | 1.4% | 1.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $407M | $144M | $230M | $262M | $192M | $1.2B | $828M | $751M | $610M | $624M | $755M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.3% | 2.2% | 3.5% | 4.1% | 4.3% | 18.1% | 12.1% | 11.1% | 9.4% | 9.6% | 11.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $407M | $144M | $230M | $262M | $192M | $1.2B | $828M | $751M | $610M | $624M | $755M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.3% | 2.2% | 3.5% | 4.1% | 4.3% | 18.1% | 12.1% | 11.1% | 9.4% | 9.6% | 11.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $10M | $9M | $11M | $12M | $14M | $305M | $271M | $339M | $414M | $485M | $486M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $240M | $223M | $130M | $131M | $103M | $545M | $453M | $281M | $121M | $108M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 11% | 13% | 11% | 9% | -6% | 85% | 72% | 61% | 45% | 53% | 56% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 13% | 10% | 7% | -5% | 59% | 56% | 44% | 33% | 32% | 32% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 12% | 9% | 6% | −6% | 38% | 39% | 24% | 10% | 5% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $347M | $187M | $124M | $277M | $360M | $717M | $650M | $808M | $718M | $861M | $1.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $48M | $38M | $50M | $46M | $37M | $40M | $57M | $61M | $56M | $40M | $47M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $636M | $658M | $743M | $713M | $565M | $629M | $590M | $562M | $601M | $571M | $1.1B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($588M) | ($619M) | ($693M) | ($667M) | ($528M) | ($589M) | ($533M) | ($502M) | ($545M) | ($531M) | ($1.0B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $3.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $977M | $1.0B | $934M | $931M | $773M | $966M | $859M | $828M | $835M | $902M | $1.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 1.7× | 1.9× | 2.0× | 2.2× | 2.0× | 2.4× | 2.7× | 2.8× | 2.6× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $3.9B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $4.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $613M | $526M | $366M | $366M | $366M | $321M | $321M | $321M | $322M | $226M | $366M | Total debtDebt |
| $266M | $339M | $242M | $89M | $6M | ($396M) | ($329M) | ($487M) | ($396M) | ($636M) | ($792M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 5.1× | 4.4× | 5.0× | 3.9× | -2.1× | 26.3× | 37.3× | — | 19.3× | 18.0× | 20.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 34.3M | 29.5M | 27.3M | 25.4M | 22.7M | 20.6M | 17.5M | 16.5M | 16.1M | 15.7M | 15.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $187.07 | $217.81 | $238.11 | $250.09 | $195.32 | $315.32 | $391.54 | $408.79 | $402.15 | $413.52 | $417.06 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.93 | $7.51 | $6.23 | $4.38 | $-3.16 | $41.88 | $50.81 | $44.73 | $36.82 | $36.42 | $42.06 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $11.87 | $4.88 | $8.43 | $10.32 | $8.48 | $57.09 | $47.20 | $45.45 | $37.81 | $39.84 | $48.32 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $11.87 | $4.88 | $8.43 | $10.32 | $8.48 | $57.09 | $47.20 | $45.45 | $37.81 | $39.84 | $48.32 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.29 | $0.32 | $0.41 | $0.45 | $0.62 | $14.82 | $15.46 | $20.50 | $25.67 | $30.97 | $31.09 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $3.06 | $4.42 | $5.02 | $4.08 | $2.66 | $5.07 | $6.84 | $8.05 | $6.49 | $5.96 | $6.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $50.06 | $57.93 | $61.45 | $64.00 | $63.49 | $70.47 | $91.10 | $102.75 | $111.42 | $113.64 | $129.70 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.2%/yr | +16.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +14.4%/yr | +36.3%/yr |
| EPS | +24.9%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +68.3%/yr | +118.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +7.7%/yr | +17.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.5%/yr | +12.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $570M of profit into $624M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $570M | $593M | $739M | $892M | $862M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$179M | +$178M | +$180M | +$188M | +$199M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$33M | −$57M | −$35M | −$132M | +$218M |
| Cash from operations | $717M | $714M | $884M | $948M | $1.3B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$93M | −$105M | −$133M | −$120M | −$104M |
| Owner earnings | $624M | $610M | $751M | $828M | $1.2B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 10% | 9% | 11% | 12% | 18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 18.0×ComfortableOperating income $736M ÷ interest expense $41M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $861M − debt $366M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $496M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -6%–85%; 47% latest = NOPAT $604M ÷ invested capital $1.3BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 47% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 2%–18%; latest $624M = operating cash $717M − maintenance capex $93MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17K of SBC) leaves $624M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $717M ÷ net income $570M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $593M ÷ Owner Earnings $624M
What this means
Of $624M Owner Earnings, $593M (95%) went back to shareholders, $485M dividends, $108M buybacks. Net of $17K stock comp, the real buyback was about $108M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.52×HarvestingCapex $93M ÷ depreciation $179M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.65×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $366M vs $1.5B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +239%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $40.61/share (latest year $36.51), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $113.91/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 12% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · −2.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
- Receivables$47M
- Other current assets$1.8B
- Accounts payable$1.1B
- Other current liabilities$206M
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of May 2, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.8B against the $96M due in the twelve months after the Jan 31, 2026 schedule: 19 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $6.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.1B · 17%
- Dividends$1.9B · 30%
- Buybacks$2.3B · 37%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.0B · 16%
- Returned to owners$4.2B
80% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.9B as dividends and $2.3B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$113.37
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 21M shares were bought for $2.3B, about $113.37 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $46.12 (2021) to $367.35 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $169.99 ($545M).
- Net change in share count−54.5%
The diluted count fell from 34M to 16M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$30.97/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 68% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership34.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$17K
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Dillard's Capital Trust I is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Department & General Merchandise Stores
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MMacy's | $21.8B | 38% | 5.0% | 13% | 4% |
| DLTRDollar Tree Inc. | $19.4B | 31% | 8.3% | 14% | 5% |
| KSSKohl's | $15.5B | 40% | 4.8% | 11% | 6% |
| BURLBurlington Stores | $11.5B | 42% | 5.9% | 23% | 6% |
| DDTDillard's Capital Trust I | $6.5B | 37% | 8.2% | 29% | 8% |
| PSMTPriceSmart Inc. | $5.3B | 15% | 4.3% | 13% | 3% |
| FIVEFive Below | $4.8B | 36% | 11.2% | 25% | 9% |
| OLLIOllie's Bargain | $2.6B | 40% | 11.6% | 14% | 8% |
| Group median | — | 38% | 7.1% | 14% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dillard's Capital Trust I has delivered.
Dillard's Capital Trust I’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Dillard's Capital Trust I earns about $510M on its 7.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $755M on 16M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $792M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DDS its page in the Manual DE →
Industry order: ← DDS the Department & General Merchandise Stores chapter DG →