← All companies ← DOW Manual DRH → ← DNUT Restaurants DRI →
DPZ, Domino's Pizza Inc.
Domino's is the largest pizza company in the world with more than 22,100 locations in over 90 markets around the world as of December 28, 2025, and operates two distinct service models within its stores, with a significant business in both delivery and carryout.
Company-owned stores through both the delivery and carryout service models.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 39% and operating margin about 18% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has held in a narrow 17%–19% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 91%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2014–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2014’14 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $4.1B | $4.4B | $4.5B | $4.7B | $4.9B | $5.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 30% | 31% | 31% | 38% | 39% | 39% | 39% | 39% | 39% | 40% | 40% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 13% | 13% | 12% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 9% | 9% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $345M | $405M | $521M | $572M | $629M | $726M | $768M | $820M | $879M | $954M | $974M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 17.3% | 18.3% | 18.7% | 16.7% | 17.4% | 17.6% | 17.6% | 18.3% | 18.7% | 19.3% | 19.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $163M | $193M | $278M | $362M | $401M | $491M | $510M | $519M | $584M | $602M | $592M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 37% | 37% | 31% | 16% | 17% | 11% | 18% | 20% | 19% | 22% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $192M | $292M | $341M | $394M | $497M | $593M | $654M | $591M | $625M | $792M | $775M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $36M | $32M | $44M | $54M | $60M | $65M | $80M | $81M | $88M | $89M | $89M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($24M) | $49M | ($2M) | ($44M) | $16M | $12M | $35M | ($46M) | ($90M) | $57M | $51M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $70M | $63M | $90M | $120M | $86M | $89M | $94M | $105M | $113M | $121M | $121M | CapexCapex |
| 3.5% | 2.9% | 3.2% | 3.5% | 2.4% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.4% | 2.4% | 2.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $157M | $259M | $297M | $341M | $437M | $528M | $560M | $510M | $537M | $703M | $686M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.9% | 11.7% | 10.6% | 9.9% | 12.1% | 12.8% | 12.9% | 11.4% | 11.4% | 14.2% | 13.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $122M | $229M | $251M | $274M | $411M | $504M | $560M | $485M | $512M | $672M | $654M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.1% | 10.3% | 9.0% | 8.0% | 11.4% | 12.2% | 12.9% | 10.8% | 10.9% | 13.6% | 13.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $53M | $80M | $84M | $92M | $106M | $122M | $139M | $170M | $210M | $237M | $238M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $82M | $739M | $1.1B | $591M | $699M | $305M | $1.3B | $269M | $330M | $358M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 87% | 83% | 95% | 104% | 103% | 99% | 88% | 76% | 86% | 94% | 103% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $35M | $140M | $44M | $34M | $203M | $182M | $164M | $77M | $207M | $151M | $259M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $118M | $132M | $174M | $190M | $210M | $245M | $255M | $283M | $309M | $316M | $306M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $38M | $37M | $40M | $46M | $53M | $67M | $68M | $83M | $71M | $79M | $69M | InventoryInvent. |
| $87M | $107M | $107M | $93M | $111M | $94M | $92M | $106M | $86M | $135M | $124M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $70M | $62M | $107M | $144M | $152M | $217M | $232M | $260M | $294M | $260M | $251M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $428M | $603M | $580M | $567M | $788M | $869M | $861M | $817M | $905M | $894M | $949M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $266M | $376M | $398M | $380M | $454M | $471M | $591M | $547M | $1.6B | $542M | $592M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.5× | 1.7× | 1.8× | 1.5× | 1.5× | 0.6× | 1.7× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $16M | $16M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $15M | $12M | $12M | $11M | $11M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $596M | $800M | $837M | $907M | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.5B | $2.2B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $5.1B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $4.8B | $4.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.5B | $2.1B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $4.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 4.0× | 4.1× | 4.3× | 3.9× | 4.2× | 4.2× | 3.9× | 4.2× | 4.5× | 4.9× | 5.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($1.2B) | ($1.8B) | ($2.7B) | ($3.0B) | ($3.4B) | ($3.3B) | ($4.2B) | ($4.1B) | ($4.0B) | ($3.9B) | ($3.9B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 56.9M | 55.5M | 47.7M | 43.3M | 41.9M | 39.6M | 37.7M | 35.4M | 35.0M | 34.2M | 33.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $35.02 | $39.91 | $58.48 | $79.22 | $86.32 | $103.87 | $115.61 | $126.53 | $134.50 | $144.29 | $147.23 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.86 | $3.47 | $5.83 | $8.35 | $9.56 | $12.39 | $13.54 | $14.66 | $16.69 | $17.57 | $17.50 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.75 | $4.67 | $6.23 | $7.86 | $10.42 | $13.31 | $14.86 | $14.41 | $15.35 | $20.54 | $20.29 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.15 | $4.11 | $5.27 | $6.33 | $9.81 | $12.71 | $14.86 | $13.71 | $14.63 | $19.61 | $19.34 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.93 | $1.45 | $1.77 | $2.13 | $2.52 | $3.08 | $3.70 | $4.80 | $6.00 | $6.92 | $7.03 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.23 | $1.14 | $1.89 | $2.77 | $2.04 | $2.24 | $2.50 | $2.98 | $3.23 | $3.52 | $3.57 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-21.42 | $-32.42 | $-57.37 | $-70.16 | $-81.48 | $-83.26 | $-111.68 | $-114.98 | $-113.24 | $-113.94 | $-115.53 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 11-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +13.7%/yr | +8.6%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +20.1%/yr | +11.4%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | +18.0%/yr | +9.1%/yr (4-yr) |
| Dividends / share | +20.0%/yr | +22.5%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +10.0%/yr | +12.0%/yr (4-yr) |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+5.0%
“Consolidated revenues increased $233.6 million, or 5.0%, in 2025 primarily due to higher supply chain revenues, higher U.S. franchise advertising revenues and higher U.S. franchise royalties and fees.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2014–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $703M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $89M it takes just to hold its position. It put $32M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $672M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $602M | $584M | $519M | $510M | $491M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$89M | +$88M | +$81M | +$80M | +$65M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$45M | +$43M | +$38M | +$29M | +$24M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$57M | −$90M | −$46M | +$35M | +$12M |
| Cash from operations | $792M | $625M | $591M | $654M | $593M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$89M | −$88M | −$81M | −$94M | −$65M |
| Owner earnings | $703M | $537M | $510M | $560M | $528M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$32M | −$25M | −$25M | — | −$24M |
| Free cash flow | $672M | $512M | $485M | $560M | $504M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $89M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $32M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $45M), owner earnings is nearer $659M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $954M ÷ interest expense $196M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.7B · 4.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $126M − debt $4.8B
What this means
Netting $126M of cash and short-term investments against $4.8B of debt leaves $4.7B owed, about 4.9× a year's operating profit (5.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $25M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $4.7B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 23 + DIO 10 − DPO 17 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle10-yr median, range 76%–104%; 94% latest = NOPAT $745M ÷ invested capital $790MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 94% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 8%–14%; latest $703M = operating cash $792M − maintenance capex $89MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves $659M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $792M ÷ net income $602M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $595M ÷ Owner Earnings $703M
What this means
Of $703M Owner Earnings, $595M (85%) went back to shareholders, $237M dividends, $358M buybacks. Net of $45M stock comp, the real buyback was about $313M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.36×ExpandingCapex $121M ÷ depreciation $89M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.65×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.8B vs $353M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +169%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $17.09/share (latest year $18.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-117.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2014–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 18% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 18% early, 19% lately, median 18%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —
What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 16.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −4.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 22, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$233M
- Receivables$306M
- Inventory$69M
- Other current assets$341M
- Debt due within a year$100K
- Accounts payable$124M
- Other current liabilities$468M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2014–2025
Over the record, the business generated $5.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$951M · 19%
- Dividends$1.3B · 26%
- Buybacks$5.8B · 116%
- Returned to owners$7.1B
163% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $5.8B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$3.0B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.5B to $4.9B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$241.42
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 24M shares were bought for $5.8B, about $241.42 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $71.54 (2014) to $455.50 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $453.52 ($1.3B).
- Net change in share count−40.6%
The diluted count fell from 57M to 34M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$6.92/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 25% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Richard E. Allison, Jr. | $7.1M | $18.9M | $528M |
| 2022 | Richard E. Allison, Jr. | $1.6M | −$5.6M | $560M |
| 2022 | Russell J. Weiner | $6.6M | −$28k | $560M |
| 2023 | Russell J. Weiner | $10.1M | $14.4M | $510M |
| 2024 | Russell J. Weiner | $8.9M | $10.7M | $537M |
| 2025 | Russell J. Weiner | $10.7M | $8.9M | $703M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership0.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$45M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Domino's Pizza Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2014–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.5B → $4.9B
Debt rose from $1.5B to $4.9B while owner earnings went from about $238M to $584M — about 6.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.4 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Restaurants
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SYYSysco Corporation | $81.4B | 19% | 3.8% | 16% | 3% |
| PFGCPerformance Food | $63.3B | 12% | 1.3% | 6% | 1% |
| USFDUS Foods | $39.4B | 17% | 2.7% | 8% | 2% |
| DPZDomino's Pizza Inc. | $4.9B | 39% | 18.0% | 91% | 12% |
| CHEFChefs' Warehouse | $4.1B | 24% | 3.2% | 6% | 2% |
| UVVUniversal Corporation | $2.9B | 18% | 7.6% | 8% | 3% |
| VSTSVestis Corporation | $2.7B | — | 6.4% | 6% | 6% |
| HWKNHawkins | $1.1B | 19% | 9.4% | 12% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 19% | 5.1% | 8% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Domino's Pizza Inc. has delivered.
Domino's Pizza Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Domino's Pizza Inc. earns about $571M on its 11.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $654M on 33M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net debt $4.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($121M) runs well above depreciation ($89M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $686M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DOW its page in the Manual DRH →
Industry order: ← DNUT the Restaurants chapter DRI →