Share count
164Mpeak FY2022
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DRVN, Driven Brands Holdings Inc.
Driven Brands is the largest automotive services company in North America with a growing and highly-franchised base of over 4,200 locations across 49 U.S. states and Canada.
Our scaled, diversified platform provides high-quality services to an extensive range of retail, commercial, and insurance customers.
Our breadth of services covers a wide variety of automotive needs, including routine maintenance services, such as oil changes, as well as paint, collision, glass, and repair services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
+6.3% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.9B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Revenue $484M +8.2% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 13.9% yr-ago 12.2%
Net income $55M yr-ago $10M
Net margin 11.3% yr-ago 2.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Company-operated store sales (70%) and Supply and Other (14%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Capital spending runs about 12% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 1 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Company-operated store sales is 70% of revenue, with Supply And Other the other meaningful line at 14%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Company-operated store sales70%$1.3B
- Supply And Other14%$269M
- Franchise And Royalty10%$190M
- Advertising6%$109M
By geographyUnited States97%Canada3%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $600M | $904M | $1.5B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 24% | 24% | 20% | 20% | 23% | 27% | 27% | 27% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $70M | $95M | $177M | $200M | $115M | $200M | $231M | $244M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 11.7% | 10.5% | 12.1% | 9.8% | 6.7% | 11.4% | 12.4% | 12.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $8M | ($4M) | $10M | $43M | ($745M) | ($292M) | $131M | $176M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 38% | — | — | 37% | — | — | — | -5% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $41M | $84M | $284M | $197M | $229M | $244M | $331M | $311M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $24M | $62M | $113M | $147M | $77M | $79M | $82M | $83M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $9M | $26M | $161M | $7M | $897M | $457M | $118M | $53M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $28M | $52M | $161M | $436M | $596M | $289M | $223M | $189M | CapexCapex |
| 4.7% | 5.8% | 11.0% | 21.5% | 34.9% | 16.5% | 12.0% | 10.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $13M | $32M | $171M | $50M | $152M | $165M | $249M | $229M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.2% | 3.5% | 11.7% | 2.5% | 8.9% | 9.4% | 13.4% | 12.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $13M | $32M | $123M | ($239M) | ($368M) | ($45M) | $108M | $122M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 2.2% | 3.5% | 8.4% | −11.8% | −21.5% | −2.5% | 5.8% | 6.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $454M | $105M | $801M | $763M | $60M | $3M | $11M | $11M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $0 | $43M | $0 | $50M | $0 | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 17% | 2% | — | 3% | — | — | 7% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| 3% | -0% | 1% | 3% | -82% | -35% | 23% | 22% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | −0% | 1% | 3% | −82% | −35% | 23% | 22% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $35M | $173M | $523M | $150M | $133M | $106M | $96M | $133M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $43M | $47M | $72M | $83M | $54M | $49M | $49M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $68M | $83M | $61M | $68M | $85M | $112M | $105M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($25M) | ($36M) | $11M | $16M | ($31M) | ($64M) | ($56M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $374M | $769M | $571M | $821M | $758M | $612M | $501M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $305M | $478M | $505M | $427M | $466M | $478M | $362M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.2× | 1.6× | 1.1× | 1.9× | 1.6× | 1.3× | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $871M | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $4.7B | $5.9B | $6.5B | $5.9B | $5.8B | $5.3B | $3.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $1.7B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $1.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.2× | 1.0× | 2.3× | 1.7× | 0.7× | 1.3× | 1.9× | 2.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $290M | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $906M | $828M | $581M | $797M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 89.0M | 104M | 165M | 167M | 162M | 161M | 164M | 165M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $6.75 | $8.67 | $8.91 | $12.19 | $10.56 | $10.87 | $11.37 | $11.54 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.09 | $-0.04 | $0.06 | $0.26 | $-4.60 | $-1.81 | $0.80 | $1.07 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.15 | $0.30 | $1.04 | $0.30 | $0.94 | $1.02 | $1.52 | $1.39 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.15 | $0.30 | $0.75 | $-1.43 | $-2.27 | $-0.28 | $0.66 | $0.74 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.32 | $0.50 | $0.98 | $2.62 | $3.68 | $1.79 | $1.36 | $1.15 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $3.26 | $10.59 | $9.99 | $9.91 | $5.60 | $5.14 | $3.55 | $4.84 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.58 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.1%/yr | +5.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +47.5%/yr | +38.1%/yr |
| EPS | +44.8%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +27.5%/yr | +22.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +1.4%/yr | −19.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
7%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
10.3×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$249Mowner earningsvs.$131Mnet incomelow FY2019
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $249M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $82M it takes just to hold its position. It put $141M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $108M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $131M | ($292M) | ($745M) | $43M | $10M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$82M | +$79M | +$77M | +$147M | +$113M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$118M | +$457M | +$897M | +$7M | +$161M |
| Cash from operations | $331M | $244M | $229M | $197M | $284M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$82M | −$79M | −$77M | −$147M | −$113M |
| Owner earnings | $249M | $165M | $152M | $50M | $171M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$141M | −$210M | −$520M | −$289M | −$48M |
| Free cash flow | $108M | ($45M) | ($368M) | ($239M) | $123M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 13% | 9% | 9% | 2% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $82M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $141M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures.”
Restated past financials
“No. 1 amended the Base Indenture to extend the deadlines for certain deliverables and to clarify certain other requirements following the occurrence of a re-issuance restatement of the Co-Issuers' financial statements.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $231M ÷ interest expense $121M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.6B · 11.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $96M − debt $2.7B
What this means
Netting $96M of cash and short-term investments against $2.7B of debt leaves $2.6B owed, about 11.1× a year's operating profit (11.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range 2%–17%; 7% latest = NOPAT $231M ÷ invested capital $3.1BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 2%–13%; latest $249M = operating cash $331M − maintenance capex $82MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 7 years. It chose to put $141M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $108M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $331M ÷ net income $131M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $249M
What this means
Of $249M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.72×ExpandingCapex $223M ÷ depreciation $82M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.28×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.7B vs $134M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −6985%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.83/share (latest year $0.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 11% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 11% early, 10% lately, median 11%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +45%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 45% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · 6.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“In addition, advances in technology such as artificial intelligence ("AI") and machine learning pose competitive risks.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$501M
- Cash & short-term investments$133M
- Inventory$49M
- Other current assets$318M
Current liabilities$362M
- Debt due within a year$25M
- Accounts payable$105M
- Other current liabilities$232M
Current ratio1.38×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.25×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.37×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$139Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$25M due · $133M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.3B$564M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$29Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$92Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$846Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$574Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$2.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$574M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.2B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.2B, of which the leases are 18%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 27, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$1.8B · 127%
- Buybacks$93M · 7%
- Returned to owners$93M
11% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $93M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$469M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $469M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$13.87
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $50M, about $13.87 each.
- Net change in share count85.0%
The diluted count rose from 89M to 165M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$1.8B35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$2.2Bover 7 years buying other businesses, against $1.8B of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Jonathan Fitzpatrick | $14.8M | $20.2M | $171M |
| 2022 | Jonathan Fitzpatrick | $6.8M | $3.1M | $50M |
| 2023 | Jonathan Fitzpatrick | $29.1M | $20.1M | $152M |
| 2024 | Jonathan Fitzpatrick | $7.7M | $11.6M | $165M |
| 2025 | Daniel Rivera | $5.2M | $3.9M | $249M |
| 2025 | Jonathan Fitzpatrick | $1.5M | −$651k | $249M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio123:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Driven Brands Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?85.0%
Diluted shares grew 85.0% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $93M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Auto Dealers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRyder System | $12.7B | 77% | 8.0% | 6% | 4% |
| DRVNDriven Brands Holdings Inc. | $1.9B | — | 11.4% | 5% | 9% |
| MNROMonro Inc. | $1.2B | — | 6.9% | 8% | 9% |
| MCWMister Car Wash | $1.1B | — | 19.0% | 8% | 16% |
| UHALU-Haul Holding | $761M | 96% | 39.3% | 8% | -29% |
| EVGOEVgo Inc. | $384M | -2% | -184.6% | — | -114% |
| Group median | — | — | 9.7% | 8% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Driven Brands Holdings Inc. has delivered.
Driven Brands Holdings Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
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Through the cycle, Driven Brands Holdings Inc. earns about $166M on its 8.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
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The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+45%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $122M on 165M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-09; net debt $1.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($189M) runs well above depreciation ($83M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $230M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Driven Brands Holdings Inc. (DRVN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DRVN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← DRS its page in the Manual DSGR →
Industry order: ← CWH the Auto Dealers & Services chapter EVGO →