← All companies ← ELV Manual EMN → ← DY Construction & Engineering ENGS →

EME, EMCOR Group

Construction & Engineering capital-intensive

We are one of the largest specialty contractors in the United States and a leading provider of electrical and mechanical construction and facilities services, building services, and industrial services.

On December 1, 2025, we sold our United Kingdom operations, the results of which are reported within our United Kingdom building services segment through the date of sale.

Our operating subsidiaries offer comprehensive and diverse solutions on a broad scale and have many long-standing customer relationships.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

EME · EMCOR Group

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$17.0B

+16.6% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $17.7B 5-yr avg $13.0B

Gross margin 19% 5-yr avg 17%

Operating margin 10.1% 5-yr avg 7.3%

ROIC 42% 5-yr avg 39%

Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 15% and operating margin about 5.0% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.9% to 10% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 20%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$7.6B	$7.7B	$8.1B	$9.2B	$8.8B	$9.9B	$11.1B	$12.6B	$14.6B	$17.0B	$17.7B	RevenueRevenue
14%	15%	15%	15%	16%	15%	14%	17%	19%	19%	19%	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	9%	10%	10%	10%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$307M	$329M	$403M	$461M	$257M	$531M	$565M	$876M	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.8B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.1%	4.3%	5.0%	5.0%	2.9%	5.4%	5.1%	7.0%	9.2%	10.1%	10.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$182M	$227M	$284M	$325M	$133M	$384M	$406M	$633M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Net incomeNet inc.
38%	29%	28%	28%	47%	28%	27%	27%	27%	26%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$262M	$366M	$271M	$356M	$806M	$319M	$498M	$900M	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.2B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$39M	$40M	$38M	$44M	$47M	$48M	$47M	$52M	$57M	$67M	$70M	DepreciationDeprec.
$42M	$99M	($51M)	($13M)	$627M	($113M)	$45M	$215M	$344M	($38M)	($214M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$40M	$35M	$43M	$48M	$48M	$36M	$49M	$78M	$75M	$113M	$115M	CapexCapex
0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$223M	$331M	$228M	$307M	$758M	$283M	$449M	$848M	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.1B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
2.9%	4.3%	2.8%	3.3%	8.6%	2.9%	4.1%	6.7%	9.3%	7.3%	6.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$223M	$331M	$228M	$307M	$758M	$283M	$449M	$821M	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	Free cash flowFCF
2.9%	4.3%	2.8%	3.3%	8.6%	2.9%	4.1%	6.5%	9.2%	7.0%	6.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$233M	$107M	$72M	$301M	$50M	$118M	$99M	$96M	$228M	$1.0B	$215M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$19M	$19M	$19M	$18M	$18M	$28M	$27M	$33M	$43M	$45M	$51M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$94M	$93M	$216M	$0	$113M	$196M	$661M	$128M	$490M	$586M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
13%	16%	17%	17%	9%	23%	23%	38%	62%	49%	42%	ROICROIC
12%	14%	16%	16%	6%	17%	21%	26%	34%	35%	35%	Return on equityROE
11%	12%	15%	15%	6%	16%	19%	24%	33%	33%	33%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$465M	$467M	$364M	$359M	$903M	$821M	$456M	$790M	$1.3B	$1.1B	$916M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$4.2B	$4.5B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$501M	$568M	$652M	$665M	$672M	$734M	$849M	$936M	$937M	$1.2B	$1.1B	Accounts payablePayables
$994M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$3.0B	$3.4B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$3.1B	$3.4B	$3.5B	$4.4B	$5.4B	$5.9B	$6.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.8B	$3.5B	$4.2B	$4.9B	$4.8B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	1.4×	1.4×	1.4×	1.4×	1.4×	1.3×	1.3×	1.3×	1.2×	1.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$980M	$965M	$991M	$1.1B	$852M	$890M	$919M	$957M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.4B	GoodwillGoodwill
$3.9B	$4.0B	$4.1B	$4.8B	$5.1B	$5.4B	$5.5B	$6.6B	$7.7B	$9.3B	$9.5B	Total assetsAssets
$423M	$310M	$296M	$312M	$277M	$262M	$247M	$3M	—	—	$256M	Total debtDebt
($41M)	($157M)	($68M)	($47M)	($626M)	($560M)	($209M)	($787M)	—	—	($660M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
24.3×	25.8×	29.8×	33.3×	28.5×	87.4×	42.8×	50.9×	355.9×	142.5×	149.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.0B	$2.5B	$2.9B	$3.7B	$3.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
61.2M	59.6M	58.4M	56.5M	55.4M	54.3M	50.1M	47.6M	46.8M	45.1M	44.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$123.38	$128.94	$139.12	$162.33	$158.73	$182.23	$220.92	$264.54	$311.19	$376.26	$397.15	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.97	$3.81	$4.85	$5.75	$2.40	$7.06	$8.10	$13.31	$21.52	$28.19	$29.93	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.64	$5.56	$3.89	$5.44	$13.68	$5.20	$8.95	$17.83	$28.87	$27.35	$25.15	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.64	$5.56	$3.89	$5.44	$13.68	$5.20	$8.95	$17.27	$28.48	$26.34	$24.14	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.32	$0.32	$0.32	$0.32	$0.32	$0.52	$0.54	$0.69	$0.93	$1.00	$1.15	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.65	$0.58	$0.74	$0.86	$0.87	$0.67	$0.98	$1.65	$1.60	$2.50	$2.58	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$25.11	$28.07	$29.78	$36.40	$37.04	$41.44	$39.36	$51.93	$62.76	$81.38	$86.52	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+13.2%/yr	+18.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+25.1%/yr	+14.9%/yr
EPS	+28.4%/yr	+63.7%/yr
Dividends / share	+13.5%/yr	+25.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+16.2%/yr	+23.6%/yr
Book value / share	+14.0%/yr	+17.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

45Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

49%low FY2020

Gross margin

19%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.2Bowner earningsvs.$1.3Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $67M it takes just to hold its position. It put $45M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.2B.

Reported net income$1.3B

Owner earnings$1.2B · 7% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.3B	$1.0B	$633M	$406M	$384M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$67M	+$57M	+$52M	+$47M	+$48M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$38M	+$344M	+$215M	+$45M	−$113M
Cash from operations	$1.3B	$1.4B	$900M	$498M	$319M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$67M	−$57M	−$52M	−$49M	−$36M
Owner earnings	$1.2B	$1.4B	$848M	$449M	$283M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$45M	−$18M	−$27M	—	—
Free cash flow	$1.2B	$1.3B	$821M	$449M	$283M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	7%	9%	7%	4%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $67M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $45M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 142.5×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.7B ÷ interest expense $12M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$865M

Net cash

Cash $1.1B − debt $247M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $865M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 17%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range 9%–62%; 45% latest = NOPAT $1.3B ÷ invested capital $2.8B

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 45% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 3%–9%; latest $1.2B = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $67M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.02×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $1.3B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 51%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $631M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B

What this means
Of $1.2B Owner Earnings, $631M (51%) went back to shareholders, $45M dividends, $586M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.67×

Expanding

Capex $113M ÷ depreciation $67M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $17.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.22×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $247M vs $1.1B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +321%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $21.85/share (latest year $28.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $82.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 4% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 9% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +19%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 19% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · 2.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −3.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$6.1B

Cash & short-term investments$916M
Receivables$4.5B
Other current assets$608M

Current liabilities$4.8B

Accounts payable$1.1B
Other current liabilities$3.7B

Current ratio1.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio—inventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio

Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$434MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$510M$510M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $722M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$2.4Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$122M

'27$98M

'28$81M

'29$67M

'30$51M

later$152M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$122Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$571Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$475Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$247M

Lease obligations (present value)$475M

Total fixed claims on the business$722M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $722M, of which the leases are 66%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$566M · 9%
Dividends$269M · 4%
Buybacks$2.6B · 40%
Retained (debt / cash)$3.1B · 47%

Returned to owners$2.8B
47% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $269M as dividends and $2.6B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$172.42
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 13M shares were bought for $2.2B, about $172.42 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $66.21 (2020) to $418.76 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $113.90 ($661M).
Net change in share count−27.0%
The diluted count fell from 61M to 45M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.00/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained44%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $884M, so each retained $1 added about 0.44 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.5B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity38%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$2.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $566M of capital spent building

$283M written down across 2 years (2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Anthony J. Guzzi	$11.0M	$14.3M	$283M
2022	Anthony J. Guzzi	$11.4M	$13.0M	$449M
2023	Anthony J. Guzzi	$11.8M	$16.3M	$848M
2024	Anthony J. Guzzi	$14.0M	$27.2M	$1.4B
2025	Anthony J. Guzzi	$14.4M	$21.4M	$1.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership0.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why EMCOR Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 26% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.5B to $4.5B while revenue grew 135%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 26% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Construction & Engineering

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PWRQuanta Services Inc.	$28.5B	14%	5.1%	8%	4%
EMEEMCOR Group	$17.0B	15%	5.1%	20%	4%
FIXComfort Systems	$9.1B	20%	6.5%	20%	6%
BLDTopBuild	$5.4B	28%	13.4%	12%	9%
IESCIES Holdings Inc.	$3.4B	19%	4.0%	17%	3%
LGNLegence Corp.	$2.6B	21%	2.4%	—	1%
AMRCAmeresco Inc.	$1.8B	19%	6.1%	8%	-10%
AGXArgan Inc.	$945M	17%	8.9%	29%	19%
Group median	—	19%	5.6%	17%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what EMCOR Group has delivered.

EMCOR Group’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, EMCOR Group earns about $710M on its 4.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($710M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.1B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+37%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+18%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.1B on 44M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net cash $660M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($115M) runs well above depreciation ($70M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh EME against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "EMCOR Group (EME), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EME, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ELV its page in the Manual EMN →

Industry order: ← DY the Construction & Engineering chapter ENGS →