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DRS, Leonardo DRS Inc.

Leonardo DRS, Inc. provides advanced defense technology to U.S. national security customers and allied defense forces worldwide.

We specialize in the design, development, manufacture, and integration of advanced sensing, network computing, force protection, and electric power and propulsion technologies and solutions.

As a mid-sized defense technology company, our combination of operational speed and agility, deep domain expertise, and established positions on priority defense platforms has resulted in a durable and diversified portfolio of programs across the DoW.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

DRS · Leonardo DRS Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.6B

+12.8% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.7B 5-yr avg $3.1B

Gross margin 24% 5-yr avg 22%

Operating margin 9.9% 5-yr avg 11.2%

ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 12%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 21% and operating margin about 8.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 6.0% to 21% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$3.7B	RevenueRevenue
17%	18%	19%	21%	23%	23%	24%	24%	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	10%	10%	13%	14%	13%	14%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	4%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$163M	$181M	$236M	$561M	$231M	$293M	$348M	$366M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.0%	6.5%	8.2%	20.8%	8.2%	9.1%	9.5%	9.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$75M	$85M	$154M	$405M	$168M	$213M	$278M	$290M	Net incomeNet inc.
21%	24%	23%	23%	13%	19%	17%	18%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$157M	$125M	$178M	$33M	$205M	$271M	$366M	$438M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$51M	$53M	$58M	$65M	$85M	$91M	$93M	$94M	DepreciationDeprec.
$31M	($13M)	($34M)	($442M)	($65M)	($55M)	($37M)	$26M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$55M	$56M	$60M	$65M	$60M	$85M	$139M	$137M	CapexCapex
2.0%	2.0%	2.1%	2.4%	2.1%	2.6%	3.8%	3.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$102M	$69M	$118M	($32M)	$145M	$186M	$273M	$344M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
3.8%	2.5%	4.1%	−1.2%	5.1%	5.8%	7.5%	9.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$102M	$69M	$118M	($32M)	$145M	$186M	$227M	$301M	Free cash flowFCF
3.8%	2.5%	4.1%	−1.2%	5.1%	5.8%	6.2%	8.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$4M	$0	$14M	$0	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$0	$396M	$0	$0	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$35M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
14%	8%	10%	19%	9%	10%	12%	11%	ROICROIC
7%	6%	10%	19%	7%	8%	10%	10%	Return on equityROE
—	6%	10%	0%	7%	8%	—	10%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$85M	$61M	$240M	$306M	$467M	$598M	$647M	$328M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$102M	$156M	$166M	$151M	$253M	$334M	$324M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$247M	$205M	$319M	$329M	$358M	$352M	$371M	InventoryInvent.
—	$478M	$479M	$457M	$398M	$426M	$351M	$187M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($129M)	($118M)	$28M	$82M	$185M	$335M	$508M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$975M	$989M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.3×	1.4×	1.6×	1.8×	1.9×	1.9×	1.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.7B	$3.9B	$4.2B	$4.5B	$4.2B	Total assetsAssets
—	$427M	$434M	$425M	$464M	$391M	$374M	$359M	Total debtDebt
—	$366M	$194M	$119M	($3M)	($207M)	($273M)	$31M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.5×	2.8×	6.7×	16.5×	6.4×	14.0×	—	21.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$2.7B	$2.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	0.0%	0.2%	0.6%	0.7%	0.9%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
—	210M	210M	215M	264M	268M	269M	269M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	$13.23	$13.71	$12.52	$10.70	$12.08	$13.58	$13.75	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	$0.40	$0.73	$1.88	$0.64	$0.80	$1.03	$1.08	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	$0.33	$0.56	$-0.15	$0.55	$0.69	$1.02	$1.28	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	$0.33	$0.56	$-0.15	$0.55	$0.69	$0.84	$1.12	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$0.00	$0.00	$1.84	$0.00	$0.00	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
—	$0.27	$0.29	$0.30	$0.23	$0.32	$0.52	$0.51	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	$6.80	$7.59	$9.89	$8.80	$9.55	$10.16	$10.31	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+0.5%/yr (5-yr)	+0.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+25.3%/yr (5-yr)	+25.3%/yr
EPS	+20.6%/yr (5-yr)	+20.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.2%/yr (5-yr)	+14.2%/yr
Book value / share	+8.4%/yr (5-yr)	+8.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

269Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

12%low FY2020

Gross margin

24%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-1.0×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$273Mowner earningsvs.$278Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $273M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $93M it takes just to hold its position. It put $46M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $227M.

Reported net income$278M

Owner earnings$273M · 7% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$278M	$213M	$168M	$405M	$154M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$93M	+$91M	+$85M	+$65M	+$58M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$32M	+$22M	+$17M	+$5M	—
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$37M	−$55M	−$65M	−$442M	−$34M
Cash from operations	$366M	$271M	$205M	$33M	$178M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$93M	−$85M	−$60M	−$65M	−$60M
Owner earnings	$273M	$186M	$145M	($32M)	$118M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$46M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$227M	$186M	$145M	($32M)	$118M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	7%	6%	5%	-1%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $93M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $46M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $32M), owner earnings is nearer $241M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 16.6×

Comfortable

Operating income $348M ÷ interest expense $21M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$273M

Net cash

Cash $647M − debt $374M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $273M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 34d

Tight

DSO 33 + DIO 46 − DPO 46 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 10%

Solid through the cycle

7-yr median, range 8%–19%; 12% latest = NOPAT $288M ÷ invested capital $2.5B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $273M = operating cash $366M − maintenance capex $93M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 4%)

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 7 years. It chose to put $46M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $227M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $32M of SBC) leaves $241M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.32×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $366M ÷ net income $278M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 13%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $35M ÷ Owner Earnings $273M

What this means
Of $273M Owner Earnings, $35M (13%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $35M buybacks. Net of $32M stock comp, the real buyback was about $3M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.49×

Expanding

Capex $139M ÷ depreciation $93M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.89×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $374M vs $1.1B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +110%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.82/share (latest year $1.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 7

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 9% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +18%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 6.0% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +4.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.1B

Cash & short-term investments$328M
Receivables$324M
Inventory$371M
Other current assets$1.0B

Current liabilities$1.1B

Debt due within a year$11M
Accounts payable$187M
Other current liabilities$907M

Current ratio1.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.52×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.30×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$951Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$11M due · $328M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 1.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$479M$120M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$640Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$26M

'27$189M

'28$8M

'29$8M

'30$9M

later$108M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$26Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$215Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$189Min 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$348Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$328M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$273M

Together, against $26M due next year23.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $601M against the $26M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 23 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$520M · 39%
Dividends$396M · 30%
Buybacks$35M · 3%
Retained (debt / cash)$384M · 29%

Returned to owners$431M
50% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $396M as dividends and $35M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $35M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count28.0%
The diluted count rose from 210M to 269M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained11%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($947M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $105M, so each retained $1 added about 0.11 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.4B30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity45%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$37Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $520M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Lynn	$6.3M	$6.3M	$118M
2022	Mr. Lynn	$11.1M	$13.2M	($32M)
2023	Mr. Lynn	$10.8M	$19.1M	$145M
2024	Mr. Lynn	$7.9M	$26.2M	$186M
2025	Mr. Lynn	$8.2M	$10.5M	$273M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$32M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Leonardo DRS Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?28.0%
Diluted shares grew 28.0% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $35M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LHXL3Harris	$21.3B	29%	15.4%	7%	11%
HUBGHub Group	$3.9B	12%	3.6%	9%	3%
WUWestern Union	$3.9B	39%	19.6%	42%	15%
FCNFTI Consulting	$3.8B	32%	10.5%	16%	9%
HRBH&R Block	$3.8B	45%	21.8%	108%	17%
DRSLeonardo DRS Inc.	$3.6B	21%	8.2%	10%	4%
ADVAdvantage Solutions Inc.	$3.5B	—	-1.2%	-8%	3%
CMPRCimpress plc Ordinary Shares (Ireland)	$3.4B	49%	4.6%	8%	7%
Group median	—	32%	9.4%	10%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Leonardo DRS Inc. has delivered.

Leonardo DRS Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Leonardo DRS Inc. earns about $150M on its 4.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($150M) Net of stock comp (−$28M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($345M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+52%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+16%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $301M on 267M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $31M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($137M) runs well above depreciation ($94M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $345M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh DRS against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Leonardo DRS Inc. (DRS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DRS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DRIO its page in the Manual DRVN →

Industry order: ← DPRO the Aerospace & Defense chapter EH →